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Rubio in India: Why Bharat–US Ties Now Run on Energy and Enterprise

NC Bipindra US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s second visit to Bharat this year was remarkable for its destinations. He landed in Mumbai on October 20, 2026, for talks aimed at easing pressure on global energy markets and External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar greeted him. He never set foot in New Delhi. The itinerary offers Bharat genuine openings, but it also raises a harder question: is the partnership being redefined on terms that suit Washington more than New Delhi? A capital bypassed Rubio was last in New Delhi in May 2026 for the Quad foreign ministers’ meeting. This time the State Department framed the trip around energy and investment and opposition leaders called the arrangements humiliating. No official reason for skipping the capital has been given, so any explanation is interpretation. The backdrop, however, is not in doubt. Ties remain strained over tariffs, immigration policy and US outreach to Pakistan. Boardrooms and a refinery On October 21, Rubio met Adani Group Chairman Gautam Adani and Tata Sons Chairman N. Chandrasekaran in Mumbai and neither side released details. He then flew to Jamnagar. Reliance said the visit covered the global energy landscape and commercial partnerships across conventional and new energy. It was closed to the media. The logic is not hard to read, though it remains analysis rather than announced policy. Rubio said Washington wants to work more closely with Reliance on refining Western Hemisphere energy, hinting at more Venezuelan crude, while US diesel prices climb ahead of the midterms. The complex processes about 1.4 million barrels a day, roughly 1.5 per cent of global refining capacity. Adani’s ports and logistics and Tata’s semiconductor and manufacturing ambitions complete the picture. Bharat’s conglomerates are being treated as nodes in American supply chains. Bharat should welcome the investment, but a relationship that runs mainly through a few corporate groups is narrower than one anchored in institutions, defence-industrial cooperation and technology partnership. The quieter trilateral Potentially more durable was the Mumbai trilateral. Jaishankar, UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed and Rubio exchanged views on energy, connectivity and contemporary developments. Officials say they also discussed West Asian security and the economic fallout of the Strait of Hormuz blockade. Reports name only foreign ministers at the table, with no finance ministers. The format suits Bharat. Gulf capital, Bharat’s scale and American strategic cover can underpin energy security and connectivity without tying New Delhi to a single supplier or bloc. A trade deal that is “close”, again Trade was the most watched subject. Rubio said the two sides were about as close as one can be without having executed the agreement. Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal said the first tranche was in its final stages, though Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman had said earlier this month that talks had plateaued. President Trump said Bharat wants a deal and that it would be “much different” from earlier ones, without discussing Bharat’s tariffs or trade surplus. Caution is warranted. Trump used almost identical language about being close to a deal in November 2025. The phrase to watch is “much different”. It may signal a deal weighted towards energy, defence and technology purchases rather than a conventional exchange of tariff cuts for market access. Russian oil, Pakistan and H-1B Rubio was accommodative about Bharat’s Russian crude purchases and said Trump will weigh the global impact before enforcing a new law punishing them. A Trump–Modi meeting is likely in December. The administration has also entered a 60-day review period following the Russian oil tariff waiver. That is encouraging, but it is not a settlement. On other irritants, Rubio offered explanations rather than changes. He defended engagement with Pakistan because it has nuclear weapons and said H-1B restrictions were not aimed at Bharat, even as Bharat’s IT firms such as Wipro, Infosys and TCS were suspended from a green-card sponsorship programme. Assurances must now become action. On the Quad, Rubio said he hopes a summit will take place before the end of the year. What Bharat should do The Diplomat argues that the relationship is being recast as a transaction built on trade and energy, with Bharat as buyer, refiner and market. That is one analyst’s reading, but the itinerary lends it weight. A confident Bharat should engage on equal terms, welcoming the thaw while measuring it by outcomes such as tariff relief, visa certainty and technology access. It should protect energy sovereignty, because diversification is Bharat’s choice, made on price and security and not a directive to swap Russian barrels for Venezuelan ones. It should keep the state in the lead, since corporate diplomacy is useful but national interest should not be negotiated through a handful of groups. And it should pursue multi-alignment, treating the Bharat-UAE-US format, the Quad and BRICS as complements rather than rivals. Questions that remain Several questions merit scrutiny. What does a “much different” trade deal actually contain? What happens when the 60-day review ends? Was skipping New Delhi a deliberate signal? What did Adani and Tata discuss with Rubio? Will the Quad summit take place this year and will Trump travel to Bharat soon? Conclusion Rubio’s visit shows that Washington needs Bharat’s refining capacity, its market and its geography. That gives Bharat leverage. The task now is to convert it into a partnership that serves Bharat’s interests across trade, technology, security and energy and not only the American agenda of the moment. (Author is Chairman, Law and Society Alliance, a New Delhi-based think tank, and guest columnist with CIHS

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Foiled Mass-Shooting Plot Against a Hindu Temple: A Global Warning

A terrifying warning about the perils of white supremacist extremism, anti-Indian bigotry, and Hinduphobia is provided by the arrest of a 19-year-old man in Illinois over an alleged mass shooting plot targeting a Hindu centre of worship in Aurora. Because the suspect possessed firearms and ammunition, documented violent intents and extreme sentiments directed at Indians and other minority people, investigators say the case is very concerning.

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Why Starlink Is Not a Telecom Story Alone

India needs better connectivity. It should not pay for it with strategic independence. Dr. Nitin Sharma India is at a crossroads. It must now take tough decisions and take them without bowing to pressure from anyone. Satellite internet can reach remote villages, mountain regions and underserved communities. But one question has got far less attention than it deserves. Who will control that connectivity? Starlink has secured a key regulatory foothold in India. Commercial services still need spectrum assignment and security clearance. While we wait, the debate is about speed, price and competition. Those matter. They are not the most important issues. India has sensitive borders. It faces complex internal security challenges. Satellite communication cannot be treated as just another telecom service. The real question is not whether Starlink can deliver faster internet. It probably can. The question is whether India should let a strategic layer of its communications depend on a foreign private company. Its satellites, technology and final decisions sit outside our control. We have faced this dilemma before. The lesson of Kargil In 1999, during the Kargil war with Pakistan, India sought GPS data for the region from the United States. USA took the side of Pakistan and refused to make the GPS data available. Indian side was left in dark, and it became even harder for us to win that war. The exact details remain a subject of debate. The lesson was clear. A country cannot assume that technology owned by another nation will be there when its security is at stake. India responded by building its own regional navigation system, NavIC (Navigation with Indian Constellation). That was not just a science project. It was a strategic decision. It was the first step becoming “Atmanirbhar Bharat”. Navigation in war cannot depend on another country’s goodwill. Now the same question arises in communications. We spent years and public money to reduce dependence on foreign navigation. Why should we accept a similar dependence on satellite communication now? Off course this is a different time and different technology, but principle of Self-reliance and sovereignty is still the same. When one company holds the switch Starlink is an impressive achievement. Its low-earth-orbit satellites connect places where ordinary networks are hard to build or easy to damage. In Ukraine, it kept people and forces connected when networks failed. That experience also raised hard questions. Public controversies over coverage near Crimea, limits on military use and terminal activation showed how much power a private provider can hold in a conflict. The point is not that Starlink failed Ukraine. It helped a great deal. The point is who decides. Imagine India’s security relying on a network where a company’s leadership, foreign rules or another government’s interests can shape decisions. Could India guarantee uninterrupted service? Could it stop remote restrictions? If there is a dispute, whose instructions prevail? A commercial contract cannot answer these questions. National security needs real control over critical capabilities. Even Europe wants its own network India is not alone in this thinking. The European Union is close to the United States. Yet it is building its own secure satellite networks, IRIS² and GOVSATCOM. The aim is communications under European control for government and strategic use. Brussels has said the system is “Built in Europe, operated in Europe, under European control.” If allies of Washington want that independence, India has even more reason to examine its own position. Strategic autonomy is not distrust. It is the recognition that national interests are supreme in all situations. Governments change. Policies change. Even commercial ties can become tools of pressure. A mature country plans for that before a crisis. The security risk is real This is not only about future wars. In late 2024, Starlink equipment was recovered in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and in Manipur. Security agencies took notice. India deals with cross-border infiltration, insurgency and trafficking. Unauthorised satellite terminals entering through porous borders deserves serious scrutiny. Elon Musk said Starlink beams were switched off over India. Questions remain unanswered then how these devices found in Manipur actually was working. Some reports suggested they could have connected through services available in neighboring territory. Those claims are not conclusively established. The incidents still exposed a real challenge. A satellite network does not rely only on towers and cables inside our territory. The satellites are overhead. The control systems may be thousands of kilometers away. Software, terminal approvals and service limits can be managed remotely. There is more. Reports said Indian authorities struggled to get ownership details for a seized terminal. In normal times, that is a privacy dispute. In a sensitive border zone, delay can be dangerous. India cannot be unsure who is using a terminal in a border area. India should be able to switch off a rouge device quickly and decision and real control should lie in India. We cannot be unsure about these matters. A license is not control The government has seen these risks. Conditions reportedly include data localisation, lawful interception, local monitoring, terminal identification and limits on sending sensitive data abroad. These are necessary. But rules on paper do not guarantee results. A company can open an Indian office, hire Indian staff and run gateways in India. The satellites, software and final authority can still sit with the parent company abroad. That difference matters. If a security agency needs data on a rogue terminal, will it get it under Indian law, without foreign approval? If connectivity must be cut in a border area, will the restriction hold across the network? If an international crisis pressures the provider, what protection does India really have? Approval should depend on these answers. Declarations of compliance are not enough. In strategic technology, capabilities must be tested independently. A condition is only as strong as the power to enforce it. Policy must not bend to pressure There is another issue. Independent policymaking. Musk recently attacked what he called monopolistic practices in India’s telecom market. The Ministry of Communications immediately rejected the claim. It

Bharat Geopolitics Policy Press Release Trade World

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PRESS NOTE: CIHS Hosted Interactive Session with Ambassador of Poland

New Delhi, August 21, 2026 – The Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies (CIHS), held an engaging and insightful interactive session on “India-Poland People Connect” with H.E. Dr. Piotr Antoni Świtalski, Ambassador of the Republic of Poland to India, at India Habitat Centre (IHC), Maple Room, Lodhi Road, New Delhi The thought-provoking discussion on Indo-Poland civilizational, cultural and people-to-people connection in a rapidly changing global order brought together scholars, policy experts and strategic thinkers to examine multifaceted ties between India and Poland, covering areas such as diplomacy, trade, education, cultural exchange and technology cooperation. In his welcome address K.A. Badarinath, Chief Executive and Director at CIHS, emphasised strong cultural, civilizational and democratic values that bind the Indo-Poland Relationship. He highlighted the necessity of enhancing people-to-people connectivity, cultural and civilizational bonds and strong international associations in shaping a peaceful and prosperous future for global communities. H.E. Piotr Antoni Switalski, in his address, highlighted shared values and historical linkages between India and Poland and called Poland’s economic rise an “economic miracle” powered by human capital, much like modern India. “With trade at $ 5 billion, there is a huge potential to double it, urging India to “use Poland” as a friendly gateway to Europe,” he noted. H.E. Piotr Antoni Świtalski, Ambassador of Poland to India, described India as a highly “effective partner” at a time when the world faces increasing unpredictability and “many disruptive forces.” He emphasised that Poland understands India’s longstanding defence relationship with Russia and believes that “Russia should not stand in the way of our dialogue, our cooperation and our partnership. We leave it aside.” On Poland’s relations with Pakistan, H.E. Świtalski said that while Warsaw maintains diplomatic and economic ties with Islamabad, this should not be interpreted as an anti-India position. During the interactive session, participants raised thought-provoking questions on topics ranging from terrorism to trade, H.E. Switalski responded with openness stating that Poland supports India’s “right to pursue terrorists everywhere they go and his country is on India’s side when it comes to fighting terrorism because “we are a victim” of that too. Delivering a vote of thanks, Rahul Pawa, Director of Research at CIHS, expressed gratitude to H.E. Dr. Piotr Antoni Świtalski for his invaluable insights and openness, to the distinguished scholars for their participation and contributing to a meaningful dialogue that reaffirmed the importance of fostering connections between people. “India and Poland are not new acquaintances. Our connection is centuries old and one can see it everywhere in streets of Warsaw and Łódź that carry the names of Gandhi and Tagore, in a century of Sanskrit scholarship at Warsaw and at Kraków and in yoga schools across Poland that have outlasted several political systems,” he noted. CIHS is committed to strengthening this sacred bond through research, cultural dialogue and by serving as a bridge for sustained discussion and deeper people-to-people connections. At CIHS, we believe that cooperation between states endures only when it rests on connection between people.

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Four Hyperlinks, One Demand: Ban a Century-Old Hindu Movement

Fact-Checking claims behind a letter for banning RSS and bar Dr. Mohan Bhagwat from Canada. Rohan Giri Read the McPherson-Kwan letter once, quickly, and it sounds urgent. Read it twice, slowly, and a different question starts to form. Two sitting Members of Parliament are asking three cabinet ministers to ban an 89,000-branch (Shakha) civic organization and personally exclude its 76-year-old spiritual head Dr. Mohan Bhagwat from Canadian soil. What did they attach to justify that? Four hyperlinks and the word “fascist,” used as though repetition were an argument. That gap, between the size of the demand and the size of the proof offered for it, is the actual story here. Walk through it claim by claim and the gap doesn’t close. It widens. An Adjective Standing in for an Argument The letter’s opening sentence calls the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) a “fascist paramilitary organization.” It never returns to prove that claim. It doesn’t need to, because the sentence is doing the job a paragraph of evidence should be doing. Here is what the RSS actually is, as a matter of public record. Founded in Bharat’s western state Maharashtra’s Nagpur in 1925 as a voluntary community service organization. Structured today as a cultural movement with elected office bearers, answering upward through district and provincial layers to a national council of roughly 1,400 representatives who review its functioning. It runs daily neighbourhood gatherings called Shakha, disaster relief programs, and education initiatives. That is the architecture of a civic cultural movement. Calling it a paramilitary force doesn’t make it one, any more than calling Canada’s elected government a “regime” turns Parliament into a junta. Both moves borrow the vocabulary of atrocity and hope nobody asks for the receipts. The Terrorist List That Already Exists, and Doesn’t Include the RSS The letter accuses Dr. Mohan Bhagwat’s association with “listed terrorist organizations,” plural, unnamed. Canada actually publishes this list. It names Hamas, Hezbollah, ISIS, al-Qaida. It also names Babbar Khalsa International and the International Sikh Youth Federation, two terrorist groups whose Canadian file is not a matter of dispute. Public Safety Canada’s own description of the ISYF states it was responsible for a number of bombings, assassinations and kidnappings targeting Hindus, moderate Sikhs, and Indian government officials, working in coordination with BKI. BKI is the organization tied to the 1985 Air India Flight 182 bombing, which killed 329 people, 268 of them Canadian citizens. The RSS appears on this list zero times. Not once, in any form, under any name. So when a letter demanding a fresh terrorist listing invokes “listed terrorist organizations” as though the target already qualifies, it is worth asking a plain question. Which organizations actually sit on that list. And why does a letter about protecting Canadians from terrorism manage to avoid naming either group Canada has formally designated as one. The vocabulary and terminology used are conventional progressive-Islamist talking points i.e., “fascist paramilitary,” “Hindutva extremism,” “genocidal rhetoric,” and “transnational repression.” There is no comparable urgency applied to actual Khalistani terrorist networks that have murdered Canadians, or to Islamist terrorism pipelines working within Canada. One Word Carrying an Entire Accusation The letter’s most severe assertion is also the most cautiously worded. Which is Nijjar’s killing. Before I get into their claims, let me tell you that Hardip Singh Nijjar was proscribed as a terrorist by Indian intelligence officials in 2020. As per official report he was top operative of the Khalistan Tiger Force (KTF) and was the mastermind behind a separate 2007 cinema bombing in Punjab, Bharat. Now, returning to their allegations, it says, in Nijjar’s killing, “reportedly” involved senior BJP leadership connected to the RSS. Read that sentence again. The whole accusation rests on a single adverb. Canada’s own Foreign Interference Commission ran a formal public inquiry with subpoena power into exactly this territory. Its final conclusion on a state link to the killing was that no definitive link to a foreign state could be proven. The men actually charged in the killing are alleged to belong to a criminal network. Not the RSS. Taking “reportedly,” running it through a finding that falls well short of the accusation, and landing on a demand to ban an organization and its members nationwide isn’t caution. It’s laundering. A Citation That Doesn’t Say What It’s Cited For The letter invokes “United Nations Human Rights experts” who supposedly called on Canada to protect Sikh Canadians from RSS threats. The actual conversation concerned threats received by a specific individual Bhai Moninder Singh, a Khalistan supporter and national spokesperson for ‘Sikh Federation Canada,’ who is also an associate of Nijjar. This was issued weeks before the letter, and on the public record does not name the RSS as the source of those threats. If the primary text says otherwise, publish it. Citing a document nobody has quoted the relevant line from is not evidence. It’s a hyperlink doing cosplay as a finding. The same problem sits under the letter’s claim about “considerable evidence of the RSS’s sphere of influence in Canada,” footnoted to a single advocacy report, not a CSIS assessment, not an RCMP finding, not a threat bulletin. Advocacy groups are entitled to publish advocacy. What two MPs are not entitled to do is attach the phrase “Canadian security officials know” to someone else’s campaign document. The Visits Where Nothing Happened The letter warns that Bhagwat’s presence “could lead to social disorder.” This is a testable claim, because Bhagwat has already made this exact trip, repeatedly, to countries with no shortage of scrutiny or free press to report what happened. He addressed a gathering in the United Kingdom in 2016. He addressed the World Hindu Congress in Chicago in 2018, in front of roughly 2,500 delegates. He delivered the inaugural address at the 2023 World Hindu Congress in Bangkok. None of these produced the disorder the letter predicts for Canada. His most reported domestic engagement with a minority community, a 2022 visit to a New Delhi mosque and madrasa, involved him meeting the chief

Bharat China Geopolitics Politics United States

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G-2 Emerge to Bharat’s Discomfort

Trump – Xi Beijing Summit 2026 resets US – China ties, calibrates business deals involving Boeing & chips pushing Bharat to look for its own rhythm. N. C. Bipindra The two most powerful leaders on earth met in Beijing on May 14 and 15, 2026. The world watched. So did New Delhi. This was only the second face-to-face summit of Donald Trump’s second term and first US presidential state visit to China since Trump himself made the trip in 2017. Trump-Xi summit was billed as a potential turning point in one of the most consequential bilateral relationships in modern history. In the end, the outcome was largely characterised as stabilising rather than transformational, heavy on symbolism and light on substance. But for India, even a modest recalibration between Washington and Beijing carries profound strategic implications. Most significant conceptual outcome of the summit was the agreement by both sides to build a “constructive China – US relationship of strategic stability,” according to Beijing’s official readout. Xi Jinping framed this as a governing framework for next three years, a deliberate attempt to convert Trump’s transactional deal-making instincts into a more durable operating baseline for US-China relations, one that would constrain even the next American president. On the economic front, the leaders agreed to preserve and extend the fragile trade truce brokered in South Korea in October 2025. In Beijing, China committed to purchasing at least $ 17 billion in US agricultural goods annually through 2028 along with soybean purchase commitments made in October 2025. China agreed to buy 200 Boeing aircraft, notably fewer than 500 planes Trump had floated ahead of the visit contributing to four per cent drop in Boeing shares. The US readout mentioned Chinese commitments to address shortages of rare earth elements including yttrium, scandium, neodymium, and indium. Beijing’s readout was conspicuously silent on this. Reports also emerged that US approved around ten Chinese technology companies to purchase Nvidia’s advanced H200 chips sending tech stocks higher though the sales may not fully materialise given China’s push for domestic semiconductor self-sufficiency. Xi reserved his sharpest language for Taiwan, warning that mishandling the issue would put the US – China relationship into “great jeopardy.” While American readout of the summit did not mention Taiwan at all which in itself is a striking omission, Trump later revealed an in-depth conversation with Xi about potential US military involvement in a possible Taiwan Strait crisis. Taiwan, meanwhile, has been watching nervously for any signs that Trump might soften US policy commitments in exchange for Chinese concessions elsewhere. Regarding Iran war which had delayed the summit by over a month, both sides agreed that the Strait of Hormuz must remain open and that Iran must never acquire nuclear weapons. Xi expressed China’s willingness “to be of help” in brokering a resolution and pledged not to send military equipment to Iran. However, Beijing’s public readout declined to echo many of these commitments and no breakthrough framework regarding Iran emerged. China may exert quiet influence on Tehran in the coming weeks but little will be visible publicly. Perhaps most concrete outcome was the agreement to meet again. Xi is invited to Washington for an official state visit on September 24, his first in more than a decade. Further meetings in Shenzhen in November and at G-20 in Miami in December are also on the calendar suggesting both sides see the diplomatic channel as worth maintaining, even if the substantive gaps remain wide. For India, the Beijing summit is not a bilateral event happening at a comfortable distance. It is a direct variable in New Delhi’s most sensitive strategic calculations. India has long benefited from US-China tensions. Washington’s pivot to position India as a counterbalance to China in the Indo-Pacific brought strategic partnerships, defence technology transfers, and elevated India’s role in the Quad alongside the US, Japan, and Australia. But India now has a different worry: the revival of a so-called “G2” dynamic, a Washington-Beijing axis that sidelines middle powers like India. The three-year “strategic stability” framework agreed in Beijing feeds this anxiety precisely. One of the most tangible economic stakes for India is its emergence as an alternative manufacturing and sourcing destination for Western companies seeking to reduce China exposure. If US – China tensions ease significantly and particularly if American firms are incentivised to re-engage with China through summit-level deal-making, the urgency for supply-chain diversification toward India could diminish. The Nvidia chip deal and Boeing order, if they solidify, signal willingness in Washington to deepen commercial ties with Beijing rather than decisively redirect them. The relationship between Washington and New Delhi has itself been under strain. Trump’s administration imposed punitive secondary tariffs on India over its purchases of Russian oil even as China continued buying the same oil without an equivalent penalty. The diplomatic fallout pushed India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi to engage more openly with Beijing and Moscow including at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit. Xi’s declaration that it is “time for the dragon and elephant to dance together” was not just rhetoric. It was a strategic signal that Beijing sees an opportunity in India’s alienation from Washington. China’s dominance over rare earth processing remains one of India’s most pressing concerns. Beijing controls the midstream supply chains for minerals critical to semiconductors, defence systems and clean energy technology. The summit’s ambiguous outcome on rare earth access, acknowledged by Washington, ignored by Beijing leaves this leverage firmly in Chinese hands. For India, which is developing its own rare earth processing capacity but remains years from self-sufficiency, a US – China deal that quietly restores Chinese mineral exports to American firms could undercut the very supply-chain diversification argument that benefits Indian industrial ambitions. The South China Sea, a flashpoint that directly concerns India’s maritime interests and regional partners in ASEAN, was largely absent from public summit readouts. The lack of any strong US statement on freedom of navigation or territorial integrity in the region may embolden Chinese assertiveness, directly affecting Indian interests in maintaining a rules-based Indo-Pacific

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484

The Oslo Press Incidents

On 18 May 2026, Norwegian commentator Helle Lyng of Dagsavisen heckled Prime Minister Narendra Modi at a joint press appearance with Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre in Oslo. That same morning, Aftenposten, Norway’s newspaper of record, had published a curtain-raiser caricature depicting Modi as a snake charmer. This report situates both incidents within four interlocking structures. First, a colonial visual grammar with documented antecedents in The New York Times (2014) and La Vanguardia (2022). Second, the methodology of the World Press Freedom Index, on which India’s 2026 ranking of 157 of 180 rests: a sentiment survey of selected respondents per country, applied to a press environment of 146,045 newspapers, 903 broadcasters, and 22 official languages. Third, the transatlantic funding ecosystem that sustains and shapes Europe’s India narrative, traced from George Soros’s Open Society Institute and Norway’s Fritt Ord in 2008, through the Rausing-Baldwin estate’s Arcadia commitment in 2021, to the European Commission’s emergence as the largest single donor by 2025. Fourth, Norway’s own documented record of Norwegianization, assimilation, and abuse against Native and minority populations, audited by the Storting in November 2024, ongoing in the Fosen case, and recorded in approximately sixty-five Barnevernet judgments at Strasbourg. The report concludes that the index, the journalist, and the publication that converged on Modi in Oslo are not three independent witnesses but three institutional outputs of one ideologically coherent ecosystem, and that India’s response that evening exposed that ecosystem for what it is. Download & Read Full Report:

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409

Pragmatism Over Ambition

BRICS currency may not be shelved all together. Non-dollar settlements, digital currencies, regional payment gateways to take precedence. N. C. Bipindra A common BRICS currency is an idea that once symbolised the grouping’s ambitious challenge to dominance of US Dollar. The common BRICS currency was proposed to reshape the global financial order apart from geo-political realignments. But the geopolitical climate is rapidly going downhill, what with the West Asian conflict engaging global attention over last two-and-a-half months now. The diverging national interests of BRICS nations are compounding the challenge. This divergence is exposing deep structural limits of the group’s common currency proposal. Instead of accelerating toward a unified currency for the 11-nation grouping, BRICS members are increasingly moving more toward a fragmented but practical financial system built around national digital currencies and local-currency trade settlements. BRICS originally with just four members in Brazil, Russia, India, and China, has grown to include South Africa (and hence became BRICS from BRIC). The BRICS now includes world’s major energy producers and regional powers, essentially positioning itself as a counterbalance to the G7, which is unwilling to accommodate other major economies within its architecture. The expanded BRICS has repeatedly discussed reducing dependence on US Dollar in trade settlements. Yet, despite the strong rhetoric from nations like Russia and China, a consensus among the member states is elusive. There is no real agreement on creating a single BRICS currency notwithstanding the Delhi declaration that had the currency as a big selling point for the group. The latest instability in West Asia, a major energy-producing region, has only complicated the situation. The conflict-driven volatility in oil markets, sanctions risks, supply chain disruptions and currency instability have all highlighted a basic geopolitical reality. BRICS economies are too diverse in structure, political orientation, and monetary priorities to surrender sovereignty over currency policy. Unlike the Eurozone, BRICS lacks integrated fiscal systems, coordinated central banks or a unified political architecture for it to move towards a common currency. Without these foundational similarities, a common currency would risk becoming economically unsustainable. The changing geopolitical environment is especially significant for Bharat. New Delhi has historically and consistently supported multi-polarity in geopolitical order. India has also emphasised greater use of local currencies in trade, particularly in energy transactions, such as with Russia and Iran. However, India has remained cautious about any arrangement that could disproportionately strengthen China’s financial influence within BRICS. With tensions across West Asia and Europe intensifying and global markets becoming more unpredictable, India may increasingly rethink the feasibility of a BRICS currency altogether. India’s concerns with a single BRICS currency are not just political. Adapting to a unified BRICS currency would require India to significantly align its monetary policy, exchange-rate management, and reserve coordination. India’s economy operates under vastly different conditions than those of China, Russia, Brazil, or South Africa. India’s inflation management, capital controls, banking regulation, and trade priorities differ sharply from those of the other BRICS nations. In times of geopolitical crisis or a pandemic situation like COVID-19, nations typically prefer stronger control over domestic monetary tools rather than less. This explains why an alternative model, such as digital national currencies for intra-bloc settlements, is gaining traction inside BRICS. Instead of replacing sovereign currencies with a single BRICS unit, member states are increasingly exploring Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) and bilateral payment systems that bypass the Dollar without requiring full monetary union. China’s digital Yuan initiative remains the most advanced example of the CBDC. Russia has accelerated the development of digital payment systems after Western sanctions. India, meanwhile, has actively tested its own digital Rupee infrastructure through the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). These developments in CBDCs suggest that future of BRICS financial integration may be technological rather than monetary. Under this evolving framework, BRICS nations could settle trade in their own currencies using interoperable digital platforms. For example, energy exports could be priced in Yuan, Rupee, Rubble, or other local currencies, depending on bilateral arrangements. Such a system would gradually reduce exposure to US Dollar, while avoiding the political and economic complications of a shared currency within BRICS. This approach offers several advantages to BRICS nations. One, it preserves monetary sovereignty for all its member states. Two, it lowers transaction costs and reduces vulnerability to sanctions. Three, it allows nations to deepen financial cooperation incrementally rather than through a risky “big bang” currency union. President Donald J Trump had been fuming on the very idea of BRICS currency and threatened to slap huge imposts on member countries in case they moved ahead. Though US dollar continues to be the major preferred currency to settle transactions, it’s slowly losing sheen. President Trump expects that a strong alternative BRICS currency would dampen the US dollar’s primacy as the major international paper. Till now, US Dollar remained the most deeply embedded in global financial system due to scale of the American economy, liquidity of US financial markets, and institutional trust surrounding Dollar-denominated assets. Even nations critical of American financial influence continue to rely heavily on US Dollar reserves and US Dollar-based trade mechanisms. Therefore, future of BRICS currency project depends less on political declarations and more on whether the grouping can build a credible financial infrastructure capable of rivaling the existing US Dollar system. At present, BRICS lacks the institutional cohesion needed for such a transformation. Moreover, internal contradictions within BRICS remain substantial. China and India continue to compete strategically and militarily in Asia. Russia’s economy faces sanctions-driven isolation. Newer BRICS members have differing alignments with the West and varying levels of dependence on US Dollar-based trade. These realities weaken possibility of a unified BRICS currency. Current West Asian conflict-induced instability may further reinforce caution among BRICS members. In periods of geopolitical uncertainty, investors and governments typically gravitate toward stable and liquid reserve currencies. And, the US dollar still dominates that space. Even today, oil exporters exploring non-Dollar trade continue to benchmark much of global energy commerce in US Dollars, because of market familiarity and financial stability. But this doesn’t

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RSS at 100: A Civilisational Dialogue

In April 2026, in the centenary year of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). RSS Sarkaryavah, Dattatreya Hosabale, undertook a sequence of engagements across the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany. During his engagements, he addressed Chatham House in London, the inaugural THRIVE 2026 summit at the Stanford Faculty Club, the Hudson Institute in Washington, the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Berlin, alongside Nobel laureates, legislators, academic communities, business leaders, community leaders and members of the Indian diaspora in all three countries. Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies has released RSS at 100: A Civilisational Dialogue, a structured account of these engagements and of the philosophical foundations on which the world’s largest socio-cultural movement now offers a hundred years of reflection and experience to humanity at large for global good. Download & Read Full Brief:

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Referendum Farce: Story Written in Karachi, Staged in New York

Rohan Giri On April 29, 2026, Gurpatwant Singh Pannun announced a Khalistan Referendum voter registration drive from the Karachi Press Club. He was speaking via video link from New York. He was targeting Sikhs who live inside Bharat. The venue, the man and the medium together tell a story that his words never could. There is a particular kind of political performance that is designed not to succeed, but to persist, not to achieve a goal, but to manufacture the appearance of. On April 29, 2026, Sikhs for Justice (SFJ) chief Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, a man proscribed under Bharat’s Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act along with his organisation, delivered precisely such a presentation from the Karachi Press Club. Speaking via video link from New York, he announced that SFJ would launch a phased voter registration drive for the purported Khalistan Referendum targeting Sikhs residing across all Bharatiiya states. Beginning in Delhi, moving to Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, and ending the registrations in Punjab itself. The sequencing was revealing. A movement that claims Punjab as its spiritual and political homeland does not begin its campaign there. It begins in Delhi, because it knows Punjab will not listen. Bharatiya officials did not miss the significance of the venue. Pakistan’s establishment was openly offering its platform to an organisation that has called for violent attacks inside Bharat and the assassination of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The SFJ has glorified terrorist Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and treated perpetrators of the Air India Kanishka bombing in which 329 people were killed, as heroes. That Pakistan now provides this group a podium at one of Karachi’s most visible press institutions is not coincidence. Pakistan is playing this game out in the open and is not even bothering to conceal its backing to a terrorist organisation. The brazenness is itself the message, a message directed not at Sikhs in Bharat, but at the ISI’s own operatives, diaspora handlers and global media amplifiers, telling them that the Khalistan project retains state-level patronage. One has to look at trail of its failures in order to comprehend why Karachi has now again emerged as this campaign’s operational hub. In order to undermine and divert Indian government, the ISI started protracted proxy war by aiding the Khalistan movement in Punjab, as this timeline already makes clear. Since 1980s, this tactic has never been formally discontinued. What has changed is the terrain. Operations for SFJ have become significantly harder in Canada and United Kingdom where governments have come under growing domestic and diplomatic pressure to scrutinise separatist activities more carefully. With Western soil getting increasingly inhospitable, Rawalpindi has fallen back on what it controls directly. Offering Karachi Press Club to Pannun is a desperate move to rake up the movement in Bharat after multiple attempts have failed, as officials have assessed. Timing of April 29 announcement was again not coincidental. That same week, Punjab Police dealt another significant blow to ISI – Khalistan terror network recovering a cache that included a rocket-propelled grenade, two packs of RDX, a metallic improvised explosive device, hand grenades, detonators, high-end pistols, wireless sets and timer switches which meant to be used in massive attacks across the state. Director General of Police Gaurav Yadav confirmed the recovery was linked to an ongoing investigation into the Shambhu railway track IED blast case, as well as grenade attack on the Crime Investigation Agency (CIA) office in Moga in 2025. This was not an isolated seizure. In prior weeks, Punjab Police had busted two separate ISI-backed Babbar Khalsa International terror modules recovering RPG launchers, additional IEDs, RDX and a fleet of vehicles with accused persons linked to Pakistan-based handler Harvinder Singh Rinda. The farce of referendum announcement and arms consignments are not parallel stories. They are part of same story, one being propaganda arm and the other as operational arm of the same ISI-directed network. Pannun’s remarks at Karachi press conference stripped away whatever pretence of a civic movement SFJ has had claimed till date. He also claimed that 1.8 million people had participated in the referendum worldwide (a figure that Intelligence Bureau officials dismissed as fabricated, noting that the SFJ has consistently fudged numbers in the past, putting out exaggerated figures to give the impression of traction for a movement that demonstrably lacks it). He pledged to back Pakistan to the fullest in the event of any future tensions with Bharat. He heaped praise on Pakistan Army chief Asim Munir, the same officer who, after Bharat’s Operation Sindoor in May 2025, was promoted to Field Marshal by the Pakistani government for his role in the conflict. A designated terrorist, operating out of New York, cheering a Pakistani general from a Karachi press club, Pannun promised to stand with an adversarial state against Bharat. One must ask: who precisely is Pannun speaking for? The answer is not the Sikh community. The referendum in itself carries no significance whatsoever. SFJ held the first phase of its unofficial and non-binding referendum exercise in London in October 2021. Since then, it has conducted similar theatrics in Canada, Switzerland and Australia, each time claiming record numbers that no independent body has verified. Not one government has moved a single step towards recognising outcome. The reason is structural given that international law’s right to self-determination applies to peoples under colonial domination or foreign military occupation. Bharat’s Sikhs meet neither criterion. They are full citizens of the world’s largest democracy, represented at every level of Bharatiya state from Parliament to judiciary, armed forces to highest office on the land. The legal and philosophical scaffolding for the farcical Khalistan referendum does not exist anywhere in serious jurisprudence. What SFJ produces instead is theatre, elaborate, expensive and entirely hollow. Punjab’s own ballot boxes deliver most decisive verdict. The 2022 Punjab Assembly elections saw Aam Aadmi Party win 92 of 117 seats, majority 79 per cent on an agenda of governance, farmers’ welfare, and electricity. The demand for a separate Sikh homeland did not feature in that mandate. The trauma of

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