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Foiled Mass-Shooting Plot Against a Hindu Temple: A Global Warning

A terrifying warning about the perils of white supremacist extremism, anti-Indian bigotry, and Hinduphobia is provided by the arrest of a 19-year-old man in Illinois over an alleged mass shooting plot targeting a Hindu centre of worship in Aurora. Because the suspect possessed firearms and ammunition, documented violent intents and extreme sentiments directed at Indians and other minority people, investigators say the case is very concerning.

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104

Belling The Bellingcat-Exposing Its Advocacy by Implication

Dr. Aniket Pingley Bellingcat’s investigation of two US charities, Sewa International USA and Ekal Foundation, finds “no evidence” of wrongdoing, yet it is built to leave the opposite impression by invoking the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. This rebuttal reads that subtext line by line.https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2026/10/06/dafs-india-rss-donations/ Before anything else, readers should hold two facts about the Bellingcat article in view. Its title is “Groups Associated With India’s Far-Right Receive Millions Through US Donor-Advised Funds.” A little way into the text, the authors write: “There is no evidence that DAF grants funded the RSS, only that they went to organisations that appear to have connections with the RSS.” I ask readers to keep that sentence in mind through everything that follows. An organisation whose stated aim is to build people for constructive work in every field of life, and which has pursued that aim for a century, will naturally have a wide network of individuals. The diaspora, too, will carry that network abroad, sustained by strong cultural ties to India. Participation in many sectors is not infiltration; it is what service produces. The RSS is a body of individuals, not a registered entity, and Indian law permits that. It openly calls India a Hindu nation, as any civilisational movement may state its idea of itself. A US commission can call for sanctions, and the RSS will keep its course. What cannot be sustained is the practice of painting it as sinister, openly or through subtext, and then stigmatising everyone associated with it. Bellingcat’s article follows a familiar method for raising alarm about the RSS. It first labels the organisation “far-right,” then brings in an expert’s opinion, and finally tells readers that nearly a hundred US politicians have pledged to refuse funding from RSS-linked groups. What it leaves out, however, is that the pledge was announced in the context of the RSS chief delivering the message of Universal Oneness at an interfaith gathering in New York. Let me state my position at the outset. Bellingcat’s article is designed to unsettle the sponsors of donor-advised funds, and it does so through what I call advocacy by implication. Just as it deliberately leaves out the context of “Universal Oneness,” saying less than it knows, I will show how its broader hypothesis is itself out of context. The article masquerades as investigative journalism while employing a sophisticated form of dog-whistling. I will take it apart step by step. A donor-advised fund exists to make charitable giving simpler, more consolidated and more sustained over time. One qualification the article leaves out is that a donor can attach a purpose to a grant recommendation. Such restricted grants are common and tend to be larger: the DAF Research Collaborative’s 2024 national study found that restricted grants were generally of higher value. In charitable giving, the donor’s conscience comes first. Can Bellingcat show that any of these donors was seeking out RSS-specific projects? It cannot, and the article says as much: “There is no evidence that DAF grants funded the RSS, only that they went to organisations that appear to have connections with the RSS.” That sentence is the escape hatch. The article reports that all of Ekal USA’s foreign grants during 2020–2024 went to the Ekal Vidyalaya school projects in India. So what does this insinuation offer the sponsors, whose business is to administer these funds for a fee? The article analyses the period from 2020 to 2024 without addressing the context of those years: 2020 and 2021 were the pandemic years. It is reasonable to ask how much of the giving during that period went towards buying, shipping and installing oxygen concentrators in India. Oxygen has no ideological spectrum; it is the same for the far-right, the centre and the far-left. According to Sewa USA’s own reporting, more than 87% of the DAF funds it received during this period came in the two pandemic years. As I said earlier, in charitable giving, the donor’s conscience comes first, and bringing the RSS into the story will not change what moves a donor. If Bellingcat wants to invoke the RSS, it should also look at the record of how Indian law-and-order authorities enlisted RSS volunteers for last-mile delivery during the pandemic. This is where the article’s coding is most refined. The passage reads: “Some DAF sponsor organisations have previously faced criticism for granting money to charities that have promoted homophobic, anti-immigrant or anti-Muslim views.” The article never says which charities those descriptions refer to. By placing this passage alongside its discussion of two charities it calls “linked” to the RSS, it invites readers to read the RSS into the list. The advocacy by implication continues. The article quotes Professor Brunson as saying that DAF sponsors “absolutely have the right and ability” to halt the processing of donations to certain organisations. Placed here, the quote tells sponsors that, because their grants reach charities “linked” to the RSS, they are free to pause them. No sentence says so. The implication does the work. That is advocacy by implication. So, what is Bellingcat’s article for? Not for the charities, which it accuses of nothing. Not for the reader, who is handed a set of figures and infographics without a basis for comparison. Its only remaining reader who can act is the sponsor. A label, an expert and a count of politicians tell these readers what to call the groups, how to feel about them, and that others have already taken a position. A passage about sponsors “criticised” for funding charities associated with hateful views, followed by a reference to the ability to halt DAF transactions, tells them that their peers have acted and that the decision is theirs. The article’s gravest fault is not any single sentence. It is the kind of knowing it models. The Bhagavad Gita has a name for it. In the eighteenth chapter, Krishna describes three grades of knowledge. The highest sees one undivided reality running through all that appears divided. The lowest, tāmasa jñāna, is knowledge that “clings to

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102

Why Starlink Is Not a Telecom Story Alone

India needs better connectivity. It should not pay for it with strategic independence. Dr. Nitin Sharma India is at a crossroads. It must now take tough decisions and take them without bowing to pressure from anyone. Satellite internet can reach remote villages, mountain regions and underserved communities. But one question has got far less attention than it deserves. Who will control that connectivity? Starlink has secured a key regulatory foothold in India. Commercial services still need spectrum assignment and security clearance. While we wait, the debate is about speed, price and competition. Those matter. They are not the most important issues. India has sensitive borders. It faces complex internal security challenges. Satellite communication cannot be treated as just another telecom service. The real question is not whether Starlink can deliver faster internet. It probably can. The question is whether India should let a strategic layer of its communications depend on a foreign private company. Its satellites, technology and final decisions sit outside our control. We have faced this dilemma before. The lesson of Kargil In 1999, during the Kargil war with Pakistan, India sought GPS data for the region from the United States. USA took the side of Pakistan and refused to make the GPS data available. Indian side was left in dark, and it became even harder for us to win that war. The exact details remain a subject of debate. The lesson was clear. A country cannot assume that technology owned by another nation will be there when its security is at stake. India responded by building its own regional navigation system, NavIC (Navigation with Indian Constellation). That was not just a science project. It was a strategic decision. It was the first step becoming “Atmanirbhar Bharat”. Navigation in war cannot depend on another country’s goodwill. Now the same question arises in communications. We spent years and public money to reduce dependence on foreign navigation. Why should we accept a similar dependence on satellite communication now? Off course this is a different time and different technology, but principle of Self-reliance and sovereignty is still the same. When one company holds the switch Starlink is an impressive achievement. Its low-earth-orbit satellites connect places where ordinary networks are hard to build or easy to damage. In Ukraine, it kept people and forces connected when networks failed. That experience also raised hard questions. Public controversies over coverage near Crimea, limits on military use and terminal activation showed how much power a private provider can hold in a conflict. The point is not that Starlink failed Ukraine. It helped a great deal. The point is who decides. Imagine India’s security relying on a network where a company’s leadership, foreign rules or another government’s interests can shape decisions. Could India guarantee uninterrupted service? Could it stop remote restrictions? If there is a dispute, whose instructions prevail? A commercial contract cannot answer these questions. National security needs real control over critical capabilities. Even Europe wants its own network India is not alone in this thinking. The European Union is close to the United States. Yet it is building its own secure satellite networks, IRIS² and GOVSATCOM. The aim is communications under European control for government and strategic use. Brussels has said the system is “Built in Europe, operated in Europe, under European control.” If allies of Washington want that independence, India has even more reason to examine its own position. Strategic autonomy is not distrust. It is the recognition that national interests are supreme in all situations. Governments change. Policies change. Even commercial ties can become tools of pressure. A mature country plans for that before a crisis. The security risk is real This is not only about future wars. In late 2024, Starlink equipment was recovered in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and in Manipur. Security agencies took notice. India deals with cross-border infiltration, insurgency and trafficking. Unauthorised satellite terminals entering through porous borders deserves serious scrutiny. Elon Musk said Starlink beams were switched off over India. Questions remain unanswered then how these devices found in Manipur actually was working. Some reports suggested they could have connected through services available in neighboring territory. Those claims are not conclusively established. The incidents still exposed a real challenge. A satellite network does not rely only on towers and cables inside our territory. The satellites are overhead. The control systems may be thousands of kilometers away. Software, terminal approvals and service limits can be managed remotely. There is more. Reports said Indian authorities struggled to get ownership details for a seized terminal. In normal times, that is a privacy dispute. In a sensitive border zone, delay can be dangerous. India cannot be unsure who is using a terminal in a border area. India should be able to switch off a rouge device quickly and decision and real control should lie in India. We cannot be unsure about these matters. A license is not control The government has seen these risks. Conditions reportedly include data localisation, lawful interception, local monitoring, terminal identification and limits on sending sensitive data abroad. These are necessary. But rules on paper do not guarantee results. A company can open an Indian office, hire Indian staff and run gateways in India. The satellites, software and final authority can still sit with the parent company abroad. That difference matters. If a security agency needs data on a rogue terminal, will it get it under Indian law, without foreign approval? If connectivity must be cut in a border area, will the restriction hold across the network? If an international crisis pressures the provider, what protection does India really have? Approval should depend on these answers. Declarations of compliance are not enough. In strategic technology, capabilities must be tested independently. A condition is only as strong as the power to enforce it. Policy must not bend to pressure There is another issue. Independent policymaking. Musk recently attacked what he called monopolistic practices in India’s telecom market. The Ministry of Communications immediately rejected the claim. It

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131

Deepened Identity Crisis

A national consensus be evolved on distinguishing a professional media person from activists, paid influencers to disruption mongers. K. A. Badarinath One Nadeem Ahmed Ameen who has a social media handle ‘news aina today’ circulated a fake and fabricated video of Vivek Bhagat, assistant commissioner of police that portrayed sexual conduct by the police officer. Three other women who claimed to be reporters covering October 3 NSUI protest against Chief Election commissioner alleged that there was misconduct on the part of Delhi Police personnel. On the other hand, women police constables and officers complained of facing harassment from drunken and lumpen elements in these protests that posed as bonafide journalists. These recent incidents in the heart of national capital and scores of such reports emanating from states as well as elsewhere point to a larger issue. Who’s a journalist? Or, a news person? Is anyone and everyone roaming the streets across Bharat be designated a media person dealing with news, views or writing editorials? A quick check on the net suggests there were as many as 100 million digital creators operating out of India. Out of these, structured content creators were reported to be anywhere between 4 – 4.5 million. Hyderabad based Indian School of Business report of July 2026 pegged the creators’ number at 4.2 million. Now, the billion-dollar question is do all these creators or a small fraction of them that converged at Jantar Mantar protests of cockroaches, Youth Congress, Aam Admi Party or left demonstrations be designated journalists? Accredited or not accredited with centre, states, recognized or not recognized by city or district authorities, many of these creators who form core of protestors making video and reels designate themselves as journalists. Many of them many not be part of known media houses and mostly one-member enterprises, they go around with micro-phones, mobile phones doing brisk business of making videos and reels. A large number of these creators are paid influencers with their own social media pages. They are on hire for paltry to heavy sums for peddling content that’s soft, toxic, sensitive with socially devasting impact. These are on beck and call of lobbies, political parties and corporates as well. Now, do we call these paid social media influencers journalists? Recent cockroach Janata party protests in Mumbai preceded by Delhi and school centric campaigns in states like Rajasthan were mostly consumed online or went viral on the net due to these creators. Should these paid creators be designated media professionals? Who paid them, how much and what’s the real motive is an unanswered question. There were stories on Facebook, Insta or LinkedIn that hit the top ten slots on trending during the Jantar Mantar protests of CJP leading to resignation of education minister Dharmendra Pradhan. Some of these creators shot to instant fame with tens of thousands followers on their handles. A large number of political activists or protestors at several of these recent demonstrations against election commission, NEET exams or students protesting at Delhi University on women safety do claim to be journalists, protestors and activists. All rolled into one. Many of the anti-establishment activists that hit the streets frequently pose as journalists with cameras, mics and video equipment while several large media houses may not even afford such paraphernalia. Also, there have been subdued activists with extreme ideological inclinations that as media persons with cheap collar mikes and mobile phone recorders. Many creators that descended at protest sites in recent past would have stuck full commercial deals with specific brief on the narrative to be peddled and number of views to be totalled, both organic and inorganic. All the more, these ‘free and independent’ journalists are participants and reporting on the protests which is one-sided and subjective. There have been stories of political aspirants turning journalists while being protestors. Under Article 19 (1) (a) of Constitution of India, newspersons implicit rights to the profession are guaranteed as part of fundamental rights. The right to receive information, process and distribute the content is guaranteed under this provision. This freedom ends when the reporting intentionally or unintentionally attacks the reputation of an individual, institution or a body. Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 prohibits media persons from harming reputation or spreading disinformation through text, visuals, cartoon or any form. Most of these provisions have been retained in the Bharatiya Nyay Samhita 2023 that replaced the IPC 1860. Should Nadeem Ahmed Ameen and the three women protestors who claim to be journalists not be tried under relevant provisions of Bharatiya Nyay Samhita 2023? One for impersonation and secondly for violation of norms governing journalists. Crisis of identity for full-time professional journalists that seek to report for media organizations stare in the face. It’s a blurring line between paid content creators with an agenda to journalists that seek to report without emotions, attachments and seeking neutrality. Verification ethics also weigh down professional journalists while activists, agitators and content creators go easy on facts, get subjective, abusive, divisive and agenda based depending on who pays for the reel, video or the content. Advocacy groups, non-government organization representatives to paid influencers, ideological activists have gone about posing as journalists big time. Digital disruption coupled with this impersonation has only deepened identity crisis for professional media personnel across the world. Citizen journalist is a concept that evolved as social responsibility and emancipation before, during and post-independence movement in India. Today’s paid influencers can never be equated with citizen journalists with social purpose pursing larger cause. A radical Islamist cannot masquerade as a newsperson. A political activist or paid influencer may not be treated as a journalist with immunity. An ideological left extremist that does not believe in democratic ethos or systems cannot make falsified claims being a media representative. A distinction has to be made. Upholding journalistic ethos, values and objectivity is something for which there may be no easy alternative!(author is a veteran journalist, chief executive & director of Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies, New Delhi based

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154

USCIRF: An Entity of Concern Misleading Congress and the American Public on India

Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies (CIHS) releases its new brief, “USCIRF: An Entity of Concern – Misleading Congress and the American Public on India”. Taking the Commission’s 24 September 2026 statement on Jagtar Singh Johal as its case study, the brief shows a body that gets basic facts wrong, erases the prosecution’s case, and pronounces charges “false” in a trial that is still under way. A routine bail order on grounds of delay becomes, in USCIRF’s hands, a headline about “weaponized” laws. The statement is no aberration. It caps years of selective reporting and sanctions proposals made without evidence. CIHS report concludes that USCIRF has abandoned monitoring for advocacy, misleading the Congress and public it exists to inform, and is itself an entity of concern.

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137

Ice Breaker or Thucydides Trap?

Presidents’ Xi and Donald J Trump see hope in this revolving relationship while contentious issues were swept under the carpet. K.A. Badarinath Did the ice finally break between President Xi Jingping and his US host Donald Trump? Were they able to transact some business at the White House after pomp and show displayed on arrival of President Xi. Diplomatic niceties and cordial atmosphere apart, there was not much in terms of take aways from the meeting held by Presidents’ Xi and Trump. Does that mean they are back to square one squabbling and pointing fingers at each other with military buildup thrown in? This again is a firm no. Huge ambitions and expectations apart, biggest outcome during UN General Assembly engagements in New York and later at bilateral summit in Washington DC is that both are willing to engage honestly and wee bit openly on key issues. They may continue to race with each other. The two may like to avoid direct confrontation. The G2 – USA and China – may open a range of communication points. Is the big billed summit all about just opening communication lines? Or, some baby steps taken? Donald Trump may have signed the Lindsay O Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. If made operative, its implications are too huge. But Donald Trump may not be in a hurry to apply various provisions of this law on China. In effect, US will not slap 100 per cent tariffs on Chinese goods and services exports. The 100 per cent tariff is tied to China buying oil, gas and other merchandise from Russia and backing its partner Iran. The existing 26 per cent tariff will stay. Well, even the three months pause on application of this one-sided draconian law would mean that Beijing will continue with its merchandise and goods exports to US. Beijing has a whopping US $ one trillion plus trade surpluses in its annual transactions with America. Communist Party of China and its oligarchs’ breath easy next three months as they scramble ways and means to doing business with US without derailing the delicate apple cart with Russia and Iran. The duo has been trusted partners of Beijing. Xi may not be willing to let go of his friendship with both Moscow and Tehran easily. The three months reprieve would give time and enough elbow room to Beijing for readying counter measures and take on the deep state propelled United States that has not logically dealt with either friends or foes. For Trump, these three months would help shore up his dwindling electoral fortunes ahead of the November midterm polls where Republicans may be facing tough time with the electorate. Wall Street Journal polls have reported that Trump’s approval ratings have dropped to 37 per cent, lowest for any incumbent President since 1990s. Inflationary pressure, economic uncertainties due to continued flare up in West Asia is what President Trump may be against while he seeks to campaign for Republican candidates in half a dozen states beginning next week. Both Presidents, Xi and Trump seem to have reconciled that geo-strategic and economic differences will continue to mar their chances of striking a working relationship. For instance, President Xi may not have got any assurance from his American host on withdrawing support to Taiwan which Beijing considers as part of its larger communist empire. Normalization of trade and investment relations in medium to long term may be too early to predict given competing interests, divergence in opinions and strategies. President Xi did not take any of his top business representatives to US. This definitely speaks volumes. On Indo-Pacific also there may be no road map anytime soon given the divergent positions on freedom to navigate as per international maritime pacts without interference from Chinese naval vessels. Reports suggest that there’s no convergence on Artificial Intelligence related framework as well though top AI honchos were lined up by Trump at the dinner with President Xi. Presence of Sundar Pichai, Sam Altman and Jensen Huang at the state dinner did not un-nerve the Chinese delegation. There was no joint communique at the end of summit level talks between President Xi and Donald Trump. And, this gave enough fodder for the paparazzi to make wild but intelligent guesses on what transpired between the two leaders and their A teams. At the end, the big question was did the two leaders get into Thucydides trap? Or, is it an evolving relationship holding promise? (author is a veteran journalist, Director & Chief Executive of non-partisan, New Delhi based think tank, Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies)

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139

Is US a Trusted Ally?

Bharat has too much at stake with President Trump signing the Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act. It is bound to impact free trade deal. N. C. Bipindra President Donald Trump signed Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 into law on September 18, 2026 at a White House ceremony expanding statutory sanctions, tariffs, and prohibitions targeting Russia and extending existing sanctions on Iran. Named after late Republican senator who championed it prior to his death in July, the bill had been a long journey since Graham introduced an earlier version in the Senate in April 2025 and was eventually co-written with Democratic Senator Richard Blumenthal to secure bipartisan backing. US Senate cleared it 86-11 in August before the House passed it 262-159. The law’s most consequential provision for New Delhi: it allows President Trump to impose tariffs of up to 100 per cent on goods from each of the top five importers of Russian oil and natural gas, a group in which India figures prominently. Will Trump Pull the Trigger? Crucially, the tariff is discretionary, not automatic. The measure does not automatically impose 100 per cent tariff on any specific country, and legal analysts note the United States may impose a lower rate, providing India with diplomatic space to negotiate a reduced tariff, an exemption, a transition period, or a formal presidential waiver. This is not Trump’s first use of tariffs as coercive leverage against India over Russian crude. He had already raised India tariffs to 50 per cent adding 25 per cent penalty tied to Russian oil purchases, framing India as “directly or indirectly importing Russian Federation oil” despite calling it a friend with unusually high tariffs. Given that history, most trade analysts expect Trump to use the new authority as a negotiating cudgel rather than a blunt instrument, deploying the threat to extract further concessions in the ongoing Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) rather than triggering an immediate 100 per cent duty that could derail a deal both sides say is nearly finished. While India’s foreign minister Subramanyam Jaishankar flagged the tariff issue with his US counterpart Marc Rubio, Bharat’s Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal said that the trade deal with US was a ‘done deal’. If key provisions of US Free Trade Agreement have already been frozen, then the new anti-Russia law may not have a bearing on India. Impact on US-India FTA The timing is delicate. Just days before the Act’s signing, Indian Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal said the two countries were “about 99 percent” done with first tranche of a trade deal, with a US delegation led by Assistant USTR Brendan Lynch holding three days of talks in New Delhi. Bharat’s Ministry of External Affairs separately described the latest round as “positive and forward-looking,” covering a broad range of issues aimed at reaching an early agreement, while reaffirming India’s commitment to comprehensive global strategic partnership with Washington. The new sanctions law effectively hangs a sword over that near-final text: New Delhi now has to weigh how any energy-related concession might be legally required to keep the tariff dormant, even as Commerce Secretary-level officials examine how recent legal changes should be reflected in the final agreement text. A prolonged standoff could push the interim deal’s signing further into 2027, jeopardising the two countries’ shared target of boosting bilateral trade to $ 500 billion by 2030. Wider Implications for US-India Ties India’s official response has been measured but firm. Ministry of External Affairs said it had noted the Act’s passage. It reiterated its commitment to ensuring energy security for 1.4 billion people through diversified sourcing, adding that the issue had been discussed at high levels with US interlocutors and that India would take necessary measures to protect its trade and economic interests. That “people-first” framing, echoed in Hindi-language coverage describing India’s insistence that energy security for its citizens is the priority, signals New Delhi will not publicly capitulate, even as it continues quiet diplomacy. The exposure is real: Russia supplied more than 51 per cent of India’s crude-oil imports in July 2026, up sharply from roughly a third of imports before the Ukraine war intensified price arbitrage in Russia’s favour. Analysts warn that repeated coercive tariff threats, layered atop the earlier 50 per cent duties, risk eroding trust in the “Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership,” pushing India to hedge harder towards BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and its own strategic autonomy doctrine, even as defence and technology cooperation, such as iCET and jet-engine co-production, continue on a separate track. Russia-Ukraine Dimension Beyond India, the law is squarely aimed at blocking financing Russia’s war machine. It imposes sanctions on Russian officials, financial institutions, defence-related networks and “shadow fleet” of vessels used to evade Western restrictions, while extending the Iran Sanctions Act for five years. Senator Katie Britt called it a message that “the United States stands unified in our opposition to their acts of aggression against Ukraine”. Democratic senators have taken an even harder line: Richard Blumenthal reportedly warned India to “better clean up your act” on Russian oil purchases. Moscow, for its part, has dismissed the law as an unfriendly act, while Beijing called it “long-arm jurisdiction” lacking authorisation under international law or the UN Security Council, both countries signalling they will not bow to pressure. The standoff between Washington DC and Moscow notwithstanding, US has extended an invite to President Putin to participate in the G-20 summit it would host later in the year. Putin acknowledged the invite but has not yet decided on his participation. Global Implications The law’s five-largest-importer trigger effectively targets China and India simultaneously and the Atlantic Council has noted it could authorise tariffs of up to 100 per cent on Chinese imports on national-security grounds if Beijing continues buying Russian oil. That dual exposure could push Beijing and New Delhi, usually rivals, toward tactical coordination on sanctions-evasion workarounds, alternative payment rails and diversified crude sourcing from the Gulf, West Africa, and the Americas. A blanket 100 per cent tariff

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191

Windowless Buildings Holding Up Viksit Bharat

India is building data centres at record speed. Harder question is who owns the intelligence inside these centres. Dr. Nitin Sharma The first-quarter GDP numbers for FY 2026-27 have done more than just beat expectations. They have restored a certain confidence. The economy grew 7.8 per cent. That was much more than Reserve Bank’s forecast. It was one of the strongest starts to a fiscal year we have seen in a while and it came despite tense geopolitical developments and surge in energy prices internationally. Manufacturing held up. So did services, investment and household spending. The story is familiar now. India keeps growing faster than most large economies. Foreign investors seem to agree. This is manifested in the fact that India drew record $ 94.53 billion in FDI inflows during 2025-26, up 17 per cent on previous year’s performance. But, let’s get realistic. A quarterly number is just an indicator. What matters is the direction. Viksit Bharat is the goal: a developed economy pump primed at $ 30-35 trillion by 2047. And, one most understated part of this edifice is data centre. For most part of last century, we measured the country’s strength in steel, cement in tonnes and megawatts or gigawatts. Ports moved goods. Railways moved people and cargo. Grids kept the lights on. That has changed. Today a row of air-conditioned sheds full of servers decides where the world’s data lives, how fast it travels, and who gets to control it. Industry estimates suggest data centers and the digital economy they support could push India’s internet economy past $ one trillion by 2030. That figure comes from a widely cited Google-Bain-Temasek projection. It is a real slice of the Viksit Bharat ambition. If the trajectory holds, data centers will not merely support India’s climb. They will drive it from the front. The numbers India’s operational data center capacity stands at roughly 1.3 to 1.6 GW today. It is spread across more than 160 facilities. Several hundred more megawatts are under construction. The market was worth about $10 billion in 2025. It is projected to more than double to $21-22 billion in four to five years. It translates to a compound annual growth rate of close to 13.5 per cent. The capacity expansion story is sharper. From under two GW today, India’s capacity is expected to grow four to five times by 2030. Some estimates go as high as eight GW. That ceiling may not hold for long. Consider AirTrunk. The Australian hyperscale operator, backed by Blackstone and Canada Pension Plan Investment Board entered India in April this year by acquiring Lumina CloudInfra. The deal handed it a pipeline of about 600 MW across Mumbai, Chennai and Hyderabad, with development potential of up to $ 5 billion. Six weeks later it announced something far larger: more than ₹ 3 lakh crore roughly $ 30 billion to build over five GW capacity in India by 2030. Maharashtra has already exchanged a letter of intent for land at Raigad Pen Growth Centre where AirTrunk is planning three GW campus. If even part of that materializes, eight GW starts to look conservative. Nearly $ 70 billion investment is in motion. Another $ 90 billion has been announced. Those are government figures, released alongside Union Budget’s long-term tax framework for cloud and data centres income. That framework runs all the way to 2047. The intent is twofold: give investors certainty and formally place data centres alongside power and transport as national infrastructure. Who is building, and where Mumbai is still the capital of India’s data centre map. It accounts for nearly half of all operational capacity. Chennai follows with about 18 per cent. Delhi-NCR has 11 per cent. The more interesting movement is in the second rung. Hyderabad, Pune, Bengaluru and now Lucknow are climbing fast. Hyderabad alone is expected to add 1,000 to 1,200 MW by 2030. That would rival Mumbai’s own expansion. States are competing hard for the money. Telangana has signed MoUs worth over ₹10,500 crore for AI data centre clusters. Rajasthan is chasing ₹20,000 crore. Uttar Pradesh is courting ₹30,000 crore for eight new data center parks. The builders are a mix. Indian infrastructure players are laying the physical groundwork: AdaniConneX, Yotta Infrastructure, NTT DATA, CtrlS, Nxtra by Airtel, Sify, and ST Telemedia Global Data Centers, which has partnered with Tata and pledged $3.2 billion for 550 MW. AirTrunk joins them as the newest entrant. Hyperscalers are writing the biggest cheques. Google has committed $ 15 billion over five years during 2026 – 30, for India’s first gigawatt-scale AI hub, built with AdaniConneX and Nxtra by Airtel. Amazon Web Services has pledged roughly $ 12.7 billion nationally including $ 8.2 billion in Maharashtra. Microsoft has earmarked close to $ three billion. The largest single development so far is Blackstone and Panchshil Realty’s 500 MW campus in Navi Mumbai. It carries an investment of over ₹20,000 crore, spans 14 buildings and three million square feet and is designed to run on up to 65 per cent renewable power. The power problem Here is the part that rarely makes headlines. It will decide everything else. Data centers are enormously power-hungry. India’s grid has never been asked to deliver electricity at this scale, for this purpose, before. Globally, data center electricity demand is projected to more than double by 2030, to roughly 945 terawatt-hours. That is more than Japan’s entire annual consumption, according to International Energy Agency. AI is the main driver. Training a large model means thousands of GPUs running without pause for weeks. AI servers can draw up to ten times the power of conventional ones. A modern AI-focused facility may need 80 MW or more. A standard one needs about 32 MW. As India moves from under two GW to a possible eight GW, electricity demand rises with it. And most of that supply must be constant. Round the clock. Uninterrupted. This is the catch with renewables. Solar and wind are intermittent. Data centers cannot tolerate intermittency. They

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Mohan Bhagwat in West: Challenging Preconceived Narratives

Dr Gautam Kumar Jha Mohan Bhagwat’s recent journey through United States, Canada and United Kingdom came at a time when Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) has completed a century of existence and continues to evoke sharply contrasting perceptions, particularly outside India. For its supporters, RSS represents cultural nationalism, social service and civilisational continuity. For many of its critics within and outside, however, RSS is viewed through the prism of majoritarianism and religious exclusion. These differing perceptions were distinctly visible during the tour. His appearances in United States attracted protests and renewed criticism of RSS, including allegations concerning religious freedom. RSS rejects such characterisations while Indian government also contested broader international assessments that it considers selective or prejudiced. Against this backdrop, Bhagwat’s three-nation tour offered an opportunity for direct engagement and conversation. It did not, and could not, settle every controversy surrounding RSS. What it did was allow international audiences to hear its chief articulate the organisation’s position on questions that have generated sustained debate: Hindu identity, Muslims in India, religious diversity, the Indian diaspora, civic loyalty and the RSS’s understanding of humanity itself. Pluralism versus Unity in Diversity One of the most interesting features of Bhagwat’s American engagements was the connect he drew between two apparently different political and civilisational experiences. United States, he observed, frequently speaks of pluralism while India speaks of unity in diversity. For Bhagwat, diversity and unity are not contradictory: diversity is a natural expression of human society, while an underlying unity binds people together. At Madison Square Garden in New York, addressing Universal Oneness gathering, he argued that India’s larger responsibility was to demonstrate that unity and diversity could coexist, not merely through preaching, but through practice. India is extraordinarily diverse in language, religion, ethnicity, food, customs and regional identities. Any conception of Indian nationhood that ignores these differences would therefore be incomplete. Bhagwat instead described diversity as a decoration of an underlying unity and argued that it must be accepted, respected and protected. More significantly, he extended the principle beyond protecting one’s own identity: just as individuals seek to preserve their own identities, he argued, they must recognise and protect others’ identities. This provides an important counterpoint to binary interpretations of cultural nationalism in which the assertion of one identity necessarily requires the suppression of another. Muslim Question, Challenging Perceptions One of the most consequential parts of Bhagwat’s American visit concerned a question that has long surrounded discussions about RSS: the place of Muslims within its conception of Bharat. In New York, Bhagwat addressed the issue in categorical terms, arguing that a Hindu who believes there should be no Muslims in Bharat contradicts the very idea of being Hindu. He linked this position to recognition of different paths towards the same ultimate truth and to respect for the dignity of every human being. The visit, therefore, placed a clearer version of Bhagwat’s stated position before an international audience. His conception of Hindu identity, as articulated during the tour, was not based on uniformity of race, religion or creed, but on an idea of civilisational belonging capable of accommodating different religious paths. A particularly interesting response came from an American Christian commentator who said that the controversy surrounding Bhagwat’s visit prompted him to investigate RSS and listen repeatedly to Bhagwat’s speeches. Explicitly identifying himself as a Christian rather than a Hindu, he remarked that much of Bhagwat’s message resonated with values he recognised in his own faith. One commentator cannot represent American opinion. His reaction is nevertheless useful because it demonstrates what direct communication can accomplish. Strong cultural or emotional ties to an ancestral homeland can sometimes raise questions about loyalty to country of citizenship or residence, and Bhagwat addressed this by distinguishing between janmabhoomi and karmabhoomi. He argued that the country where members of diaspora live, work and build their lives is their karmabhoomi and therefore entails civic obligations. Affection for India as janmabhoomi should not come at the expense of responsibilities towards the society in which they live. This presents diaspora not as a population divided between two loyalties, but as a bridge capable of retaining civilisational and emotional connections with India while participating fully in another national community. Over centuries, Indian diaspora has played a crucial role in nation-building and development of countries where they settled. At the same time, many have remained connected to Bharat through what may be described as an enduring cultural umbilical cord. These people-to-people connections have therefore become an important dimension of India’s relations with Western countries. Political relations may fluctuate, governments and priorities may change, but diaspora communities, educational networks, businesses, families and cultural associations often provide a deeper sense of continuity. New York to Toronto: Vishwa Bandhu Bhagwat carried the same broad message to Canada. His visit culminated in the Hindu Vishwa Bandhu programme in Toronto where the emphasis remained on Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, the world as one family, and on respecting each other rather than erasing diversity. He made distinction between Vishwa guru and Maha shakti, arguing that India’s aspirations should not be understood merely in terms of becoming a conventional superpower. Instead, he associated India’s historical influence with knowledge, service and a civilisational concern for humanity. In this understanding, national resurgence need not mean domination over others. Rather, India’s rise should contribute to a more united world, where civilisational confidence goes together with coexistence, respect for diversity and concern for human well-being. Toronto to London: Celebration of Oneness Final leg of Bhagwat’s journey took him to London during September 2-7, 2026. British programme broadened the tour from diaspora outreach to a more explicit civilisational and interfaith dialogue. Bhagwat met faith leaders, academics, researchers and other public figures and visited religious institutions including the Shree Swaminarayan Mandir in Willesden and the Khalsa Jatha British Isles Gurdwara. The programme culminated in the ‘Celebrate Oneness’ interaction in London on 6 September, attended by more than 600 participants representing 326 organisations. Echoing his ‘universal oneness’ message in America, Bhagwat explained that diversity should be understood in relation to

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India and the Next BRICS: Turning Diversity into Strategic Influence

Sankalp Singh Chauhan India’s historic BRICS Presidency comes at a defining moment for the global order. Its challenge is not to build another bloc, but to make a more diverse world capable of working together. What began as BRIC, Brazil, Russia, India and China, formally came together at its first summit in Yekaterinburg in 2009, transformed it into BRICS after South Africa’s inclusion. For more than a decade the five-country grouping steadily developed cooperation in finance, development and global governance. The major expansion of 2024 brought Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates into the fold, while Indonesia joined in 2025, taking BRICS to 11 full members. India now assumes the chair at a particularly consequential moment: the grouping has evolved from a compact association of emerging economies into a much broader platform representing a significant voice of the Global South. The world itself is entering an era of profound geopolitical and economic realignment. Wars and conflicts, supply-chain disruptions, economic uncertainty, technological competition and growing dissatisfaction with existing multilateral institutions are reshaping the international system. Against this backdrop, India’s 2026 Presidency is not merely another turn in the rotational calendar; it is an opportunity to shape what the expanded BRICS becomes next. With 11 full members, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, BRICS now has considerably greater geopolitical and economic weight. Its influence is further widened by 10 partner countries viz., Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. This expansion gives BRICS greater reach, but also a harder task: how can countries with different political systems, economic interests and strategic priorities translate diversity into cooperation? That is where India can make a distinctive contribution. From Expansion to Delivery: India’s presidency has an opportunity to move BRICS beyond declarations and towards practical cooperation. The priorities are clear: trade and investment, resilient supply chains, energy and food security, health, climate action, digital public infrastructure, technology, connectivity and reform of global institutions. The test will be whether these priorities produce institutions and mechanisms that citizens and businesses can actually use. India’s experience with digital public infrastructure offers an important model. Greater interoperability of digital payment systems, cross-border transactions and financial technology could lower transaction costs and strengthen economic ties across the Global South. The ambition should be neither isolation from the West nor confrontation with it. It should be strategic autonomy combined with inclusive multilateralism. The Currency Question: Few ideas surrounding BRICS attract as much attention as the possibility of a BRICS currency. Yet credibility requires distinguishing aspiration from reality. A common currency is not an established BRICS policy. The more immediate and practical path is the expansion of local-currency trade, payment-system interoperability and alternative cross-border financial mechanisms. Over time, these could evolve into a broader financial architecture, including a possible common unit of account or other settlement mechanism, without requiring an immediate monetary union. The objective is therefore not simply “de-dollarisation.” It is to create more choice, resilience and efficiency in international finance. BRICS as an Innovation Platform: The next phase of BRICS should also be defined by technological cooperation. Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, biotechnology, quantum technologies, space, clean energy, agricultural technology and digital commerce offer areas where emerging economies can move from being technology consumers to technology creators. A BRICS innovation ecosystem, supported by research partnerships, start-up networks, technology funds and easier movement of knowledge and capital, could become one of the grouping’s most consequential long-term projects. Equally important are areas of human security: affordable healthcare, food security, climate resilience, disaster management and sustainable infrastructure. A Wider Global South: The expansion of BRICS has made its relationship with the wider developing world increasingly important. Partner countries and BRICS Plus outreach can give smaller and emerging economies a greater voice without requiring every country to become a full member. This broader architecture could become one of BRICS’s greatest strengths, provided expansion does not overwhelm decision-making. India’s diplomatic challenge is therefore to build consensus without sacrificing ambition. What Success Should Look Like: The success of India’s Presidency should ultimately be judged not by the number of declarations issued, but by what changes after the summit. First, BRICS should deliver measurable progress in trade and investment, including easier market access, stronger supply-chain resilience, greater MSME participation and mechanisms that make South-South commerce faster and less costly. Second, it should advance a genuinely connected digital and financial architecture. Interoperable payment systems, greater use of national currencies and more efficient cross-border settlements could provide an immediate, practical foundation for deeper financial cooperation. Third, success should mean tangible cooperation in energy, food, health and climate security. In a world vulnerable to energy shocks, food disruptions, pandemics and extreme weather, these are not peripheral development issues; they are questions of global stability. Fourth, BRICS should create an innovation and technology agenda capable of connecting universities, researchers, entrepreneurs and industries across member and partner countries. Cooperation in AI, semiconductors, biotechnology, quantum technology, space and clean energy could determine whether the Global South becomes merely a larger market or a major source of future innovation. Finally, India’s Presidency should strengthen the voice of developing countries in global governance. Reform of institutions such as the United Nations, IMF and World Bank should aim at greater representation, legitimacy and responsiveness, not at replacing one hierarchy with another. Perhaps the most important measure of success will be whether BRICS can demonstrate that geopolitical diversity does not have to produce institutional paralysis. Can countries with competing strategic interests still cooperate on issues of common interest? Can BRICS remain economically ambitious without becoming an anti-Western alliance? Can its expanded membership create wider representation without diluting effectiveness? And can India preserve its role as a bridge between competing centres of power? If the answer is yes, BRICS could move from being primarily a grouping of emerging economies to becoming a credible platform for a more balanced international system. India’s role will be central to that transition. India has

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