



Analysis

From Siege to Staccato Strikes

26/11 Mumbai Attack to 10/11 Red Fort Blast

Published November 26, 2025

Publication No. P0545-261125

CIHS Centre for Integrated
and Holistic Studies

Analysis:

***From Siege to Staccato Strikes:
26/11 Mumbai Attack to 10/11 Red
Fort Blast***

Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies (CIHS) is a non-partisan, independent, research think tank headquartered in New Delhi, India. CIHS is dedicated to enriching individual decision making by presenting innovative ideas, fostering informed public debate, and advancing effective policy and programme development to advance humanity. Aspiring to positively shape the future of society, CIHS works to share knowledge on pressing global challenges and opportunities by fostering a ‘culture of scholarship ’and advancing informed public engagement.

Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in these publicly available briefings, factsheets, reports are correct at the time of publication. However, if you have any comments on our documents please email info@cihs.org.in

Disclaimer and Limitation of Liability: This report is for public distribution and has been furnished solely for information and must not be reproduced or redistributed to others without written consent. None can use the report as a base for any claim, demand or cause of action and, also none is responsible for any loss incurred based upon the report.

Table of Content

Abstract	05
Highlights	06
Introduction	07
Comparative Table: 26/11 vs 10/11 (Across 12 Strategic Indicators)	10
Major Pakistan-backed attacks (26 Nov 2008 to 10 Nov 2025)	14
Concluding Observations	17
References	18

Abstract

This analysis traces the evolution of Pakistan-backed terrorism against India and examines how the nature of the threat and India's response have changed over time. It showcases that India has moved from facing high-complexity, foreign directed terrorism, exemplified by 26/11, to confronting low-signature, resource-light and domestically executed yet foreign-inspired attacks, represented by 10/11 and the foiled ricin plot. Through a comparative analysis of twelve strategic indicators, the paper shows how terrorism has shifted from maritime and cross border infiltration, multi-site sieges and continuous remote command to single-point vehicle-borne IEDs, micro-cells and self-radicalised actors who exploit urban anonymity, accessible explosives and digital ecosystems. The paper further highlights that India's national security apparatus has responded by improving speed, accuracy and social depth in counterterrorism, including sharper digital intelligence, hardening of high-value urban spaces, faster forensics and community-based counter-radicalisation. Validated by a sharp decline in overall incidents and fatalities, even as the lethality and unpredictability of individual attacks remain. Finally, it situates India's experience within the global counterterrorism debate, arguing that zero tolerance for terrorism and its sponsors is now a strategic necessity and calling for a structural overhaul of the international counterterrorism architecture so that other states can match India's resolve and preparedness.

Highlights

- Pakistan-backed outfits such as LeT, JeM, HuM and their fronts like TRF, aided by the Pakistan Army and ISI, have sustained a decades-long campaign of cross-border terrorism against India.
- Between 26/11 and 10/11 Red Fort blast, terrorism against Indian metros has shifted from high-complexity, externally directed urban sieges to low-signature, resource-light, domestically executed yet foreign-inspired attacks exploiting urban anonymity and digital radicalisation.
- India's counterterrorism architecture has responded with faster network detection, stronger digital intelligence, smarter urban protective design, quicker forensics and local counter-radicalisation efforts, contributing to sharp declines in overall incidents and fatalities.
- The contemporary threat is increasingly "atomised": self-radicalised highly educated individuals and micro-cells using accessible explosives, encrypted ecosystems and even CBRN possibilities, capable of producing strategic shock despite fewer large-scale attacks.

The analysis highlights that zero tolerance for terrorism and its sponsors is a strategic necessity and calls for a structural overhaul of the global counterterrorism regime, real-time intelligence fusion, rigorous financial tracking, enforceable sanctions and stronger collective resolve to match India's preparedness.

Introduction

Pakistan-based and backed terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) have waged a persistent campaign of cross-border terrorism against India. These groups operate with full assistance and backing from Pakistani, in particular the Pakistan Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). A number of high-impact terrorist attacks during the past decades following 1993 Mumbai blasts, which killed 257 people via an ISI-enabled Dawood (D-Company) network; 2008 Mumbai siege executed by terrorists trained by the LeT that claimed 166 lives; and 2019 Pulwama suicide bombing carried out by JeM operatives killing 40 CRPF personnel. During the course of these decades, Pakistan's army and intelligence apparatus assisted infiltration routes, backed terrorist activities, funded, maintained and ran training camps primarily in Pakistan Occupied Jammu Kashmir (PoJK) and its Punjab province through narcotics sales, foreign donations and direct financial and logistical support.

The Air India IC-814 hijacking in 1999 and the Parliament attack in 2001 further highlighted ISI's operative role in organising, facilitating and coordinating anti-India terror operations, while the nature of the 1999 Kargil intrusion and aggression in Ladakh's High Himalayas revealed the scope of rogue military adventurism under Pakistani General Pervez Musharraf. Pakistan's has never denied involvement (at-least not in its parliamentary debates and testimonies of its elected members) in these attacks and has in fact shielded US designate terrorists like Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, Masood Azhar, and Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi amongst several others. In fact, Tahawwur Hussain Rana, accomplice of Mumbai terrorist attacks 2018, has admitted his presence in Mumbai throughout the 26/11 terrorist siege and acted as a "trusted agent" of the Pakistan Army, linking the carnage directly to Rawalpindi's generals.



Tahawwur Rana, after deserting his post as a former officer in the Pakistani Army, fled to the United States and eventually founded an immigration consultancy in Chicago. Rana along with his childhood friend, David Coleman Headley, a Pakistani American citizen, whose real name is Daood Gilani, based on their long-standing relationship formed a cooperation in Lashkar-e-Taiba's operations. Headley, who had completed three Lashkar-e-Taiba training cycles (Aam, Khas and an advanced commando module) under Pakistan Army supervision, became a Islamist terrorist, and used Rana's ties with the Pakistan Army and its spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), to conduct reconnaissance operations in Mumbai to examine the Taj Mahal, Oberoi, CST, and Nariman House.

Rana, currently on extradition in India, during questioning has named Major Iqbal, LeT operations Chief Sajid Mir and retired Major Abdul Rehman “Pasha” as the officers who synchronised scouting, financing and commando insertion, every path pointing back to Pakistan’s GHQ. His confession demolishes Islamabad’s decade-old claim that 26/11 was the work of “rogue non-state actors.”

Over time, organised cross-border attacks gave way to a combination of terrorist and religious extremism targeting civilians and security forces, especially in Jammu and Kashmir. This development was mirrored in April 2025 Pahalgam attack by the LeT-affiliated group The Resistance Front (TRF), another US designated global terrorist grouping having affiliation with the LeT from Pakistan. ISI's involvement in recruiting and training, flow of weaponry and financial assistance, propaganda through media networks and Pakistan's dual-track strategy of official denial, false victims of terror narratives combined with persistent covert asymmetrical warfare against India were some of the trends that persisted over these decades.

Over the last seventeen years between 26/11 Mumbai terror attack (2008) and 10/11 Red Fort vehicle blast in Delhi (2025), there has been a drastic shift in the nature, scope and operational logic of terrorism targeting metropolitan centers in India. One of the most advanced state-assisted terrorist assaults ever carried out on Indian territory was the 26/11 Mumbai attacks in 2008, which involved a well-planned, seaborne urban siege with several assault teams that were



Kuber Boat, used by terrorists

trained, armed, launched and remotely controlled from Pakistan. Following a terrorist maritime insertion, nine terrorists infiltrated Mumbai's coastline and dispersed throughout the city, carrying out simultaneous mass shootings, arson, and hostage situations at prominent civilian and symbolic locations like the Oberoi Trident, Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, CST railway terminus and Nariman House. They used AK-series rifles, grenades and RDX-based IEDs with military accuracy, killing between 166-175 people and injuring over 300 over the period of about 60 hours. In addition to killing and spreading fear, the operation's scope, tactical discipline and command-and-control assistance from handlers on the other side of the border revealed a well-planned act of cross-border terrorism that aimed to psychologically destroy India's financial capital and test the robustness of its national security framework.

10/11 Red Fort blast in Delhi (2025) served as a glaring reminder of how even low-budget, low-manpower terror tactics may cause disproportionate harm. In this instance, a car loaded with ammonium-nitrate-based explosives was fleeing close to the Red Fort complex, one of India's iconic political and historical landmarks. This resulted in a unplanned explosion that killed significant number of civilians and disrupted the city's sense of security. The trigger was Indian Government and its security forces crackdown on terror that had left terrorist operatives radicalised by Pakistan in a state of panic.



Red Fort Blast-10/11

Comparative Table: 26/11 vs 10/11 (Across 12 Strategic Indicators)

This table places the 26/11 Mumbai attacks and the 10/11 New Delhi blast side by side across twelve strategic indicators to show how India's terror threat has evolved. It tracks the shift from foreign-directed, high-complexity urban siege to compact, lower-signature attacks driven by domestic radicalisation. Read together, the indicators offer a rapid diagnostic of how tactics, sponsorship and vulnerabilities have changed over seventeen years.

Indicator	26/11 Mumbai (2008)	10/11 Delhi (2025)	Strategic Meaning
Nature of Attack	Multi-site siege, involving armed assault teams	Single VBIED blast near Red Fortt	Shift from high-complexity to minimal-footprint attacks
Casualties	166 dead, 300+ injured	Dozens injured (13 dead)	Lower casualties but similar symbolic impact
Attacker Type	10 trained foreign terrorists (Lashkar-e-Taiba)	1-3 perpetrators, domestic, self-radicalised	Radicalisation moves inside borders
Weapons Used	Military-grade AK-47 rifles, grenades, RDX-based IEDs	ANFO car bomb/ IED	Terror moves to accessible low-level explosives
Logistics	Very high, maritime infiltration, handlers, scouting, multi-team operations	Low to moderate, local vehicle procurement, low signature explosive materials	Detection becomes harder due to minimal signatures
External Sponsorship	Strong Pakistan-link support via LeT handlers	No evidence of direct foreign direction; points to lone actor/small cell radicalisation	Terror becomes decentralised and harder to attribute
Command Structure	Real time instructions from remote handlers abroad	Self-directed or small group planning; digital self-radicalisation footprints	Traditional C2 disruption less effective

Indicator	26/11 Mumbai (2008)	10/11 Delhi (2025)	Strategic Meaning
Duration	60+ hours across multiple sites	Seconds long execution; single detonation event	Terror aims for fast shock, not prolonged battles
Target Type	High-density civilian spaces, luxury hotels, train station, Jewish center	Iconic national monument (Red Fort), symbolic political target	Symbolism constant, methods evolve
Forensics/Detection	Multiple forensic trails: satellite phones, GPS, maritime tracks, VoIP handlers	Primarily digital forensics: CCTV, mobile traces, online video manifesto, vehicle residue	Police must pivot to digital-first investigation
Tactical Objective	International spectacle through siege drama and hostage crisis	Symbolic disruption with minimum footprint and fast detonation	Islamist messaging still central
Challenge	Identify and dismantle external networks, intercept maritime routes, state-level sponsorship	Detect lone-wolf radicalisation, regulate precursor chemicals, urban explosive mitigation	Intelligence paradigms must shift

Taken as a whole, the comparison shows that while casualties have reduced, the strategic intent and symbolic Islamist targeting remain constant. The centre of gravity has moved from cross border infiltration and foreign handlers to local radicalisation, accessible explosives and digital footprints, which are harder to pre-empt. The table therefore underlines the need for a renewed intelligence paradigm that focuses on lone actors, small modules, precursor controls and rapid protection of mass civilian and iconic sites.

While security scenario for India's metropolitan centers has changed from high-intensity, externally directed urban warfare to low-signature, locally enabled terror attempts between the 26/11 Mumbai attacks in 2008 and 10/11 Red Fort blast in 2025. Mumbai was a classic foreign-infiltrated, foreign-trained terrorist attack that included international objectives, multi-site sieges, mass casualty intent and 60 hours of continuous operational control. In contrast, the Red Fort blast demonstrates a new operational logic: a single-point VBIED employing locally sourced, homemade explosives; a narrower window for execution and a growing profile of "white-collar radicalisation" as opposed to cross-border terrorists. 10/11 is a change toward

deniable, resource-light, symbol-focused operations that take advantage of home vulnerabilities and urban congestion, whereas 26/11 aimed worldwide spectacle and strategic paralysis. This development highlights how India's counterterrorism issue has evolved from stopping foreign infiltration to interfering with scattered, adaptable and frequently domestic micro-cells that function within the urban fabric.

According to preliminary investigations the panic blast in Delhi was Islamist in nature, wherein self-radicalised individuals with the help of a small group, locally embedded network that was skilled at making use of urban anonymity, digital echo chambers and low-footprint logistics rather than a huge, externally organised module. The incident highlighted the changing terror threat landscape, where ideologically motivated lone actors and micro-cells can accomplish strategic shock without the characteristics of a traditional foreign-backed operation because of easily accessible bomb-making materials and online radicalisation pipelines. This, coupled with ricin foiled terror plot raised severe concerns for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) terrorism around the world.



Low-footprint Logistics- Red Fort Blast

This change has important ramifications for counter-radicalisation tactics, urban security architecture, intelligence collection and India's zero tolerance stance in the international counter-terror discourse. With the Modi government in power, the total number of terror events and fatalities in India decreased significantly in the past decades according to India's Ministry of Home Affairs ([MHA](#)) data. In addition, the number of terrorist occurrences decreased to 2,242 between 2014 and 2024 from 7,217 between 2004 and 2024. Overall death toll dropped by 70% over this time, civilian fatalities dropped by 81% and security personnel injuries dropped by 50%. The lethality of individual attacks and the variety of techniques used, however, continue to change even when aggregate fatalities decline, according to statistics from the [Global Terrorism Index](#) and other international datasets. A reduced number of attacks

can nevertheless cause disproportionately large casualties because of tactics like vehicle-borne bombs, CBRN attacks, suicide operations and lone-actor strikes that have boosted the destructive potential of fewer instances.

Terrorists' goals, mass casualties, spectacle and shock remained same between 26/11 and 10/11,



Mumbai Attack Casualties

inference is clear: threat has not been eliminated by the achievement of degrading existing networks; rather, it has become more affordable, faster and unpredictable. Counterterrorism needs to change to include greater resources for identifying localised radicalisation, wiser urban planning and quicker forensics

but their methods underwent a significant shift. The 10/11 Red Fort blast exemplified the contemporary trend of lower cost, decentralised, domestically executed yet foreign motivated attacks that achieved maximum symbolic impact with minimal logistic footprint, in contrast to the costly, externally enabled, multi-team urban siege of 26/11 that revealed interstate sponsorship and necessitated intricate logistics. The



Delhi Blast Casualties

Major Pakistan-backed attacks (26 Nov 2008 to 10 Nov 2025)

Date	Location (India)	Perpetrator (attributed)	Fatalities (reported)	Key Pakistan-link evidence	Modus operandi
1 26 Nov 2008	Mumbai (multiple sites: CST, Taj, Oberoi, Nariman House, Leopold Café, Cama Hospital)	Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)	175 total (including attackers); 300+ injured.	Attackers were trained/embarked from Pakistani soil; handlers traced to Pakistan; captured attacker (Ajmal Kasab) was Pakistani. Court records, international investigations and journalist forensics trace planning to LeT networks in Pakistan.	Sea-borne infiltration (boats), small assault teams, rifles/grenades, prolonged hotel sieges/hostage taking.
2 2–5 Jan 2016	Pathankot Air Force Station, Punjab	Suspected Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) / United Jihad Council (claimed by some channels)	7 security personnel + 4 militants (reports vary; several injuries)	Indian investigators trace Pakistan-based handlers / cross-border networks; JeM operatives named in Indian investigations and media.	Small team assault on airbase; prolonged close-quarters firefight, use of automatic weapons, grenades, IEDs.
3 18 Sep 2016	Uri (brigade HQ), Jammu & Kashmir	Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) (Indian attribution)	19 Indian soldiers killed; 4 attackers killed	Indian government and multiple investigations attributed planning/execution to JeM based in Pakistan / PoK; JeM is Pakistan-based and designated terrorist group.	Large-scale raid on army camp using automatic weapons and RPGs; cross-border infiltration

Date	Location (India)	Perpetrator (attributed)	Fatalities (reported)	Key Pakistan-link evidence	Modus operandi
4 14 Feb 2019	Pulwama (Lethpora), Jammu & Kashmir	Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) — attacker Adil Ahmad Dar (suicide bomber)	40 CRPF personnel (+1 bomber) killed; 35 injured	JeM publicly claimed responsibility; Indian investigations and international reporting attribute the strike to JeM (Pakistan-based).	n suspected. Vehicle-borne suicide bombing targeting a security convoy on national highway.
5 22 Apr 2025	Pahalgam (Baisaran), Jammu & Kashmir	The Resistance Force (TRF), offshoot of Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba	26 male Hindu tourists killed	Reports indicate a former soldier of Pakistan Army was tasked by the Army's Special Service Group (SSG) to join the LeT and strengthen the terror organisation's Kashmir operations. Attack led to launch Operation Sindoor by India.	Targeted attack by terrorists on Indians based on their religious identity
6 10 Nov 2025	Near Red Fort / Lal Qila metro station, New Delhi	Investigation s point to Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and linked modules (NIA/press reporting); arrests include suspects	Reported 10–15 killed (initial media mix of 8–15); 20–30+ injured (provisional figures)	Indian investigators have publicly stated links to Jaish-e-Mohammed and Pakistan-based handlers (encrypted communications, funds/handlers traced); arrests and NIA charges referenced this linkage in press releases.	Car-bomb (Hyundai i20), alleged suicide/ vehicle-borne IED; precursor seizures in Faridabad

Date	Location (India)	Perpetrator (attributed)	Fatalities (reported)	Key Pakistan-link evidence	Modus operandi
		with alleged JeM ties			linked to the network.

While the 26/11 Mumbai attack showcased India as a victim of cross-border terrorism, the 10/11 Red Fort blast highlight a more prepared national security apparatus confronting globalised Islamist violent extremism. India's counterterrorism strategy is evolving to meet new styles of violence: from spectacle to speed, from rigid hierarchies to self-activation, and from cross-border infiltration to urban obscurity. In response, India's security architecture has built in greater speed, accuracy and social depth to retain strategic advantage in a constantly shifting threat environment.

India's forward-looking security posture is visible in its quicker identification of terrorist networks, its more sophisticated digital intelligence that can detect radicalisation, recruitment and operational chatter across encrypted and open platforms, and its emphasis on urban planning and protective design that harden high-value zones without paralysing them. Rapid, technologically advanced forensics now shorten investigative cycles, while sustained funding for local counter-radicalisation initiatives strengthens community resilience, improves early warning and reduces the pool of individuals vulnerable to extremist narratives. Together, these pillars underpin a contemporary, adaptable and deterrence-oriented national security ecosystem.

India has largely blunted the era of large-scale externally directed terror; the central challenge now is the immediate, invisible and atomised terrorism of the 2020s. The attacks remain fresh in public memory, and ensuring that those responsible are punished, wherever they are based, reinforces the reality that terrorism recognises no borders. It is also a stark reminder of the enduring effects of attacks abetted by the Pakistan Army and ISI, and of the continuing need for international cooperation to confront terrorism, particularly that which emanates from Pakistani soil.

Concluding Observations:

Zero tolerance for terrorism, terrorists and their enablers is now a strategic necessity, not a lofty ideal. States must recognise that any permissiveness, whether through ideological cover, safe havens or geopolitical trade-offs, feeds a borderless menace. What is needed is a single, coherent approach that criminalises support networks, disrupts digital and financial ecosystems and imposes real costs in money and prestige on both state and non-state sponsors. The international system cannot be content with managing the fallout of terrorism; it must undertake a sustained, unyielding effort to dismantle its infrastructure.

Yet the global counterterrorism architecture remains antiquated, fragmented and ill-suited to the speed and complexity of today's threat environment. State-backed hybrid terrorist proxies, encrypted ecosystems and decentralised cells move faster than institutions designed for a pre-digital era. A major structural overhaul is required, with real-time intelligence fusion across jurisdictions, rigorous cross-border financial tracking, enforceable sanctions against state sponsors and agile international platforms able to respond to new threats without political paralysis. Without such reform, the world will continue to fight twenty-first century terrorism with twentieth century tools. India's sharpened national security edge has helped deflect large-scale attacks on its citizens; other states must display similar resolve and preparedness if they are to protect their own.

References:

Press Information Bureau

Institute for Economics & Peace

Indian security Journals

South Asia Terrorism Portal

Reuters

AP

India Today

CIHS Article “The Case Against Tahawwur Hussain Rana”



Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies (CIHS) is an non-partisan, independent, research think tank headquartered in New Delhi, India. It is committed to bringing innovative ideas to the society, fostering informed public debate, promoting good policy and programme formulation. Ultimately, enhancing individual decision-making on some of the world's most pressing issues.