Bangladesh Election Geopolitics Hindus Human Rights Politics

Client State or Regional Player?

BNP’s huge victory puts a big responsibility on Tarique Rahman to reshape Bangladesh’s politics, re-balance power equations globally and rejig economic policy formulation. N. C. Bipindra The outcome of February 12, 2026, general elections marked a watershed moment in Bangladesh’s political history. It has dramatically altered balance of power and set the stage for a new era in governance. Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s (BNP) resounding victory signals not merely a change in government but reflect a deeper shift in Bangladesh’s domestic political order. With a commanding parliamentary majority in 13th Jatiya Sangsad, BNP has tromped home to power after nearly two decades in opposition. The political space once dominated by Awami League has undergone an unprecedented shift. The election is widely regarded as most competitive and consequential since political upheaval of 2024 which saw fall of long-serving Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, following mass protests and civil unrest. The absence of Awami League from electoral fray reshaped competitive landscape, effectively ending entrenched two-party rivalry that had defined Bangladeshi politics for decades. In its place, a new alignment has emerged, with BNP consolidating power while Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami got mainstreamed, strengthened its parliamentary footprint as principal opposition formation. At the centre of this political transformation stands Tarique Rahman, BNP leader, who is poised to assume the office of prime minister. His return to frontline politics after years in exile represents a dramatic personal and institutional comeback. For BNP, the electoral mandate is both a vindication of its long campaign against what it described as authoritarian rule and heavy responsibility to deliver institutional reform, economic recovery and political reconciliation. One of the most significant developments accompanying the election was approval of constitutional reforms through a parallel referendum. The amendments introduce term limits for prime minister, strengthen judicial independence and expand safeguards aimed at preventing executive overreach. These reforms are designed to address concerns about excessive concentration of power that had accumulated over past decade and a half. The referendum’s success indicates broad public appetite for systemic recalibration and democratic consolidation, reflecting a desire to prevent re-emergence of dominant-party rule. Domestically, BNP’s victory reshapes political calculus in several critical ways. First, it dismantles old Awami League–BNP binary that had structured electoral competition since the 1990s. The sidelining of the Awami League leaves a significant vacuum in secular-nationalist political space. Whether that space is eventually reoccupied by reconstituted Awami League, a new centrist force or remains fragmented will determine durability of the new political order. For now, BNP’s dominance gives it legislative freedom to pursue policy reforms without the constraints of a fragmented parliament. Second, the rise of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami as a strong opposition block introduces new ideological dynamics into parliamentary politics. Jamaat’s improved electoral performance underscores continued resonance of conservative and religiously oriented political narratives in certain regions. While BNP and Jamaat have historically cooperated tactically, the evolving relationship between them will shape legislative debates on social policy, education, socio-religious equations and governance norms. The presence of a robust Islamist opposition also complicates BNP’s balancing act between appealing to its traditional base and projecting a reformist, moderate image to urban and business constituencies. The collapse or marginalisation of smaller parties, including the once-influential Jatiyo Party highlights another structural shift. The electorate appears to have consolidated around clearer poles of power, reducing role of kingmakers and coalition brokers. This concentration of power can enhance decision-making efficiency but also raises concerns about reduced pluralism if institutional checks are not effectively maintained. The newly introduced constitutional safeguards will therefore face an early stress test under BNP stewardship. Youth participation and civic mobilisation have emerged as defining undercurrents of this electoral cycle. The protests of 2024 were largely driven by younger Bangladeshis demanding accountability, employment opportunities and an end to entrenched patronage networks. Although youth-led political platforms did not translate that energy into sweeping parliamentary gains, their influence on public discourse has been unmistakable. All major parties, including BNP were compelled to address issues such as job creation, digital governance, anti-corruption measures and institutional transparency. The durability of youth engagement will determine whether Bangladesh’s political evolution moves toward participatory reform or reverts to personality-driven politics. Economically, the new government inherits a fragile macroeconomic environment marked by inflationary pressures, currency volatility and strains in the export sector. The garment industry considered backbone of Bangladesh’s economy, experienced disruptions amid political instability. BNP has pledged to restore investor confidence, stimulate private-sector growth and reform regulatory institutions. Achieving these objectives will require careful fiscal management and sustained political stability. A decisive parliamentary majority gives the government room to legislate, but it also removes excuses for policy paralysis. Governance credibility remains a crucial question. The BNP’s previous tenure in government was marred by allegations of corruption and administrative inefficiency. To differentiate itself from the era it replaces, the party must demonstrate a tangible commitment to institutional strengthening rather than patronage redistribution. Early actions on judicial independence, anti-corruption enforcement and civil service reform will serve as signals of intent. Failure to meet heightened public expectations could rapidly erode the legitimacy conferred by the electoral mandate. The broader significance of the 12 February 12 2026 election lies in its redefinition of political legitimacy in Bangladesh. For years, electoral contests were overshadowed by boycotts, disputes and questions about inclusivity. The competitive nature of this poll and comparatively strong voter participation suggest renewed engagement with democratic processes. However, the absence of a historically dominant party complicates narratives of full inclusiveness. Long-term stability will depend on whether political competition remains open and institutionalised rather than episodic and crisis-driven. Ultimately, the 2026 election represents both an end and a beginning. It ends an era defined by prolonged single-party dominance and inaugurates a phase of recalibration in Bangladesh’s domestic politics. When Tarique Rahman assumes office as prime minister, Bangladesh’s external alignments are likely to undergo calibrated adjustments rather than abrupt reversals. Relations with India may enter a more negotiated and transactional phase. Historically, BNP has taken a more sovereignty-centric approach compared to Awami League, particularly on issues such as water sharing,

Bangladesh Bharat Hindus Human Rights Pakistan Policy Security

195

Hindu Pogrom Under a Nobel Laureate’s Watch in Bangladesh

Ethnic Cleansing of Bangladeshi Hindus A Nobel Peace Prize is not a shield against scrutiny. Bangladesh’s post-August 2024 reality demands a hard, evidence-led assessment: violence against Hindus has escalated into a pattern that aligns with internationally recognised elements of ethnic cleansing. This is not a claim made lightly, nor is it built on rhetoric. It is grounded in documented indicators that appear repeatedly across historical cases, from the Balkans to Rwanda and the forced flight of Kashmiri Hindus. Our report, “Hindu Pogrom Under a Nobel Laureate’s Watch in Bangladesh,” examines what changed after the extra-constitutional transition that installed Muhammad Yunus as head of the interim administration. In the immediate aftermath of Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, Hindu homes and temples were specifically targeted, and minority families attempted to flee toward India. This is the first stage seen in many ethnic cleansing trajectories: a sudden collapse of security, followed by identity-targeted attacks that signal “you are not safe here.” Reuters reporting captured these early markers, including vandalism of Hindu temples and homes and attempted flight by minorities. Ethnic cleansing is defined less by slogans and more by method. The method in Bangladesh is visible through six elements. Forced displacement is the predictable output when a minority is subjected to sustained terror and sees no credible protection from the state. When families attempt to flee, when communities retreat into guarded enclaves, when daily life becomes a risk calculation, the displacement is no longer voluntary. It is coerced Violence and terror form the second element. The pattern includes killings by shooting, hacking, abduction, lynching, and arson. The purpose is not only to kill, but to send a message to all remaining members of the community. Dipu Chandra Das’s lynching and burning is an emblematic example of violence designed to intimidate, not merely to harm. Deliberate attacks on civilians are the third element. The victims are not combatants. They are teachers, traders, community leaders, elderly couples, workers, and youth. They are targeted in homes, workplaces, and transit routes, consistent with identity-based selection rather than incidental crime. In the first post-ouster phase, minority groups documented attacks on Hindu homes and temples across multiple districts, underscoring organised targeting rather than isolated incidents. Destruction of property is the fourth element, and it is a strategic tool. Burning homes, looting businesses, and desecrating temples do more than punish. They make return difficult, erase cultural presence, and collapse economic survival. These are classic “remove the population by destroying the conditions of life” tactics. Reuters recorded that hundreds of Hindu homes and businesses were vandalised and multiple temples damaged during the initial post-ouster violence. Confinement is the fifth element. Even without formal camps, a minority can be confined by fear. When communities self-restrict movement, rely on volunteer night-guards, and avoid public visibility, they are being functionally contained. This is how pressure accumulates until exit becomes the only perceived option. Systematic policy is the sixth element. Ethnic cleansing does not require a written decree. In many cases, it proceeds through the combination of organised extremist violence and state failure: weak protection, delayed response, denial of communal targeting, and persistent impunity. Here, the core accountability question is state responsibility. Minority groups have accused the interim government of failing to protect Hindus, and the Yunus administration has denied those allegations. Denial, in the presence of repeated identity-targeted attacks, is not neutrality. It is an enabling posture. This is where the Yunus interim administration becomes central. The issue is not whether Yunus personally directs each assault. The issue is whether the state under his leadership has fulfilled its duty to prevent, protect, investigate, prosecute, and deter identity-based violence. When the outcome is repeated killings, recurring temple attacks, widespread property destruction, and the steady tightening of fear around a minority community, responsibility does not stop at the street-level perpetrator. It rises to the governing authority. The report also examines the role of Islamist forces operating in the current environment. Independent reporting notes that hardline Islamist actors have become more visible and influential since the fall of Hasina. This matters because ethnic cleansing campaigns typically require both ideological mobilisation and operational impunity: a narrative that dehumanises the target, and a system that fails to punish the perpetrators. Bangladesh is at a decision point. It can either reassert protection for all citizens and rebuild the rule of law, or drift toward a majoritarian model where minorities survive only as tolerated remnants. The world has seen this script before. The lesson from Rwanda and the Balkans is that early warning indicators are not “political noise.” They are the architecture of atrocity. What is required now is not performative condemnation. It is measurable action: robust protection for minority localities, transparent investigations, prosecutions that reach organisers and inciters, disruption of extremist mobilisation networks, and independent monitoring that makes denial impossible. Without these steps, the pattern described in our report will continue to harden. The Nobel label does not change the facts on the ground. The responsibility of the interim government is to stop the trajectory. If it cannot, it must be treated internationally as enabling an ethnic cleansing process by omission, denial, and impunity.

Bangladesh Bharat China Economy Geopolitics Human Rights Policy Security

173

Myanmar’s Strategic Crossroads China’s Influence, Western Interests and a Turbulent Election

Arun Anand Myanmar (formerly Burma) sits at a critical crossroads in Asia, both geographically and geopolitically. The country’s location – bordering China, India, Bangladesh, Thailand, and Laos, with a long coastline on the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea – makes it a bridge between South Asia and Southeast Asia. In fact, Myanmar is often described as the “main connecting hub” linking East, South, and Southeast Asia. Its shores provide access to the Indian Ocean’s major shipping lanes, which has long attracted great power interest. In short, Myanmar’s geostrategic location grants it outsized importance: it is the only Southeast Asian nation sharing borders with both India and China, and it offers a land gateway from the Bay of Bengal into the heart of Asia.

Bangladesh’s Political Alliances Ahead of the 2026 Elections: Domestic Shifts and Geopolitical Alignments

Bangladesh Bharat Election Hindus Human Rights Leadership Pakistan Policy Politics

267

Bangladesh’s Political Alliances Ahead of the 2026 Elections: Domestic Shifts and Geopolitical Alignments

By N. C. Bipindra As Bangladesh moves toward the general elections scheduled for February 2026, the country is experiencing its most far-reaching political realignment in decades. The collapse of Sheikh Hasina’s long-entrenched Awami League dominance following the 2024 mass uprising has dismantled the familiar two-party framework and given rise to a fragmented, competitive political arena. New coalitions, revived Islamist forces and youth-driven political platforms are all vying for space, and their manoeuvring is unfolding amid intensifying regional and global interest. For India, China, the United States and Pakistan, the choices Bangladeshi voters and parties make in 2026 will shape not only domestic governance but also Dhaka’s strategic orientation in South Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific. From Awami League Dominance to Political Fragmentation For more than a decade, Bangladesh’s political and foreign policy trajectory was closely associated with Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League. Domestically, the party presided over a strong centralised system that delivered economic growth while constricting political competition. Internationally, it cultivated a close strategic partnership with India, maintained extensive economic and infrastructure engagement with China and managed an increasingly strained relationship with the United States over issues of democracy, elections and human rights. The upheaval of 2024 abruptly ended this equilibrium. The interim administration under Muhammad Yunus pledged institutional reform and credible elections, but it also left the Awami League politically marginalised, creating a vacuum that rival forces are now racing to fill. BNP: Strategic Balancer with a Nationalist Tilt In this transformed landscape, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has emerged as the most significant electoral contender. Long the principal opposition to the Awami League, BNP now sees itself as the natural governing alternative in a post-Hasina order. Its campaign narrative centres on restoring democratic norms, recalibrating economic policy, and reasserting civilian political authority. The death of party chairperson Khaleda Zia in December 2025 has accelerated a generational shift within the BNP, with her son Tarique Rahman assuming a central leadership role and directing alliance-building efforts ahead of the polls. This transition has infused the party with renewed urgency but also heightened scrutiny of its internal cohesion and strategic direction. Geopolitically, a BNP-led government would likely pursue a more balanced and less India-centric foreign policy than the Awami League. While ties with New Delhi would remain important, BNP has historically been more cautious, sometimes sceptical, of India’s influence and would seek a relationship framed more explicitly around reciprocity and sovereignty. At the same time, BNP is open to deepening economic engagement with China, viewing Beijing primarily as a source of investment and infrastructure rather than an ideological partner. Relations with the United States are expected to improve relative to the later Awami League years, as Washington sees BNP as more receptive to competitive politics, though US support would remain contingent on credible elections and limits on Islamist influence. Any warming of ties with Pakistan under a BNP government would likely be symbolic rather than transformative, constrained by historical sensitivities and limited economic incentives. Islamist Bloc: Ideological Identity, Strategic Ambiguity Alongside BNP’s resurgence, the return of Islamist politics has added a new layer of complexity to the electoral contest. The reinstatement of Jamaat-e-Islami has allowed it to rebuild an Islamist-leaning bloc drawing on conservative rural constituencies and religious networks. Although Jamaat is unlikely to dominate nationally, it is well-positioned to influence outcomes in a fragmented parliament. Its re-entry into mainstream politics has unsettled secular and centrist forces, raising questions about Bangladesh’s ideological trajectory after years of enforced secularism under the Awami League. From a geopolitical perspective, Jamaat’s participation is viewed with unease by both India and the United States. New Delhi associates Islamist political mobilisation with potential risks to border security and counter-extremism cooperation, while Washington remains wary of Jamaat’s ideological orientation and historical baggage. Pakistan, by contrast, sees a degree of ideological affinity in Jamaat’s worldview, though this does not automatically translate into strategic alignment. China has taken a more pragmatic stance, showing little concern for Jamaat’s ideology so long as political stability is maintained and economic engagements remain intact. In this sense, Islamist influence complicates Bangladesh’s external relationships without clearly anchoring the country to any single power. National Citizen Party (NCP): Reformist Politics, Geopolitical Ambiguity Another significant player in the evolving political landscape is the National Citizen Party, a youth-led formation that emerged from the 2024 protest movement. The NCP articulates a reformist agenda centred on institutional accountability, anti-corruption measures and generational change in politics. Its rise reflects widespread public fatigue with dynastic politics and entrenched elites. However, the party’s limited grassroots organisation and inexperience have constrained its electoral prospects, pushing it toward alliance calculations that have sparked internal divisions, particularly over potential cooperation with Islamist groups. Internationally, NCP’s discourse resonates most strongly with Western actors, especially the United States, which views its emphasis on transparency and civic rights as aligned with democratic norms. The party has not articulated a clear or consistent stance toward India or China, reflecting both its novelty and its focus on domestic reform rather than foreign policy. Over the longer term, NCP represents a potential new political elite that could tilt Bangladesh toward stronger engagement with Western institutions, but in the immediate electoral cycle, its influence is likely to be indirect, mediated through alliances. Awami League Remnant: Pro-India, Diminished but Not Irrelevant Although the Awami League has been largely sidelined, its residual networks within the bureaucracy, business community and local governance structures continue to matter. Any partial rehabilitation of the party would be welcomed in New Delhi, which still regards the Awami League as its most reliable partner in Bangladesh. However, strained relations with the United States and deep hostility toward Pakistan would remain defining features of an Awami League foreign policy orientation, limiting its room for manoeuvre even if it regains political relevance. Democracy, Stability, and Strategic Competition For the United States, 2026 election represents a test of process rather than personalities. Washington’s primary concerns revolve around electoral credibility, political pluralism and the containment of violent extremism. A BNP-led or broadly technocratic

Bangladesh Bharat Hindus Human Rights Pakistan Security Terrorism

306

Bangladesh: A Nobel Halo, an Islamist State,Terror Networks and Radicalisation as State Policy

Rahul PAWA | @imrahulpawa (X) Global jihadists see an opening: a chance to reconnect their Pakistani networks with Bangladeshi extremists, reversing years of counterterrorism and counter-radicalisation gains. On a mid-December night in Bangladesh, 25-year-old Dipu Chandra Das, a Hindu garment factory worker was beaten by a frenzy of Islamists, hung from a tree, and set ablaze on a highway. His alleged “crime”? A rumor that he insulted Islam. Yet investigators have since confirmed there is zero evidence that Dipu ever blasphemed at all. Not one can point to a single derogatory remark he made; “no one saw or heard” anything offensive, a Rapid Action Battalion officer admitted. In other words, an innocent Hindu man was lynched and immolated over a lie. One would expect such a medieval atrocity, captured on video and circulated worldwide, to provoke an outpouring of shock from international human rights watchdogs. Imagine if the roles were reversed: a Muslim man lynched and burned by a mob in a Hindu-majority country. The global indignation would be instantaneous and deafening. But in Dipu’s case, the outrage has been oddly muted. Major human rights organizations and Western governments that normally champion minority rights barely mustered a whisper of protest. The deafening silence of these supposed watchdogs is as harrowing as the crime itself, and it exposes a disturbing double standard. Bangladesh’s own minority rights groups vehemently condemned the lynching, the Bangladesh Hindu-Buddhist-Christian Unity Council decried the “so-called blasphemy” killing as an assault on communal harmony. But where were the urgent press releases from Geneva, the high-profile tweets from Human Rights Watch, the emergency sessions at the UN? Their voices have been either absent or astonishingly subdued. Such restraint stands in stark contrast to their usual activism when religious persecution occurs elsewhere. The message implicit in this silence is chilling: that the lynching of a poor Hindu man in Bangladesh is somehow a lesser transgression on the global human rights ledger. The hypocrisy extends to Bangladesh’s interim rulers. The current government, led by Nobel Peace laureate Muhammad Yunus, swept to power in August 2024 after a Islamist-led “Monsoon Revolution” toppled Sheikh Hasina’s democratically elected administration. Internationally, Yunus is venerated for championing human rights and equality. Domestically, his regime’s actions tell a darker story. Chief Adviser Yunus was quick to issue a condemnation of Dipu’s lynching, vowing the perpetrators “will not be spared”. However, such words ring hollow against the regime’s track record: while it denounces one mob killing, it has concurrently overseen the release or escape of hundreds of criminals and Islamist extremists since taking power. At Hadi’s funeral, Yunus himself delivered a eulogy that should have set off international alarm bells. In front of tens of thousands, Yunus heaped praise on Hadi’s “mantra” and vowed to fulfill Hadi’s vision “generation after generation”. Let’s be clear: Hadi was explicitly known for his anti-India and anti-Hindu rhetoric and polarising, Islamist-tinged politics. By publicly sanctifying Hadi’s ideals, Yunus sent a dangerous signal that anti-India and anti-Hindu dictate is now quasi-official ideology in Dhaka. Unsurprisingly, the fallout was swift. Days after Hadi’s death, Bangladesh erupted in fury, not just against alleged conspirators in his killing, but against perceived Indian influence. Mobs attacked the Indian Assistant High Commission in Chittagong, and hundreds of protesters marched on the Indian High Commission in Dhaka, chanting anti-India slogans and even hurling stones at diplomatic compounds. Bangladesh’s police hinted (without evidence) that Hadi’s assassins might have fled to India – where ex-PM Hasina has taken refuge – a claim that only inflamed public paranoia. In the frenzy, fact and fiction mattered little: ‘anti-India and anti-Hindu agenda’ was the rallying cry. Caught in the crossfire were Bangladesh’s Hindu minorities, now doubly scapegoated as both “blasphemers” at home and perceived fifth-columnists for India. Attacks on Hindu homes, temples and community leaders have spiked over the past year and a half. Even before Dipu Das’s lynching, minority groups warned that the post-Hasina political climate had emboldened extremists to settle scores with Hindus, Buddhists and Christians. Tragically, those warnings proved prescient in Bhaluka, Mymensingh, when Dipu’s killers exploited a religious rumor to unleash lethal mob “justice.” Police and RAB have detained ten suspects, Mohammad Limon Sarkar, Mohammad Tarek Hossain, Mohammad Manik Mia, Ershad Ali, Nijum Uddin, Alomgir Hossain, Mohammad Miraj Hossain Akon, Mohammad Azmol Hasan Sagir, Mohammad Shahin Mia, and Mohammad Nazmul, aged 19 to 46. The interim regime’s, especially Mohammad Yunis’s own actions, from baiting an anti-Indian agitator to allowing Islamist hardliners back into public life, have fertilised the soil in which Islamist extremism and radicalisation grows. Perhaps most cynical of all has been the Bangladesh Foreign Ministry’s complicity and the atrocious attempt to downplay these horrors. When India officially protested the mob killing of a Hindu Bangladeshi (and even a small peoples demonstration in New Delhi decrying it), Dhaka’s response was dismissive. Foreign Affairs Adviser Mohammad Touhid Hossain bristled at the notion that Dipu Das’s lynching had anything to do with minority targeting. He then lectured that “such incidents occur across the region” and every country has a responsibility to address themas if mob lynching and immolation of religious minorities is just business as usual in South Asia, nothing special. This whataboutist shrug is nothing short of an attempt to normalise hate crimes. By equating a communal lynching with generic law-and-order problems everywhere, Bangladesh’s officials signal that the brutal murder of a Hindu for an unproven slur is not a national emergency but a routine matter that merits no extra soul-searching. This attitude is profoundly dangerous. Bangladesh was founded on principles of secularism and communal harmony in 1971, a legacy now under siege. To shrug off anti-Hindu violence as “common in the region” is to abandon the very idea of a pluralistic Bangladesh. It emboldens extremists and tells persecuted minorities that they are essentially on their own. Indeed, Islamist radicals have heard the message loud and clear. With the new regime’s indulgence, dormant terrorist networks are roaring back to life. Key jihadist leaders have re-entered the fray, for example,

A Nation at Risk While the World Watches

Bangladesh Bharat Hindus Human Rights Pakistan Policy Security Terrorism

180

A Nation at Risk While the World Watches

By R K Raina The events that unfolded in Dhaka this week should end any remaining illusion that Bangladesh’s current political drift is a contained or internal matter. On Wednesday afternoon, hundreds of protesters marched towards the Indian High Commission under the banner of July Oikya, raising anti-India slogans and issuing open threats against a diplomatic mission. Police restraint prevented immediate escalation, but the message was unmistakable: radical forces now feel emboldened enough to challenge diplomatic norms in broad daylight. The protest was not spontaneous. July Oikya, a front comprising several groups linked to the July mass uprising, had announced its “March to Indian High Commission” in advance. Its leaders warned that they would forcibly enter the High Commission if their demands were not met. These included the return of individuals convicted in the so-called July massacre case, including former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and an end to what they described as “Indian conspiracies” against Bangladesh. Such rhetoric mirrors the familiar language of Islamist mobilisation across the region, where external enemies are invoked to justify internal radicalisation. What makes this incident especially alarming is not merely the hostility directed at India, but the broader political context in which it occurred. Several fundamentalist and extremist figures, previously detained on terrorism-related charges, have been released in recent months under the current interim administration. Many of these elements are now active on the streets, shaping protest narratives and openly threatening foreign missions. This is not accidental. It is the predictable outcome of legitimising radical actors under the pretext of political transition. Threatening a foreign high commission violates the most basic norms of the diplomatic community. When such acts are tolerated, or downplayed as expressions of popular anger, the consequences extend far beyond bilateral relations. They signal a breakdown of state authority and a willingness to allow extremist mobilisation to dictate political space. This moment must be understood within Bangladesh’s longer historical arc. The country was born in 1971 as a rejection of Pakistan’s ideological model. Bengali nationalism asserted that language, culture and democratic choice mattered more than religious uniformity imposed by the state. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman articulated this vision decades earlier, insisting that Bengal’s history and identity could not be erased. That vision guided Bangladesh through its most successful periods of economic growth and social stability. The forces now gaining ground stand in direct opposition to that legacy. Pakistan’s role in this trajectory is being conspicuously ignored. Since 1971, Islamabad has never reconciled itself to the idea of a secular, culturally confident Bangladesh. Its historical hostility to Bengali identity culminated in genocide, and its ideological influence has since flowed through organisations that opposed Bangladesh’s independence. Jamaat-e-Islami, banned for its collaboration with Pakistan during the liberation war and now politically rehabilitated, remains the clearest example. Its ideological alignment with Pakistan is neither incidental nor historical trivia; it is central to the current moment. Yet while these forces resurface, much of the world has chosen silence. Worse, some have framed recent developments as a domestic political correction, urging restraint while avoiding any serious engagement with the ideological direction Bangladesh is being pushed towards. Treating the rise of radical street power, the intimidation of diplomatic missions and the release of extremist figures as internal matters is not neutrality. It is abdication. This selective blindness sets a dangerous precedent. Terrorism, it appears, is being judged differently depending on the target and the geography. Threats against Indian diplomatic property are brushed aside, while the same actors would be condemned instantly if they appeared near other embassies. Such double standards undermine the very international norms. The regional consequences are serious. South Asia is already burdened by fragile borders, unresolved conflicts and ideological fault lines. Allowing Bangladesh to slide towards Pakistan-style politics, marked by street radicalism, ideological hostility and economic uncertainty, risks destabilising an entire neighbourhood. The early economic signals are already troubling. Political instability and radical mobilisation have begun to erode confidence in what was once one of Asia’s most promising growth stories. Equally at stake is Bangladesh’s cultural future. The sustained assault on symbols of the liberation movement, and the replacement of Bengali nationalism with political Islam represent an attempt to rewrite the country’s founding narrative. History shows that such projects do not end with symbolism. They reshape education, law and social norms, often irreversibly. World policymakers should be under no illusion. Pakistan itself is a case study in how tolerating or enabling radical forces for short-term stability leads to long-term dysfunction. Decades of engagement have failed to undo the damage caused by ideological capture of the state. To allow Bangladesh to move down the same path is not a policy error; it is a strategic failure. The warning signs today are far clearer. Threats to diplomatic missions, the release of extremists and the open mobilisation of radical fronts are not normal features of democratic transition. They are indicators of state erosion. If the world continues to look away, it will share responsibility for what follows. The erosion of peace in this region, the empowerment of extremist networks and the slow destruction of Bengali cultural identity will not remain confined within Bangladesh’s borders. Silence, in this case, is not caution. It is complicity. (Author is a former diplomat and policy commentator focused on South Asian geopolitics, Tibet and India’s neighbourhood. He contributes to leading think tanks and policy platforms on regional and civilisational issues.)

1971 Genocide and the Unhealed Scars of Bangladesh

Bangladesh Bharat Hindus Human Rights Pakistan Policy Security Terrorism

175

1971 Genocide and the Unhealed Scars of Bangladesh

Bangladesh may paper over its wounds one by one, but the scars of systematic genocide during 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War will remain permanent. Pummy M. Pandita The 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War was marked by a systematic campaign of genocide carried out by the Pakistan Army and its supporting forces, Razakars, against the Bengali population, pro-independence activists, intellectuals and civilians. The Razakar Force, officially established by the Pakistan Army under the command of General Tikka Khan and acknowledged as a proxy paramilitary entity, was pivotal in the perpetration of these offenses at the direct command from Pakistan. More than fifty years post-independence, Bangladesh persistently pursued international acknowledgment and a formal apology from Pakistan; however, these requests remain unmet. The enduring impact of violence and denial has resulted in lasting sociopolitical wounds that continue to manifest in both domestic and diplomatic contexts. Established pursuant to the East Pakistan Razakars Ordinance issued in August 1971, this militia group was intentionally created to serve as a local support mechanism for Pakistan’s counter-insurgency efforts against the Bengalis of erstwhile East Pakistan. The establishment and functioning of this militia group were crucial to the genocidal tactics employed by the military leadership of Pakistan in order to stifle the aspirations for independence from Pakistan. The contingent comprised roughly 50,000 volunteers, primarily sourced from Islamist groupings in Pakistan political groups including Jamaat-e-Islami, Al Badr, Al Shams and others that resisted Bengali autonomy. In stark contrast to purported accounts, the Razakars were not merely engaged in “internal security” operations; they were complicit in heinous acts of mass murder, sexual violence, torture and terror directed at civilians, with a particular focus on Hindu communities, political dissidents, scholars and advocates for independence from Pakistan. After the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971, approximately 200,000 women and girls, predominantly Hindus, were raped by the Pakistani Army and its allied proxies (Razakars). These heinous acts were part of an effort to create a “pure” Muslim race in Bangladesh. The targeting of Hindu women has continued, with sexual violence being used to intimidate and displace Hindu families. Multiple thoroughly recorded massacres during 1971 by Razakars alongside the Pakistan Army, encompassing extensive killings in Jathibhanga (approximately 3,000–3,500 victims), Gabha Narerkathi (95–100 Hindu victims), Akhira and Char Bhadrasan, among others, each exemplifying methodical assaults on defenseless populations. In December 2019, almost fifty years post Bangladeshi independence, the Government of Bangladesh released an official enumeration of 10,789 individuals recognized as Razakars, a clear initiative to identify and document those who supported the Pakistan Army’s operations against the Bengali population. The aim was to guarantee that future generations retain awareness of the genuine perpetrators of violence and treason, opposing any efforts to obscure or sanitise this historical narrative. Notwithstanding these actions, the pursuit of justice remains unfulfilled and the scars of history endure. The lack of an official apology transcends mere diplomatic obstruction; it signifies a refusal to acknowledge historical responsibility, thereby exacerbating the anguish of survivors, the families of victims and the broader communities deeply affected by the events of 1971. For a significant segment of Bangladeshi society, especially among Hindu communities that were disproportionately targeted, the ongoing lack of recognition constitutes not merely an omission but a deliberate erasure. It denies victims and survivors both justice and historical recognition, making their suffering invisible and original crimes even worse. This silence reinforces impunity, invalidates experienced trauma and indicates a systemic reluctance to address the violence perpetrated by Razakars and Pakistan Army against these communities. The Razakar legacy stands as a profound and enduring mark in the collective consciousness of Bangladesh, serving as a proof to the genocidal tactics employed by the Pakistan Army and its accomplices. It highlights the necessity for healing from mass atrocities, which hinges on the pursuit of truth and formal accountability, elements that cannot be fully achieved without clear recognition and apology from those who hold historical responsibility. The plight of Hindu communities in present-day Bangladesh finds its roots in the tragic events of the 1971 Liberation War and this suffering has persisted in a sporadic manner throughout the subsequent decades. In the year 1971, the Pakistan Army, in conjunction with the Razakars, engaged in state-sanctioned violence that resulted in widespread atrocities, including mass killings, sexual violence and the deliberate persecution of the Hindu community as a distinct religious group. The immediate consequences resulted in significant refugee movements and a sustained demographic reduction of Hindus in Bangladesh. Since the attainment of independence from Pakistan, there has been a recurring pattern of communal violence, biased governance practices, assaults on property and places of worship and a prevailing sense of impunity for those who commit such acts. This troubling trend has notably escalated during periods of political instability in 2024–25, resulting in cycles characterised by fear, displacement and the erosion of rights. Historical context: targeted violence in 1971 “Operation Searchlight” on March 25, 1971, started the Bangladesh Liberation War, which lasted from March to December 1971. The campaign conducted by the Pakistan military specifically aimed at Bengali freedom fighters, scholars, students and, with notable intensity, Hindu civilians. Recent and ongoing research show that there were coordinated mass executions, gang rapes used as weapons against women (especially Hindu women) and communal cleansing in towns and rural areas where Hindus lived. Independent scholarly reviews, government compilations of incident reports and survivor testimonies delineate massacres nationwide, enumerating particular incidents with substantial civilian casualties. Scholars and post-war accounts emphasise that although Bengalis were the primary targets, Hindus were subjected to extreme brutality due to their perceived political and cultural alignment with India and the Bengali freedom struggle. The ongoing vulnerability of Hindu communities in Bangladesh from 1972 to 2024 has been perpetuated by a combination of systemic impunity, inadequate legal accountability and politicised justice. Post 1971 period promised justice, but convictions for war crimes were few and far between, allowing many criminals and their networks to become part of local power structures again. Even when accountability mechanisms like the International Crimes Tribunal were used, the idea and practice of

Bangladesh Pakistan Terrorism

175

Bangladesh’s self-goal: tilt to Pakistan

Jamat e Islami and Muhammed Yunus seek to shape Bangladesh into politically radical Islamic nation and threaten its Bengali Identity N. C. Bipindra During a 1955 debate in Pakistan’s Second Constituent Assembly on whether the eastern province should be called East Bengal or East Pakistan, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman said, “We have demanded so many times that you should use East Bengal instead of East Pakistan. The word Bengal has a history and a tradition of its own.” Today, Bangladeshis share Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s sentiments: Bengali is their ethnicity and Bangladesh is their nation. In fact, Bangladesh’s formation in 1971 was built on Bengali nationalism spearheaded by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the Father of Bangladesh. In August 2024, during uprising that led to ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, radical Islamic groups with an affinity to Pakistan were unleashed under the garb of student protests who attempted to vandalise the legacy of true hero of Bangla identity Sheikh Mujibur. The same Sheikh Mujiibur who was hailed as greatest Bengali of all time ahead of Rabindranath Tagore by BBC Bengali Language Service Survey, about whom Cuban leader Fidel Castro once said, “I have not seen the Himalayas. But I have seen Sheikh Mujib.” Pakistan has historically rejoiced vandalism of Bengali identity (in fact, any identity other than their own). Urdu-speaking Pakistanis, who hate local languages including Punjabi or Sindhi, have neither sympathy nor commonality with Bengali culture, language, or societal beliefs. Since partition in 1947, the policies and outlook of Pakistan have been indifferent, irrational and mired in hatred for Bengali identity of Bangladesh. The entire world took note of utter neglect and callous treatment meted out to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in aftermath of cyclone Bhola in 1970 by the Pakistani central government. To date, the aid that was promised by Pakistan to East Pakistan has not been transferred. Rather than offering a nursing hand, a year later, Pakistan launched terror on the streets of Bangladesh under Operation Searchlight. The horror of ‘Operation Searchlight’ undertaken by Pakistani military on March 25, 1971, to crush Bengali nationalist movement after Awami League won a majority in the general elections is still fresh and painful for the conscience of Bengali people. The stark and ignoble truth about Pakistan’s genocide in Bangladesh is that it was a conscious military policy steered at the government level to undermine Bengali society and in some cases attempt to change Bengali gene pool. For over 52 years, Pakistan has neither established nor attempted open, direct, people-to-people connections with those inside Bangladesh who support Bangla nationalism. Of the hundreds of cuts inflicted by Pakistan on Bangladesh, the most noticeable is an ongoing attempt at systemic erosion of Bangla identity and its replacement with the ideology of political Islam, which is the basis of governance in Pakistan. The underlying role of Jamat e Islami, a radical organisation which was banned in 2013 (and such other organisations), is hard to miss in the ouster of a democratically elected government in 2024. No wonder Jamat e Islami has found favour with Bangladesh’s current interim administration under Muhammed Yunus, who lifted the ban on the radical organisation. While other Islamist militant groups in Bangladesh do have connections with Pakistan, since 1971, Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh has been Pakistan’s true friend and partner. These radical Islamic groups have left no stone unturned to shred the fabric of Bangla identity and colour the whole of Bangladesh in politically radicalised Islam. Therefore, people of Bangladesh need to view Pakistan’s recent warming to Bangladesh through a historic and nationalistic lens. The recent developments coincide with an unusual wave of military and diplomatic engagement between Bangladesh and Pakistan, marked by the visit of Pakistan’s Navy Chief to Dhaka and the first docking of a Pakistani naval vessel at Chattogram port since 1971. Bangladesh, at this stage, must remember and side with friends who were steadfast with them through their biggest economic transformation and offered a helping hand in times of crisis. The more Bangladesh leans towards becoming Pakistan-like in text and tenor, its economy will further tank. Radicalism and a healthy economy simply cannot coexist. Over the past year alone, Bangladesh’s GDP growth has fallen from a flying 6.1% to crawling 3.76%. A year ago, Bangladesh’s growth was comparable to India’s and China’s and was considered one of the enterprising economies in Asia. Bangladesh must understand that Pakistan, which is mired with deep corruption, radicalism, a struggling economy, and is often part of the FATF ‘grey list’ and is home to most of the recognised terrorist organisations in the world, and works as a puppet state to China, cannot assist Bangladesh in any meaningful way. On the contrary, Bangladesh must seek a rational division of the pre-1971 assets of the state of Pakistan, and the aid that was promised in the aftermath of Cyclone Bhola. The evidence conclusively indicates that the recent shift in Bangladesh–Pakistan relations would further push political instability in Bangladesh, foster political Islam, provoke conflicts along shared borders, and, most importantly, pose a threat to the Bangla identity, which is the basis of the foundation of Bangladesh. Additionally, fondness towards Pakistan would dent Bangladesh’s image at world forums. Friendship with a failing (failed) state like Pakistan cannot bring more than this. The world has faith in Bangladesh; that Bangladesh would learn its lessons from history, as exact events of 1971 may not repeat themselves, but they may rhyme. Georg Hegel, a German philosopher, once said, “What experience and history teach is that nations and governments have never learned anything from history or acted upon any lessons they might have drawn from it.” This now sounds true and apt for Bangladesh’s recent shift towards Pakistan. (Author is Chairman, Law and Society Alliance, a New Delhi-based think tank, and guest columnist with CIHS)

Situational Analysis - Geopolitics, Hindu Hate, Islamisation and Decay of Democracy in Bangladesh

Bangladesh Hindus Human Rights Security

522

Situational Analysis – Geopolitics, Hindu Hate, Islamisation and Decay of Democracy in Bangladesh

Decay of Democracy in Bangladesh Bangladesh faces a dangerous convergence of Islamic resurgence, targeted minority persecution, and democratic regression. This situational analysis explores convergence of internal unrest and external influence, especially through narrative warfare and strategic alignments, which has accelerated the deterioration of democratic governance and encouraged radical elements in the post-2024 scenario. For more details…….

Bangladesh

531

Democracy Roiled in Bangladesh

In a move unprecedented in political history, Bangladesh’s caretaker government, headed by Muhammad Yunus, has imposed a blanket ban on the Awami League (AL), one of the nation’s most politically influential parties in history. The ban, put into effect via newly interpreted anti-terrorism and war crimes acts, represents an unprecedented turn in Bangladesh’s political history. With neither public trial nor parliament debate, this action has brought to fore serious issues of political impartiality, deterioration in democratic polity and legitimacy of transitional power.

Blog Post