Freedom House’s Western Biases, Methodological Flaws & Lack of Understanding of India’s Democratic Realities
N. C. Bipindra
American think tank Freedom House’s latest 2026 annual report rates India as “Partly Free” with a score of 62 on maximum 100 points.

This has once again triggered a debate on how global democracy indexes assess nations, particularly large and complex ones like India.
The report posits India within the broader narrative that Freedom House is building off twenty-year global decline in freedoms.
A closer look at the assessment shows that Freedom House conclusions rest on methodological limitations, normative biases and insufficient contextualisation of India’s democratic ecosystem.
The Freedom House’s methodological framing aggregates diverse indicators such as political rights, civil liberties, media freedom and minority protection into a single numerical score.
While Freedom House may be targeting simplicity while quantifying the complex study, this clearly risks obscuring the immense heterogeneity of India’s federal structure.
India’s governance standards, political competition and civil liberties vary significantly in different states and the entire nation is not universally governed by one single political formation or a uniform demographic composition.
India is not a monolithic political entity but a vast and layered democracy of over 1.4 billion people. Reducing its democratic health to a single number inevitably leads to analytical compression or deviations where localised or episodic concerns are interpreted as systemic decline.
Moreover, critics have long argued that Freedom House’s framework reflects a Western and liberal template of democracy, shaped by political and historical experience of United States and Europe.
This raises questions about whether the same benchmarks can be uniformly applied to societies grappling with different challenges, including post-colonial state-building, socio-economic inequality and persistent security threats.
In India’s case, the need to balance civil liberties with national security concerns, particularly in the context of cross-border terrorism and internal insurgencies, complicates any straightforward classification.
The report’s broader claim of a continuous global decline in freedom over two decades also warrants scrutiny.
While there is no denying the rise of authoritarian tendencies in certain regions, such a sweeping narrative risks over-generalisation.
It tends to overlook democratic resilience in parts of the Global South and conflates governance challenges with democratic backsliding.
In India, visible tensions within the political system may, in fact, reflect democratic contestation rather than erosion.
A noisy, conflict-ridden public sphere is not necessarily evidence of authoritarianism; it can also indicate a system where competing interests continue to be negotiated in the open.
One of the central concerns raised by the report is the alleged harassment of journalists, civil society organisations and political opponents.
While individual cases and controversies undoubtedly exist, it is important to situate them within the broader landscape of Indian public life. India hosts one of world’s most expansive and diverse media ecosystems, spanning print, television and digital platforms.
Critical reporting on government policies is widespread and investigative journalism continues to shape public discourse.
Legal actions against media entities or non-governmental organisations are often framed in the report as politically motivated.
But in many instances, they are rooted in regulatory compliance issues, particularly concerning financial transparency and foreign funding norms. The distinction between the enforcement of law and the suppression of dissent is crucial and often blurred in external assessments.
Similarly, the claim that political opposition is under systematic pressure must be weighed against empirical realities. Opposition parties continue to win elections at the state level, govern key regions and mount significant electoral and political challenges.
The regularity of elections, high voter turnout and peaceful transitions of power underscore the continued vitality of India’s democratic framework.
Institutions such as the Election Commission of India play a central role in ensuring electoral integrity and despite criticisms, they remain broadly functional and credible.
All criticisms of India’s Election Commission haven’t stood judicial scrutiny in the last decade.
This goes on to prove that the poll body’s institutional functioning met quality standards in consonance with the constitutional framework and election laws.
The report’s emphasis on the marginalisation of minority communities, including Muslims, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, touches upon a deeply important issue. However, it is essential to distinguish between structural socio-economic inequalities and deliberate state-led democratic regression.
India’s social fabric has long been shaped by hierarchies and disparities that predate contemporary political developments.
Successive governments have implemented policies aimed at addressing these challenges, including affirmative action, targeted welfare schemes and financial inclusion initiatives.
While gaps remain and must be addressed, framing these issues solely as indicators of declining freedom risks overlooking both historical context and ongoing policy interventions.
Another area of concern highlighted in the report is the perceived weakening of political pluralism, including practices such as “resort politics” and challenges in implementation of the Right to Information framework.
Yet, these phenomena are not unique to India and are often characteristic of competitive democracies. Political manoeuvring, party defections and coalition instability are features seen in many parliamentary systems.
Crucially, such developments in India are subject to legal scrutiny and institutional oversight.
The Right to Information Act, despite implementation challenges, continues to empower citizens and remains one of the most robust transparency mechanisms globally. Isolated administrative bottlenecks do not necessarily amount to a systemic erosion of accountability.
The report also draws attention to the controversial practice of punitive demolitions, sometimes described as “bulldozer justice,” and references a 2024 ruling by the Supreme Court of India that deemed such actions unconstitutional.
While the concerns surrounding due process are valid, the very fact that the judiciary intervened to check executive overreach highlights the resilience of India’s institutional framework.
The availability of legal remedies, the role of an independent judiciary and the intensity of public debate all point to a system capable of self-correction.
Rather than indicating authoritarian drift, such episodes demonstrate the dynamic tension between different arms of the state, which is intrinsic to a functioning democracy.
A comprehensive evaluation of India must also take into account the scale and complexity of its electoral processes. Regular elections involving hundreds of millions of voters are conducted with remarkable logistical efficiency.
Voter participation remains consistently high, reflecting public trust in the democratic process. The system’s ability to accommodate diverse political actors, from national parties to regional formations, underscores the depth of political pluralism.
Ultimately, the Freedom House report raises important questions, but its conclusions about India appear to be shaped by selective emphasis and insufficient contextual grounding.
By focusing disproportionately on areas of concern while underplaying institutional strengths and democratic resilience, the report presents a skewed picture.
India’s democracy is undeniably imperfect, as are all democracies, but it is also robust, adaptive and deeply participatory. The challenge, therefore, lies not in dismissing criticism outright but in engaging with it through a more nuanced lens. External assessments must move beyond one-size-fits-all frameworks and recognise the diversity of democratic experiences.
In India’s case, what may appear as disorder or friction is often the byproduct of a vibrant and contested public sphere, where multiple voices continue to find expression.
In conclusion, the classification of India as “Partly Free” says more about the limitations of the evaluative framework than it does about the country itself.
A more balanced approach would acknowledge both the areas requiring reform and the enduring strengths of India’s democratic institutions.
Without such a balance, global indexes risk losing credibility and failing to capture the true complexity of democracy in the 21st century.
(Author is Chairman, Law and Society Alliance, a New Delhi-based think tank, and guest columnist with CIHS)