Situational Analysis

Khalistani-Jamaat Joint Operations amid Minority Killings in Bangladesh

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Executive Summary

1. Khalistani support for Islamist-linked violence and minority killings in Bangladesh, and the appearance of anti-Hindu and anti-India sloganeering outside the Bangladesh High Commission in London, reiterate that this is not simply a local Western "public order" problem. It is foreign territory being utilised as an outward-facing theatre for a Pakistan-rooted, anti-India orientation, where street spectacle and digital amplification do the work of deniable pressure.

2. Apart from a small cluster of Pakistan-backed extremist networks, the overwhelming majority of Punjabis in India and abroad do not subscribe to "Khalistan." In practice, Khalistani extremism survives as an externally amplified project rather than a locally rooted mass movement, drawing its energy from overseas Pakistani army and intelligence nodes, transnational advocacy circuits, and online echo chambers rather than Punjab's social reality.

3. Khalistan has operated as a Pakistan-backed terror-proxy project against India, inheriting the logic of covert, low-intensity warfare institutionalised under Pakistan's military establishment in the Zia era. It is not a faith-driven demand; it is a political instrument engineered to internationalise pressure, inflame fault-lines, and keep India on the defensive through deniable actors.

4. The project's selective cartography exposes its artificiality, because it seeks to amputate India's Punjab while conveniently exempting Pakistan's Punjab, including the pre-Partition sacred geography central to Hindu-Sikh guru tradition, such as Nankana Sahib and Panja Sahib. This asymmetry is not an accident; it is the signature of a proxy construct rather than an authentic Punjabi Hindu-Sikh aspiration.

5. Pakistan's Khalistan-linked extremist ecosystem peaked in the 1980s and 1990s through bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and mass killings, including the 1985 Air India bombing. Its contemporary relevance, however, is sustained less by on-ground organisation than by a diaspora-driven capability that produces visibility through protest extremism, optics, vitality, and grievance entrepreneurship.

6. Bangladesh has become a useful theatre for extremists because minority killings can be rhetorically justified as "resistance" or "revenge," allowing extremism to be repackaged

as a moral drama. The strategic payoff is that a narrow extremist agenda can expand into a wider civilisational grievance script, with anti-Hindu hostility serving as the bridge into broader anti-India agitation.

7. Jamaat-e-Islami is not merely a party; it is a hardened radical Islamist movement, founded in Lahore in 1941as an Islamist project designed to reorder society through an explicitly radical conception of Islam. Its organisational DNA is mobilisation-centric, and it has repeatedly demonstrated the capacity to weaponise street power and narrative discipline against pluralist constraints.

8. Jamaat behaves like an ecosystem rather than a jurisdiction-bound actor, sustaining overseas networks that exploit Western democratic openness for legitimacy laundering, fundraising, and narrative export. These networks can present themselves as "community representation" or "rights advocacy" while circulating sectarian frames that normalise coercion and sharpen hostility toward minorities.

9. After the August 2024 regime change, the Yunus-led interim administration moved rapidly to rehabilitate Jamaat in Bangladesh's political space by revoking restrictions and signalling permissiveness, even as reported violence against Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian minorities intensified. The contradiction is stark: a Nobel laureate presiding over a period where minorities have pleaded for protection while the state's posture has projected denial, drift and selective enforcement.

10. The convergence is operational, not theological. Khalistani networks bring diaspora spectacle and anti-India optics, while Jamaat-linked ecosystems bring street violence, mobilisation grammar and overseas infrastructure. Different banners, one direction: they internationalise grievance, normalise communal hostility, especially anti-Hindu messaging and target India through deniable networks and information warfare, with Bangladesh as the churn space and London as the broadcast stage.

Reports of Khalistan-linked support for Islamist-connected agitation in Bangladesh, and the spillover into diaspora street theatre, including outside the Bangladesh High Commission in London, where demonstrators raised anti-Hindu and anti-India slogans, cannot be read in isolation from the central fact on the ground: *minorities in Bangladesh are being killed and terrorised*. Since the political transition and Yunus-led interim administration took charge in August 2024, credible reporting has documented a recurring pattern of mob violence and targeted killings affecting Hindus and other minorities, with incidents repeatedly rationalised through convenient pretexts such as "blasphemy" allegations or local disputes. Against this backdrop, the London optics are not "community protest" but the export of a domestic human-rights emergency into an international propaganda theatre. However, it is equally important to separate this engineered agitation from real community sentiment: apart from a small cluster of Pakistan-backed extremist networks, the overwhelming majority of Punjab's Hindus and Sikhs do not subscribe to "Khalistan." What is taking shape instead is a narrow but loud international nexus, Khalistani and Jamaat-linked actors, amplified through Pakistan-rooted diaspora circuits seeking to internationalise grievance, normalise anti-Hindu sentiment and redirect the Bangladesh crisis into a broader anti-India campaign, even as Bangladesh's minorities continue to pay the price in blood under a Nobel laureate's watch.

Khalistan - Pakistan's Deniable Proxy Against India

An overwhelming majority of Punjabi's in India and outside do not subscribe to the idea of "Khalistan." Khalistan represents an imagined political construct envisioned to be carved out of India's Punjab, devoid of any theological or scriptural legitimacy within the Guru tradition of Punjab, a spiritual heritage shared and revered by both Dharmic faiths Hindus and Sikhs.

Khalistan has largely functioned as an instrument of Pakistan's proxy policy against India, a doctrine given operational form under 1970s Pakistani military dictator Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq through covert, low-intensity warfare and terrorist proxies. The irony of this design lies in its selective cartography: while it seeks to amputate India's Punjab, it conveniently excludes Pakistan's Punjab, the pre-partition heartland of Hindu-Sikh Guru traditions. Home to sacred sites such as Nankana Sahib and Panja Sahib. This asymmetry exposes the project's artificiality: a political tool masked as a religious cause, serving Pakistan's long-standing "bleed India through a thousand cuts" doctrine rather than any authentic Punjabi Sikh aspiration. Another hideous and dreadful element from the same playbook has been the attempt to instigate and

amplify extremist currents, including efforts to stoke Zia's‘ Kashmir-and-Khalistan ’(K2) policy by nurturing terrorist nodes and sustaining external propaganda ecosystems around India's Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab.

Pakistan's Khalistan extremist network attained its peak in the 1980s and 1990s, a violent campaign involving bombings, assassinations, kidnappings and mass killings, resulting in nearly 22,000 deaths, including about 12,000 civilians. In 1985, Khalistani extremists based in Canada bombed an Air India flight from Toronto to New Delhi, killing all 329 people on board, including 82 children (below age 13), marking the deadliest terrorist attack in Canadian history.

Today, Khalistan finds little to no resonance in Punjab itself; whatever residual visibility it retains is sustained largely by a globalised online echo chamber; diaspora amplification, algorithmic outrage cycles, and transnational propaganda networks rather than local mass sentiment. Its recent foray into Bangladesh, especially attempts to frame violence against Bangladeshi Hindus as ‟resistance” or ‟revenge,” signals something darker: a politics of enmity, not emancipation. It is less a credible separatist programme than an exported rhetoric of grievance that seeks to widen the target set, normalise communal cruelty, and transmit a message to India that the intent is escalation, not upholding a rights based order.

A Milewski research published by the Macdonald Laurier Institute details how Pakistan backed the Khalistan extremists by exploiting Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs to avenge its 1971 defeat. It notes that Pakistan viewed Khalistan as a strategic buffer that would sever India's land access to Kashmir, a long-standing objective of the Pakistani military. Intelligence reports indicate that the ISI is supporting Khalistani extremists in a massive social media campaign, using Facebook and Instagram to reach young Sikhs with a false narrative of alleged ‘suppression’ and ‘atrocities’ in India. A Hudson Institute report, Pakistan’s Destabilization Playbook: Khalistani Activism, warns that Pakistan’s intelligence agency may be linked to Khalistan agitation in the US. It notes a recent surge in ‘anti-India Khalistan-related activism’ and highlights the significant risk of such groups receiving funding, support and training from Pakistan.

Jamaat-e-Islami- Bangladesh Node in a Wider Islamist Ecosystem

While Pakistan-backed Khalistani extremist networks injected anti-Hindu and anti-India slogans into London’s protest theatre, Jamaat-e-Islami, a pan-regional Islamist movement with

a long ideological lineage and a recurring footprint on counter-terror radars has its own ecosystem for converting its ideological objectives into transnational agitation. Jamaat is best understood not merely as a Bangladeshi party, but as an ideological movement whose roots trace back to Lahore (1941), founded by Syed Abul Ala Maududi as a core project to reorder society through an explicitly radical conception of Islam. In Bangladesh, Jamaat's project has repeatedly collided with the country's constitutional DNA: in 2013, a court found its registration incompatible with Bangladesh's secular constitution, effectively pushing it out of electoral politics and triggering violent street reactions by its members. Its historical baggage is darker still. Multiple senior Jamaat leaders were convicted by Bangladesh's war-crimes tribunal for atrocities linked to 1971 Bangladesh Genocide, then East Pakistan, and several were executed. episodes that hardened Jamaat's reputation as a movement willing to weaponise ideology and street power when challenged.

What matters operationally is that Jamaat is not confined to one jurisdiction; it behaves like an ecosystem. In India, the Government of India continues to proscribe Jamaat-e-Islami (Jammu & Kashmir) as an "unlawful association" under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), extending the ban again in February 2024. Internationally, the movement's adjacency to violent proxy architectures is not theoretical: U.S. counter-terror profiles describe Hizbul Mujahideen, a designated terrorist group, as the terrorist wing of Jamaat-e-Islami, illustrating how political-Jihadi infrastructure can intersect with armed networks.

After Sheikh Hasina fell victim to regime change and the August 2024 transition, the Nobel laureate Yunus-led interim administration moved quickly to rehabilitate Jamaat in Bangladesh's political space, most notably by revoking the ban imposed under anti-terror provisions and removing restrictions on the party. This political reset unfolded alongside violent and heinous attacks on Bangladesh's Hindu, Buddhist and Christian minorities; rights groups urged the interim authorities to act decisively to protect minorities and end the cycle of mob violence and impunity. However, the noble laureate instead chose to further the Islamist agenda and remained in denial.

This is the connective tissue to London. When protests outside the Bangladesh High Commission over minority killings were disrupted by Khalistani counter-mobilisation, complete with anti-India and anti-Hindu sloganeering, it revealed how different extremist milieus can cohabit the same diaspora stage and feed the same informational ecosystem. Jamaat's ideological machinery thrives in precisely this environment: a globalised grievance

market where violence can be repackaged as "resistance," minorities can be framed as legitimate targets, and local crises can be exported as transnational propaganda. The outcome is not reform or reconciliation; it is the consolidation of a portable, networked hostility in which anti-minority animus and anti-India narratives reinforce each other across borders.

Anti-India Convergence: Khalistani and Jamaat Ecosystems, Pakistan Roots

Both Khalistani and Jamaat-linked agitation ultimately draw from Pakistan-rooted ecosystems, not as organic mass movements, but as instruments that fit Islamabad's long-running proxy logic. The convergence is not ideological unity so much as a shared operational rationality: two different mobilising projects, each with its own origin story and constituency claims, learning that they become more effective when they occupy the same information space, target the same adversary image, and recycle each other's frames. What looks like a chaotic collage of slogans and street protests is, in practice, ideology based politics in the contemporary age.

How the Khalistani–Jamaat alignment works

Strand	What it *is*	What it *does*	Where it converges	Why it matters
Khalistani extremist networks	A Pakistan-nurtured proxy project that has repeatedly sought to internationalise anti-India discourse.	Operates as a diaspora-centric mobilisation vehicle: transnational Pakistan-linked nodes, digital amplification, stage-managed protest theatre.	Inserts itself into Bangladesh's minority-violence moment and then shows up on diaspora stages-e.g., disruption of a London protest outside the Bangladesh High Commission.	Converts limited ground resonance into outsized geopolitical noise, while widening targets via Islamabad-centric frames.
Jamaat-e-Islami ecosystem	A Maududi-rooted Islamist movement built for cadre mobilisation and ideological capture (beyond electoral politics).	Provides the mobilisation grammar of radical Islamist way: street violence, narrative, coercive majoritarian permissibility.	Bangladesh becomes the churn space (street power + permissive climate); Western cities become the broadcast stage (visibility + legitimacy laundering).	Normalises the logic that minorities can be punished and violence can be rhetorically laundered as "resistance."

Yunus paradox	A Nobel laureate heading the interim administration since 8 Aug 2024.	Rapid political rehabilitation of Jamaat: ban revoked (28 Aug 2024), restoring room for the movement amid a volatile transition.	The state's moral authority ("Nobel") becomes a shield for international complacency while street power hardens at home.	The "peace" brand doesn't protect minorities; it can soften external scrutiny at exactly the wrong time.
Real-world cost: minorities	A pattern of reported minority-targeted killings and mob violence since Yunus assumed office.	Violence repeatedly disguised as "public anger" or "law and order," (for ex; Bangladesh Foreign ministry brief) creating predictable impunity.	The blood becomes content; the content becomes mobilisation fuel; mobilisation spills onto London-style stages.	This is the core human-rights emergency, everything else is theatre built on top of bodies.

Khalistani extremism operates primarily as a diaspora-centric mobilisation vehicle, whose contemporary influence is driven less by local organisational receptiveness in Punjab and more by Pakistan-backed transnational networks and digital amplification. Its centre of gravity is not Punjab's ground reality but the ability to manufacture visibility, through diaspora stagecraft, social-media amplification, and episodic "relevance injections" by attaching itself to external flashpoints. That is why Bangladesh matters to this ecosystem. By inserting itself into the narrative of violence and minority targeting in Bangladesh, then echoing or amplifying rhetoric that frames violence as "resistance" or "revenge," Khalistani agitation expands from a narrow core extremist agenda into a broader grievance script. The strategic payoff is scale: a cause that struggles to command ground resonance can be repackaged as a global "rights" drama, while keeping its core function intact; anti-India and anti-Hindu agitation.

Jamaat, by contrast, is valuable because it provides the mobilisation grammar of radical Islam: ideological framing, street activation, and the normalisation of coercive majoritarian politics under the language of moral struggle. In a transitional or weak-enforcement environment, that grammar is especially potent because it shifts the boundary of what becomes publicly permissible. Once minorities are cast as legitimate "targets of anger" and violence is rhetorically laundered as retaliation, the threshold for collective cruelty drops. The outcome is not simply episodic violence; it is a climate where intimidation becomes routine and impunity becomes predictable, conditions that then generate exportable narratives for liberals and diaspora mobilisation.

And Jamaat's export capacity is not incidental; it is structural. It has long cultivated Islamist-jihadi ecosystems abroad that thrive inside Western democracies precisely because those

democracies are open. The freedoms of association, speech, charity formation, campus organising, and diaspora lobbying become a force multiplier: networks can present themselves as "community representation" or "rights advocacy" while pushing a hardline ideological agenda, laundering sectarian frames into respectable language, and packaging domestic coercion as moral protest. This is not a side story; it is how a local agitation acquires global reach without bearing the costs of operating under tighter scrutiny at home. This is the mechanism of convergence. Khalistani networks supply a global megaphone that can turn local episodes into an international spectacle; Jamaat supplies a justificatory framework that can turn violence into a story of "resistance," and an overseas ecosystem that can broadcast it through Western institutions and platforms. When those two logics meet, Bangladesh as the churn space, London as the broadcast stage, the same pattern repeats. Events are stripped of local complexity and repackaged into portable grievance; perpetrators are softened into "protesters" or "Students"; victims are recoded as provocateurs; and the political message is redirected toward India. The targets align even when the banners differ: anti-Hindu hostility becomes an acceptable register of mobilisation, and anti-India agitation becomes the organising principle.

Crucially, this alignment thrives on deniability. It does not require a single command chain or formal coalition. It works through adjacency and reinforcement: shared information ecosystems, co-located protests, mutually amplifying narratives, and overlapping influencer networks that make each ecosystem appear larger than it is. The architecture is networked rather than hierarchical, which is precisely what makes it resilient. Disrupt one node and the message still travels; delegitimise one banner and the frame reappears under another; challenge one claim and the outrage cycle simply migrates to a new theatre.

Different banners, same strategic direction: internationalise grievance, normalise communal hostility, especially anti-Hindu messaging and pressure India through deniable networks and information warfare. In that sense, the "Khalistan–Jamaat" overlap is best read as a convergence of functions, Khalistani extremist spectacle plus Islamist mobilisation grammar, backed by overseas ecosystem-building, into a single transnational agitation space. The end state is not emancipation or rights; it is strategic disruption: exporting instability, manufacturing communal friction, and keeping India permanently on the defensive across multiple fronts, with the sponsors insulated by distance, intermediaries, and plausible deniability.

Minority Rights and Issue of Selective Advocacy:

The core story isn't "narratives" in London, it's bodies on the ground in Bangladesh. Since Muhammad Yunus took charge of the interim administration on 8 August 2024, minority communities have faced a recurring pattern of targeted violence and mob criminality, often dressed up with convenient pretexts ("blasphemy", "extortion", "theft") and then waved away as ordinary law-and-order issues. The bitter irony is hard to miss: a Nobel Peace Prize laureate presiding over a moment where minorities are pleading for protection while perpetrators act with growing confidence that the system will blink first.

Date (incident)	Victim(s)	Community targeted	Location	Details
2024-09-21	At least 4 men	Ethnic minorities / Buddhist communities in CHT	Khagrachhari & Rangamati (Chittagong Hill Tracts)	Sectarian violence led to at least four ethnic minority deaths; homes/businesses attacked; Buddhist temples targeted.
2024-08-06	Mrinal Kanti Chatterjee	Hindu	Bagerhat Sadar	A retired schoolteacher killed in his home just two days before the interim government officially took oath, during the immediate post-regime change violence
2025-04-17	Bhabesh Chandra Roy	Hindu	Biral, Dinajpur	A *Hindu* community leader and local Puja Udjapan Parishad vice-president. He was abducted and beaten to death; his body was recovered near his home.
2025-12-02	Prantosh Kormokar	Hindu	Raipura, Narsingdi	A 42-year-old gold trader. He was lured out of his home on the pretext of business and shot dead in a nearby school playground.
2025-12-02	Utpol Sarkar	Hindu	Saltha, Faridpur	A 35-year-old fish trader. He was intercepted by assailants while traveling to a market and hacked to death in an open field.

2025-12-07	Yogesh Chandra Roy	Hindu	Taraganj, Rangpur	A 75-year-old Freedom Fighter (Muktijoddha) and retired headmaster. He was found with his throat slit in his home
2025-12-07	Surbana Roy	Hindu	Taraganj, Rangpur	60-year-old wife of Yogesh Chandra Roy. She was killed alongside her husband in their home; her throat was also slit.
2025-12-18	Dipu Chandra Das	Hindu	Bhaluka, Mymensingh	Lynched by Islamists linked to Jammat; He was beaten and set on fire after accusations of blasphemy.
2025-12-25	Amrit Mondal (Samrat)	Hindu	Pangsha, Rajbari	Beaten to death by a mob over an extortion allegation, per police/press reporting.
2025-12-29	Bajendra Biswas	Hindu	Bhaluka, Mymensingh	He was shot dead inside a garment factory. Incident occurred in the same area as Dipu Das's killing.
2026-01-03 (after 2025-12-31 attack)	Khokon Chandra Das	Hindu	Damudya, Shariatpur	Assaulted and set on fire; later died in hospital from injuries, per Bangladeshi reporting.
2026-01-05	Rana Pratap Bairagi	Hindu	Monirampur (Jashore)	Shot dead at close range after being called out from his premises; also linked to local journalism work.
2026-01-05	Sharat Chakraborty (Mani)	Hindu	Palash, Narsingdi	Hacked to death near his home gate after closing his shop.
Early Jan 2026 (reported)	Mithun Sarkar	Hindu	Mahadebpur, Naogaon	Died after jumping into a canal while fleeing a pursuing group over theft allegations.

Major killings of minorities since 8 Aug 2024

A recurring feature of Jamaat-linked Islamist violence against minorities, especially Hindus, is that the street-level perpetrators are often drawn from Jamaat's own mobilisation ecosystem, including its student/youth wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, which has repeatedly been identified by minority community leaders as the frontline cadre in waves of attacks on Hindu homes and temples. In documented testimony that also cites Bangladeshi minority organisations, leaders of the Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council and the Bangladesh Puja Udjapan Parishad have explicitly held Jamaat-e-Islami and Islami Chhatra Shibir responsible for lethal, coordinated attacks on minorities, describing the violence as deliberate and organised rather than incidental disorder.

A consistent feature across these cases is the rhetorical minimisation of targeted violence. Incidents are routinely characterised as crowd disorder, spontaneous "public anger," or ordinary disputes, despite clear indicators of minority targeting and a repeated causal sequence that runs from accusation to collective mobilisation and, too often, to fatal attack. The case of Dipu Chandra Das captures this moral collapse in its most grotesque form: credible reporting indicates he was attacked by a mob following a blasphemy allegation, beaten with extreme cruelty, and set on fire—an act designed not merely to kill, but to terrorise and to broadcast a message of collective vulnerability to the wider Hindu community. This is precisely how an informal doctrine of impunity takes shape: no policy needs to be announced, because euphemism, selective enforcement, and procedural delay are enough to normalise the expectation that minorities can be attacked in public spectacle and that accountability will arrive late, if at all.

Concluding Observations

The picture that emerges is not a chance overlap but an operational alignment that fits a familiar Pakistan-rooted logic of deniable pressure. Khalistani extremist nodes supply diaspora spectacle and anti-India optics, while Jamaat-linked ecosystems supply the mobilisation grammar of political Islam and the infrastructure to convert local violence into exportable agitation. Different banners, one direction. The strategic utility is obvious: keep India permanently on the defensive through transnational narrative warfare, while using Bangladesh's volatility as a churn space where anti-minority hostility can be normalised and then broadcast outward.

The most damning contradiction is the “noble halo” problem. Under a Nobel-branded interim leadership, the world’s scrutiny softens at precisely the moment minorities need protection most. Yet the ground truth remains brutal: Hindus continue to bear the sharpest edge of targeted violence, and Islamists have long treated Hindus as a worldwide civilisational target—useful both as scapegoats at home and as symbols in a broader ideological conflict. In Bangladesh, Jamaat’s jihadi ideas and street ecosystem feed this permissive climate, while Western democracies become the playground that multiplies its reach, through diaspora organisation, legitimacy laundering, and digital amplification. Pakistan’s role, meanwhile, remains the steady throughline: enabling, nudging, and exploiting these networks as instruments of proxy agitation, even as minorities pay in blood and the rest of the world is distracted by slogans.

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