China Defence Security Technology

China’s Defence Ministry Releases Counter-drone Video as Shaheds Saturate West Asia

Beijing did not send troops to West Asia. It sent a marketing clip. Rahul PAWA | x – @imrahulpawa On 6 March 2026, as Iranian Shaheds continued to breach air defences across six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states simultaneously, China’s Ministry of National Defence posted a 35-second clip on its official English-language website. With few sentences about detecting “low-altitude, low-speed, and small aerial targets such as drones.” The timing was surgical. The product was not. This is what Chinese defence marketing looks like in 2026: exploit a live war, insert an unproven system into a panic-driven procurement conversation, and bank on customers too frightened, too indebted, or too technically unsophisticated to ask the right questions. War That Created the Window On 28 February 2026, Israel and the United States struck Iran’s military infrastructure under Operation Roaring Lion and Operation Epic Fury. Tehran answered within hours. Operation True Promise IV sent ballistic missiles and UAS simultaneously into Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the UAE. Within 36 hours, all six GCC states had been struck by Iran. No drill. No simulation. Nightmare Gulf war planners had war gamed for twenty years arrived at once. Iran’s UAS campaign did not relent. By 5 March, UAE alone had tracked 1,072 inbound UAS and 196 ballistic missiles. On that single day, 131 aerial threats were engaged over Emirati airspace. Iran’s Shahed variants, types 136, 107, and 238, constituted the bulk of confirmed rounds. The economics were catastrophic for defenders. Gulf interceptors ran between three million and twelve million dollars a shot. A Shahed costs hundreds. Iran could sustain the arithmetic indefinitely. Gulf capitals could not. Defence ministries across Asia, Africa, and the West Asia drew the same conclusion simultaneously: counter-UAS capability was no longer optional. They needed a system. They needed to procure one publicly. They needed it now. Beijing had been waiting for precisely this moment. What the Release Actually Says The MND release is worth reading with forensic care. The Radar-Video Fusion Platform, it states, “combines radar and video means” and is “capable of guiding the video system to conduct real-time tracking once targets are detected by radar.” It identifies “moving ground targets within the designated area” and “low-altitude, low-speed, and small aerial targets such as drones” as its detection targets. Strip the language and what remains is this: a fixed post, a radar that cues a camera, operating within a bounded area. The system detects and tracks. It does not intercept. It does not jam. It does not kill. No engagement range. No reaction time. No kill mechanism of any kind. This is the front end of a kill chain presented without the kill chain. Against 131 inbound Shaheds in a single operational day, a border camera that hands off to a video tracker is not a counter-UAS solution. It is a perimeter sensor with a marketing budget. PLA Combat Record That Should End the Conversation The question of whether Chinese military technology performs under fire is no longer theoretical. It has been answered, repeatedly, in the field, by China’s own export customers. Operation Sindoor, May 2025. Pakistan deployed its Chinese-supplied air defence grid against Indian Air Force strikes. Chinese-made HQ-9 and HQ-16 surface-to-air missile systems failed to intercept a single incoming missile. The YLC-8E anti-stealth radar at Chunian Air Base was destroyed. Wing Loong-II UAS were shot down by Indian air defences. Indian Rafale jets using SCALP precision missiles bypassed the Chinese-supplied grid entirely. PL-15 air-to-air missiles fired by Pakistani J-10C jets either missed or malfunctioned, with some reportedly landing in Indian territory. Pakistan’s defeat was total. Its arsenal was 81 percent Chinese-supplied. The pattern did not begin in 2025. Myanmar grounded the majority of its Chinese-supplied jets due to radar defects and unresolved structural faults years after delivery. Nigeria returned seven of nine Chengdu F-7 fighters to China for urgent repairs after a series of crashes, then abandoned the fleet entirely and purchased Italian M-346 aircraft instead. Pakistan’s F-22P frigates reported radar degradation, engine overheating, faulty Gimbal Assembly motors, and compromised missile guidance. Chinese manufacturers acknowledged the defects and declined to repair them on any workable timeline. Saudi Arabia acquired China’s SkyShield laser counter-drone system. In desert operational conditions it experienced significant performance degradation. A laser counter-drone platform that fails in desert heat is not a serious military proposition. This is not a pattern of isolated incidents. It is a pattern of systemic failure across platforms, across countries, across years. A Camera on a Stick China’s approach to military exports relies on perception management over battlefield performance. Advanced-looking systems. Orchestrated reveals. English-language portal releases timed to maximum global anxiety. The 6 March video is the template made visible: a border post dressed as a solution, a sensor dressed as a kill chain, published at the precise moment that counter-UAS procurement panic was highest in recorded history. Radar-Video Fusion Platform may perform adequately on a quiet frontier against a lone surveillance UAS in permissive conditions. That is what it was built for. It was not built to operate inside a Shahed saturation campaign. It cannot engage. It cannot degrade. It cannot stop a single inbound round. Against 131 aerial threats in a single day it can watch and record them arriving. In the Gulf war of 2026, that is not a military capability. It is a camera on a stick. The release was not written for engineers. Any competent defence engineer notes the absence of an engagement mechanism, reads “within the designated area,” and closes the browser. It was written for procurement officials in anxious capitals under political pressure to show populations that something is being acquired. In that market, Beijing is not selling a solution. It is selling the appearance of one. Based on the record from Islamabad to Lagos to Naypyidaw, the customers are still buying. They just keep finding out what they actually paid for. (The author is an international criminal lawyer and director of research at New Delhi based think tank Centre for Integrated

China Geopolitics Policy Security United States Video War World

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As Iran Fights the Allies, China Learns from It

China did not start this war and will not finish it. What it will do is walk away with something more valuable than victory; the data, the proof, the blueprint for the confrontation it is quietly rehearsing on the other side of the world in the western Pacific. Rahul PAWA | March 3, 2026 | x- imrahulpawa When three American F-15E Strike Eagles spiralled out of the sky over Kuwait on the night of March 1, the story that dominated headlines was one of tragic friendly fire. Kuwaiti Patriot batteries, overwhelmed by the sheer volume of Iranian drones and ballistic missiles crisscrossing the Gulf, misidentified their own side’s aircraft in a chaotic, saturated battlespace. All six aircrew ejected safely. The jets did not survive. CENTCOM was unambiguous: friendly fire in a saturated sky, not Iranian action. Iranian state media claimed otherwise. The Pentagon held its line. But the deeper question remains: why that sky was so saturated in the first place. The answer leads not to Tehran. It leads to Beijing. China has not fired a single shot in this war. It has condemned the strikes on Tehran as violations of international law. And yet the weapons flying over the Gulf, the drones that refused to be jammed, the missiles that found their targets, the internet blackout sealing 93 million Iranians from the outside world, all rest on a technological architecture Beijing spent a decade carefully constructing. Not as charity. As a field test. This is the war behind the war. China using Iran as a live laboratory for systems it will one day need against adversaries whose weapons it is now learning to defeat. Every drone that navigates through Western jamming. Every radar that acquires a stealth aircraft. Every $20,000 drone that forces the expenditure of a $4 million Patriot interceptor. Beijing is watching, logging, and learning. The most operationally significant Chinese technology active in this conflict is BeiDou-3, China’s sovereign alternative to GPS. Following Isreal-Iran’s Twelve-Day War last year, in which GPS spoofing partially blinded Iran’s guided munitions, Iran drew a hard lesson. It formally abandoned the American system and transitioned its military navigation architecture to BeiDou. The encrypted network resists allied electronic warfare; its integrated short-message service sustains command node communication even when terrestrial infrastructure is destroyed. Iran’s 2026 missile campaign has demonstrated navigational resilience its 2025 predecessor lacked, striking targets across all six GCC states simultaneously and forcing the UAE alone to intercept 161 of 174 ballistic missiles fired at it. But BeiDou is not merely Iran’s tool. It is China’s proof of concept, a navigation system battle-hardened against the world’s most sophisticated jamming apparatus, stress-tested under real combat conditions. The telemetry flowing back to Beijing from every Iranian strike package is worth more than any simulation its engineers could run. The same scenario applies to the YLC-8B anti-stealth radar, reportedly transferred to Iran after the 2025 war. Engineered to operate on VHF frequencies that defeat radar-absorbent coatings, it addresses the defining challenge of modern air warfare: how do you acquire what your adversary designed to be invisible? Whether the YLC-8B batteries survived the opening strikes of Operation Epic Fury remains unclear, the IDF claims over 200 Iranian air defence systems destroyed. But even degraded performance data feeds directly into China’s own development cycle. Iran is the test range. The PLA is the end customer. This Chinese pattern of real-world testing was visible long before this war. Last May, during India’s Operation Sindoor strikes on terrorist and Pakistani army infrastructure, Chinese-origin PL-15 beyond-visual-range missiles and HQ-9 surface-to-air systems were active on the Pakistani side. Beijing opportunistically leveraged the conflict to test its weapons in live combat. It did not stop at data collection. The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission confirmed that China deployed fake social media accounts to circulate AI-generated imagery purporting to show debris from aircraft destroyed by Chinese weapons. A deliberate campaign to discredit India’s Rafale purchase and advance sales of China’s J-35. Chinese embassy officials reportedly persuaded Indonesia to pause a Rafale procurement already in process. Beijing said nothing publicly. It did not need to. Iran and Pakistan have become China’s two most valuable proving grounds. One tests area-denial and air defence against American and Israeli platforms. The other tests beyond-visual-range air combat against Indian platforms. China supplied roughly 82% of Pakistan’s arms imports between 2019 and 2023, it had substantial strategic investment in the outcome. Together, both theatres are delivering what no exercise can replicate: live performance data against real Western hardware. The supply chain completes the picture. On February 25, three days before the strikes began, the US Treasury sanctioned procurement networks supplying precursor chemicals and sensitive machinery to Iran’s IRGC missile and drone programmes, following 2025 designations of six Hong Kong and PRC-based entities feeding Iranian arms production. The $20,000 drones flooding the Gulf, cheap enough to force the expenditure of interceptors costing two hundred times more are products of that chain. A think tank report warned that US high-end interceptors including SM-3, PAC-3 MSE and THAAD could be depleted within days of sustained high-tempo operations. That attrition calculus is now live. Away from the battlefield, Iranian internet connectivity has collapsed to roughly 4% of normal levels. The tools enforcing that blackout bear Chinese brand names: Huawei and ZTE deep-packet-inspection platforms, Tiandy facial-recognition hardware explicitly supplying the IRGC. The function is unambiguous; seal the population off, suppress evidence of military degradation, keep the regime viable long enough to matter. Prima facie, none of this has made Iran invincible. Khamenei is dead. The IDF has conducted over 700 strike missions. What Chinese technology has done, in both theatres, is keep the fight going longer than it otherwise would have, and send data back to Beijing that no laboratory can replicate. The drones are still flying. The missiles are still navigating. The lights inside Iran are still off. And in Beijing, someone is taking very careful notes. Preparing for the western Pacific. (Rahul Pawa is an international criminal lawyer and

Bangladesh Bharat China Economy Geopolitics Human Rights Policy Security

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Myanmar’s Strategic Crossroads China’s Influence, Western Interests and a Turbulent Election

Arun Anand Myanmar (formerly Burma) sits at a critical crossroads in Asia, both geographically and geopolitically. The country’s location – bordering China, India, Bangladesh, Thailand, and Laos, with a long coastline on the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea – makes it a bridge between South Asia and Southeast Asia. In fact, Myanmar is often described as the “main connecting hub” linking East, South, and Southeast Asia. Its shores provide access to the Indian Ocean’s major shipping lanes, which has long attracted great power interest. In short, Myanmar’s geostrategic location grants it outsized importance: it is the only Southeast Asian nation sharing borders with both India and China, and it offers a land gateway from the Bay of Bengal into the heart of Asia.

International Pakistan Terrorism Uncategorized

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2001 INDIAN PARLIAMENT ATTACK

Pummy Mattoo Pandita 13 December 2001 is remembered as a turning point in Bharat’s democratic history, when democracy was not merely challenged but violently attacked by Jaish-e-Mohammed, targeting not just lives, but the very sovereignty, constitutional stability and civic trust on which the nation stands.

China Economy Hindus International Misinformation Policy World

215

Reject Hindu Label to Slow Growth

Hinduphobia, colonial enslavement led certain intellectuals, socialists to frame Hinduness for tardy progress. Real culprits are socialists and their handlers! K.A.Badarinath It’s a colonial era slur. None has the right to deride about two billion Hindus living in 100 countries on some pretext or the other. Debunking Hindutva as being somehow responsible for Bharat’s tardy progress or sub-optimal GDP growth of 3.5 per cent in 1950s and 1980s era reeks of hatred. At last week’s Hindustan Times annual leadership summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi rightly pointed to colonial mind-set for framing Hindu faith with tardy economic growth. Big question is why does one attribute slow economic progress and development to Hindutva? Why do some scholars make derogatory remarks and prejudiced framework to point fingers at Hindu people? Why do self-proclaimed intellectuals and economists ignore Bharat’s seven to eight per cent growth in last two decades was precisely due to these very Hindus? Colonial overhang and socialist underpinning of some intellectuals may have led to bracket low growth with Hindutva. As per The Oxford Companion to Economics in India, economist Raj Krishna made an attempt in 1982 to link the then 3.5 per cent economic growth to an inherent cultural phenomenon. Raj Krishna, a faculty member with Delhi School of Economics, blamed Hindus for not thinking big, staying reticent sans ambition etc. Well, Raj Krishna or his disciples’ arguments are not tenable. He may have grossly erred on intent and by design. Economic progress and development models hitherto adopted during Smt Indira Gandhi or Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru were largely socialist in orientation and governance. Till, economic reforms were unveiled in 1991, state controls were overbearing and stifled growth. In pre-liberation era, strangulating free enterprise, spirit of Bharat’s businesses and individuals was the norm. Even the governance model was socialist in nature with most power concentrated in Prime Minister like the communist oligarchy. Most annoying was accusing Hindus of strangulating socio-economic development in Bharat and slowing down fight against poverty. It’s rather well documented that economist Raghuram Rajan had revived the debate on linking Hindutva to slow growth rates in 2023. In last quarter ending September 2025, Bharat’s economy reported an expansion of 8.2 per cent with about 65 crore people going to work. Similarly, Bharat was the top major economy to report growth of 7.3 per cent globally, highest amongst G-20 nations with China and Indonesia at second and third position with 5.3 per cent and 5.1 per cent respectively in 2024-25. Countries like Italy and Canada reported contractions in their economies during some quarters. Germany reportedly was at bottom of the pyramid with a feeble 0.2 per cent growth. Stellar economic performance by Bharat was not given a cultural, civilizational or Dharmic label? If it’s not Hinduphobic mind-set, why did self-proclaimed intellectuals bring in Hindu angle to lack of or slow economic progress? Consequence of this Hinduphobic mind-set was that ‘Hindu rate of growth’ gained credence internationally amongst academics and audience thereby driving wrong notion and reinforcing that Bharat and Hindus was incapable of development. Attaching a civilizational label or wrongly portraying Hindus as lethargic or not being innovative may be rejected lock stock barrel. In fact, socialist policies adopted in first four decades put Bharat’s economy on a slumber. Unleashing the potential in a free, flexible and predictable policy paradigm would allow Bharat to realize its potential and emerge the ace. Getting out of colonial mind-set and rejecting out-dated socialist doctrines is pre-requisite to further hastening growth the Bharatiya way. (author is Director & Chief Executive at New Delhi based non-partisan think tank, Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies)

Afghanistan China Geopolitics International Kashmir Pakistan Security Terrorism World

395

India Stopped an ISIS-K Bio-Terror Plot the World Needs to Talk About

An ISIS-K bio-terror attack that could have killed over a hundred thousand people was just stopped in India. Why isn’t the world talking about it? Rahul PAWA In a world saturated with headlines of conflict and calamity, an extraordinary victory against terrorism has gone almost unnoticed beyond specialist circles. Indian authorities quietly dismantled a bio-terror plot so chilling in ambition that its success would have rewritten the story of global security. Just days ago, India’s Gujarat Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) dismantled an Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) cell, the South Asian affiliate of the Islamic State preparing to unleash a mass biological terrorist attack. At its core lay ricin, a toxin so lethally efficient, one of the deadliest known toxins, derived from something as ordinary as the castor bean. It was a scheme as simple as it was monstrous, poisoning the essentials of life itself, and it was stopped just in time. Its story came to light with an arrest that barely drew notice. Acting on specific intelligence, Gujarat ATS arrested Dr Ahmed Mohiyuddin Saiyed, a China-educated MBBS graduate, in Ahmedabad for his links to ISIS-K. Investigators say he had been extracting ricin from castor oil, four litres of which were recovered from his possession and had already procured laboratory equipment and begun initial chemical processing when officers arrested him. According to police sources, his plan was as insidious as it was horrific: to poison public drinking water supplies and even food (prasad) at Hindu temples, thereby silently killing masses of civilians. Officials estimate the plotters intended to kill “scores of people” and were aiming for catastrophic casualties. In worst-case scenarios, analysts have speculated that hundreds of thousands of lives might have been at risk, had a major water reservoir or a large temple gathering been successfully poisoned. The ambitious reach of this foiled plot underlines why it deserves far more international attention. This was not a lone wolf or a fringe fanatic acting in isolation; it appears to have been coordinated by ISIS-K, working through educated operatives. Dr. Saiyed’s handler, Abu Khadija, was an Afghanistan-based terrorist associated with ISIS-Khorasan, and he potentially arranged arms deliveries for the cell via drones crossing the Pakistan border. Saiyed did not act alone. Two other accomplices, 20-year-old Azad Suleman Sheikh and 23-year-old Mohammad Suhail from Uttar Pradesh, India’s northern state were arrested alongside him. These men had spent the last year conducting reconnaissance on potential targets across India, scoping out crowded public places where a poison attack could yield maximum chaos. Among the locations they surveilled were Asia’s largest wholesale produce market in Delhi (Azadpur Mandi), a bustling fruit market in Ahmedabad, and even the headquarters of RSS, a prominent social organisation in Lucknow. The chosen targets, places of food, water, community life, speak volumes about the terrorist’s cruel intent to strike at the very heart of ordinary society. By targeting temple prasad (food offered to Hindu devotees) and municipal water, they aimed to turn sustenance into a weapon. The depravity is chilling. Ricin itself is a nightmare agent. Tasteless and deadly, it is classified as a Category B bioterrorism agent under the Chemical Weapons Convention. A dose of a few milligrams can kill an adult if delivered effectively, and there is no antidote. Notably, ricin is not a typical weapon in the terrorist arsenal. it has surfaced mostly in fringe plots and isolated incidents (such as poisoned letters addressed to U.S. Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump in past years), but never before at this scale. The rarity of ricin attacks is partly why this plot is so alarming: intelligence agencies warn that ISIS and its affiliates have been actively discussing bio-terror tactics in encrypted chats, marking a strategic shift towards unconventional methods. In other words, the very fact that jihadist groups are exploring bioweapons is a worrisome evolution of terror. Unlike bombs or guns, a biological or chemical attack can sow panic far beyond the immediate victims. It contaminates the basic trust we place in our communal resources. As one counter-terror official noted, poisoning a city’s water or food supply would not only kill people but “wreak havoc in the minds of the people”, inflicting psychological trauma on society at large. Had the ricin plot succeeded, it could have easily been one of the deadliest terror attacks in modern history, a silent mass murder stretching over days or weeks as poisoning victims fell ill, and an entire populace plunged into fear. Thankfully, that nightmare never came to pass. Indian security forces acted on a tip and caught the plotters red-handed, seizing their cache of castor oil, weapons (including imported semi-automatic pistols), and digital evidence of their plans. The swift operation, coordinated by Gujarat ATS with central intelligence support, likely saved countless lives. It was, in effect, a major victory in the global fight against terrorism. Yet outside of India, this triumph registered barely a blip. Global media outlets that routinely headline terror incidents offered only cursory reports, if any, on India’s ricin plot bust. Why? One reason may be that success stories simply garner less attention, when disaster is prevented, there are no dramatic visuals of carnage to propel 24/7 news coverage. A bomb that didn’t go off is often a footnote, while a bomb that explodes is breaking news. This asymmetry in coverage creates a perverse situation where we pay more heed to terrorist violence than to vigilance that averts violence. There is also an uncomfortable truth about geographic bias. Had a quarter-million people in a Western city been in danger from a foiled bio-attack, one suspects it would dominate international headlines and talk shows. But when such a plot is foiled in India, it struggles to capture the world’s imagination. This is despite the fact that ISIS’s operations in South Asia are very much a global concern, the ISIS-K module behind the ricin plot has ties spanning Afghanistan and Pakistan, and reflects the same menace that threatens cities from London to New York. Indeed, an Indian investigation report recently

Britain's Palestine Recognition Hands China the Mediterranean

China Geopolitics International Policy Security United Kingdom

447

Britain’s Palestine Recognition Hands China the Mediterranean

CCP spent six decades cultivating Palestinian movements, embedding influence in Western activism and positioning itself as the indispensable power in a post-American WestAsia. Britain just made that job easier. Rahul Pawa On 21 September 2025, Prime Minister Keir Starmer broke with decades of U.K. policy formally recognising the state of Palestine. It was Britain’s most consequential West East move since the 1917 Balfour Declaration, made over explicit U.S. objections and Israeli fury. In London’s rush to show moral leadership, one reality was ignored: Beijing had spent six decades preparing for this moment. The CCP’s Palestinian project began in the 1960s. Between 1965 and 1970, Beijing sent small arms, mortars and anti-tank weapons to the Palestine Liberation Army and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. It trained cadres at the Whampoa Military Academy in Nanning and dispatched instructors to Syria and Algeria. In May 1966 Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Ahmad al-Shuqairy thanked “Peking” for constant arms and training shipments. After the Six Day War in 1967, Israeli commanders displayed captured Chinese-made AK-47s, 81mm mortars and chemical decontamination gear seized in Gaza and Sinai. Alongside, Beijing also built a diplomatic bridge. In December 1995 it opened a foreign office in Gaza; a de facto embassy to the Palestinian Authority, decades before most Western states considered recognition. Its message to Palestinians was consistent: you can count on us when the West won’t. By Xi Jinping’s era the posture turned strategic. In 2017 the PLA opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, a Red Sea hub housing thousands of Chinese troops. Beijing secured port stakes from Gwadar in Pakistan to Haifa in Israel, embedding itself along the arteries that supply Europe and the Gulf. A 25-year strategic agreement with Iran in 2021 locked in $400 billion in Chinese investments across oil, gas and transport corridors. CCP’s pattern is clear: first ports, then troops. Djibouti proved it, Hambantota confirmed it, Gaza may be next. Beijing has already demonstrated how commercial access becomes military power, and a recognised Palestine gives it the opening to repeat the same playbook on the Mediterranean. While Beijing built bricks abroad it built narratives at home. State-aligned Arabic media channels and TikTok streams pump out Gaza content at scale. A July 2025 Program on Extremism report mapped how the CCP’s influence runs through Western activism itself. That report details how Shanghai-based tech investor Neville Roy Singham, a onetime Huawei adviser, poured millions into U.S. and U.K. activist groups after Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack. Groups like the People’s Forum, ANSWER Coalition and “Shut It Down for Palestine” became organising hubs for anti-Israel protests. BreakThrough News, their media arm, live-streamed marches while praising Xi Jinping Thought and Maoist revolution. Investigators concluded the effect was “to project the CCP as a defender of justice while undermining U.S. influence.” In December 2023 the People’s Forum hosted a “China75” event lauding Beijing’s governance model; by early 2024 its funding spiked from under $500,000 to $4.4 million as it expanded pro-Palestinian actions. The same network underwrote protests at Columbia University and in Whitehall, echoing CCP state rhetoric about “imperialist Zionism.” When Starmer spoke to recognise Palestine, Beijing didn’t improvise. Chinese State media instantly framed Britain’s recognition as vindication of the CCP’s “historic” support for Palestinian independence. Chinese diplomats in Ramallah pointed out they had welcomed Mahmoud Abbas to Beijing two years earlier and had pushed a ceasefire plan in 2023. They reminded Palestinian officials who had invested in them when no one else would. With London’s imprimatur, a Palestinian government now has every incentive to turn to CCP for reconstruction finance and infrastructure contracts. Beijing can bolt these onto its Belt and Road Initiative, locking in leverage over a new state at the heart of the Levant. U.S. influence, already eroded by drift and divided Congresses, will shrink further. China’s record speaks for itself. In Djibouti, commercial port access became a PLA base within three years. In Sri Lanka, Chinese loans turned into a 99-year lease at Hambantota. CCP has cultivated a pattern: ports, logistics, security co-operation and then military presence. If Palestine’s future leadership wants investment and security guarantees, CCP will deliver both. Even a small PLA signals unit or intelligence station would tilt the Eastern Mediterranean’s security balance. By presenting any facility as humanitarian or anti-piracy, Beijing can minimise Western backlash while gaining a front-row vantage on Israel, Egypt and NATO operations. Britain’s recognition may have been meant as a rebuke to Israel. However, in practice it is a strategic gift to Beijing. It signals to the Arab world that the West’s will is fractured and that China, not America, not Europe is the constant patron. It creates a diplomatic vacuum China is already moving to fill, from Gaza reconstruction bids to Palestinian security training. This is not hypothetical. Chinese firms dominated Iraq’s post-2003 oil fields; they built most of Africa’s new ports in the last decade. Palestine is a likely next. And unlike the United States or the U.K., the CCP fuses infrastructure with intelligence collection and military access as policy. Starmer’s Downing Street statement marks not the dawn of West Asia peace but a milestone in Beijing’s global ascent. The CCP spent six decades cultivating Palestinian movements, embedding influence in Western activism and positioning itself as the indispensable power in a post-American West Asia. Britain just made that job easier. (Rahul Pawa is director, research at New Delhi based think tank Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies)

China Geopolitics International Leadership Policy

595

Keeping The Window Open!

Delicate balancing of relations between US, China & Russia is test of Bharat’s foreign policy framework that centres on strategic autonomy. K.A.Badarinath Will there be a huge shift in Bharat’s foreign policy framework? Or, possible tilt towards China, Russia conglomeration, a permanent feature? Will this lead to increased distancing between India and US under Republican White House stewardship? What’s in store on geo-political, strategic and economic engagement for Bharat and the world? There are several unanswered and unsettling questions that pop up in inter-personal conversations and on the information highways as one scans on Google, Weibo to Douyin. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China and Japan has set off a flurry of conversations internationally. Both, Beijing and Tokyo are most intrinsic foes that do not have much in common especially after the war leading to Japan’s surrender in 1945. Several questions that analysts, anchors and seasoned newsmen are also awe-stuck given that in the first place he lined up the visits to both China and Japan in one go. Secondly, not only do they keep distance but belong to two diametrically opposite camps but have huge issues in global equations. While China and Russia have had rivalled US-led NATO group, Japan falls into the latter alliance. Thirdly, this visit of Prime Minister Modi is significant in the backdrop of United States President Donald Trump weaponising trade, imposing 50 per cent tariff on Bharat’s goods and services and thereby burning bridges. Fourthly, Prime Minister Modi’s two nation visit gained prominence as the ‘global south’ network seeks to consolidate its position via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization whose twentieth session was held in Tianjin as China holds the rotating chair as of now. Fifth, most analysts think that Bharat’s ‘strategic autonomy’ policy framework is being put to test with re-setting its relations vis-à-vis US and China. Sixth, however, top hawks in Bharat’s foreign affairs department do expect the relations with United States to bounce back to normalcy as had happened in the past after Washington DC imposed unilateral sanctions in aftermath of Pokharan nuclear tests. Seventh, the probability of a ‘delicate balancing act’ that New Delhi would enact with caution but firmness of purpose as its near time posturing without yielding to bullying tactics of US. Eighth, there’s no reason why Bharat should not continue oil trade with Russia or any other country depending on prevailing market conditions. Neither US nor Europe have locus standi to corner Bharat citing oil trade given their own continued ‘lucrative gas deals’ with Russia and its partners. Ninth, Prime Minister Modi’s visit to both Japan and China indicate that Bharat has the depth to manage diversities. For instance, enhancing Japanese investments to US $ 68 billion from $ 34 billion through 170 deals is a big take away for both Bharat and Japan who enjoy strategic and special relationship. This is a firm message for US that sought to dry up the foreign investment pipeline in Bharat to push for a ‘bad trade deal’. By not participating in a significant programme to commemorate China’s victory over Japan is again a big message to Beijing that New Delhi has its friends elsewhere as well. Bilateral summit between Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping has been regarded as pivotal to ‘resetting relations’ as development partners and ‘not as rivals’. While the intent is good, first step has been taken to normalise relations, there are several challenges especially on borders, Belt and Roads Initiative that brings Chinese projects to the doorstep via Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir. Apprehensions seem to be very high on both over outcome of these meetings even as China and Bharat ready to celebrate 75-years of diplomatic relations. One significant point made by Prime Minister Modi that has gone viral was border peace and tranquillity was like an insurance policy for future enduring relations. Can the dragon and elephant in the room tango seamlessly is a billion dollar question as resetting of relations is attempted. As one Chinese scholar wrote ‘it’s rational choice and shared responsibility for both India and China to reset relations’. A big take away is a meeting between Prime Minister Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin with carpooling and Ridge Carlton delegation level talks happening in a ‘delightful’ atmosphere. The visuals and videos of Modi, Putin traveling in a Russian made car throwing protocols to winds is not something European Union or US will want to watch. Given that US described Russia and Ukraine conflict as ‘Modi’s war’ has had no impact on the two leaders’ summit deliberations that extended a wee-bit. Also, 2025 marks 15 years of Indo-Russian strategic relationship that would come into full play later this year. From Bharat’s perspective, there have been a few takeaways from 20-members SCO summit. Unadulterated condemnation of Pahalgam attack by terrorists from across the borders is what India expected and achieved. Also, expanding trade relations between different SCO member countries with payments squared off in respective currencies is big. This would also mean that increasingly trade would get delinked from US dollar and euro while Chinese Renminbi, Russian rouble and Indian Rupee would gain in terms of acceptability. While the show in China came to a near close, the implications of new found friendship between Presidents’ Xi, Putin and Prime Minister Modi will result in sleepless nights for those in Trump administration and Brussels, housing headquarters of European Union. (Author is Director and Chief Executive of New Delhi based non-partisan think tank, Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies) Keeping The Window Open!

Business Economy Geopolitics Trade World

538

Damn EU Oil sanctions!

Strategic autonomy coupled with its right to source crude at affordable prices and quality is non-negotiable. Here’s New India… By NC Bipindra Latest round of sanctions announced by European Union on July 18, 2025, has opened a new chapter in the growing geopolitical standoff between Brussels and New Delhi. For the first time, EU has directly targeted Indian oil trade, specifically naming Nayara Energy’s Vadinar refinery which is majority-owned by Russia’s Rosneft. The EU sanctions, coming as it does within days of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s warning about secondary sanctions on India, are part of these regional institutions’ crackdown on what it calls indirect financing of Kremlin’s war in Ukraine. At the heart of this issue lies India’s continued and unapologetic purchase of discounted Russian crude. India has been refining this oil and exporting resultant diesel and jet fuel, some of which flows back into Europe. While New Delhi views this as a perfectly legal and economically sound strategy, Brussels sees it as a dangerous workaround that weakens Western sanctions regime. What makes this clash more than a bureaucratic quarrel is its broader significance for global energy markets, economic diplomacy and tests limits of Western pressure in a multipolar world. Why Is the EU Escalating Pressure on India over Russian Oil Purchases? EU wants to isolate Russia economically. India, however, is determined not to compromise its energy security and strategic autonomy, the principles it considers non-negotiable. From European perspective, India’s growing role as a refinery hub for Russian crude threatens to undercut its sanctions framework. Eighteenth package of EU sanctions which includes lowering price cap on Russian crude to about $ 47.60 per barrel and sanctioning over 100 tankers in Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet,” is aimed at choking off alternative routes for Russian oil revenue. By focusing on Indian exports and targeting refineries like Vadinar, Europe is sending a clear message that it will go after any actor — state or private — that contributes to propping up Moscow’s war chest. What are Its Strategic Imperatives? But India isn’t taking this lightly. Ministry of External Affairs responded swiftly and sternly, calling the EU’s actions unilateral and unjust. Officials in New Delhi accused the bloc of practicing double standards, pointing to Europe’s own imports of Russian LNG and uranium even after war in Ukraine escalated. Energy security, Indian leaders assert, is not just a matter of policy but a constitutional duty, especially for a developing nation with over 1.4 billion people striving for economic growth and social stability. From New Delhi’s standpoint, its trade with Russia is both lawful and pragmatic. Indian officials frequently cite EU Regulation 833 / 2014, which states that once a good is substantially transformed in a third country, it is no longer considered to originate from the sanctioned country. India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar and Petroleum Minister Hardeep Singh Puri have made this argument repeatedly, maintaining that diesel refined in India is legally distinct from the Russian crude it was made from. The economic logic behind this policy is also compelling. Minister Puri has stated that importing discounted oil from Russia has saved India billions of dollars, helped stabilise inflation and shielded consumers from worst of global energy shock. In a world still reeling from economic aftershocks of the pandemic and the war, these savings have helped India remain on a steady growth trajectory while other economies faltered. India’s position is also shaped by deeper strategic calculations. The country has long prided itself on its foreign policy of non-alignment, now recast as “strategic autonomy.” This allows New Delhi to navigate complex relationships with both the West and traditional partners like Russia without being forced to pick sides. India’s close defence and energy ties with Moscow continue, even as it deepens cooperation with the United States and European Union in other areas like technology, trade, and counterterrorism. What are India’s Strategic Options? Rather than cave in to external pressure, India has quietly but effectively diversified its oil imports. Over past year, it has increased purchases from Middle Eastern countries, United States, Brazil and new suppliers in Africa and Latin America. This diversification has enabled India to demonstrate that it is not wholly dependent on Russian oil, even as it defends its right to continue buying it. At the same time, India has expanded its investment in natural gas, renewables and long-term energy security. A 15-year LNG deal with United Arab Emirates’ ADNOC, for example, will bring in one million tonnes of gas annually, supporting the country’s gradual shift toward cleaner fuels. India’s resilience is also built on its ability to conduct trade outside of Western financial and logistical systems. Russia has set up rupee-based trade settlements, used vostro accounts through Indian banks and relied on non-Western insurance and shipping firms. This alternative infrastructure insulates India-Russia energy trade from Western sanctions to a large extent and helps maintain stability despite external disruptions. Even as EU tightens restrictions and hints at possible secondary sanctions, India continues to find new export markets for its refined petroleum products. Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America have emerged as key destinations where buyers are less concerned about the origins of crude and more focused on price and availability. These regions offer India a buffer against any loss of European markets, keeping its refineries running and export revenues intact. At the legal level, India has pushed back forcefully the very idea of violating sanctions. Indian legal experts argue that under international law, unilateral sanctions not backed by United Nations are not binding. New Delhi has taken this position consistently and has also pointed out hypocrisy of Europe’s own uneven implementation of sanctions where Russian LNG and enriched uranium remain untouched by embargoes. Behind all this lies a larger philosophical question. Should developing countries bear the brunt of economic disruptions caused by conflicts they did not start and do not control? India has answered this with a firm no. It argues that energy access at affordable prices is a matter of global

Tiananmen Square: Silenced Memory, Bloody Mirror to CCP Legacy

China Human Rights

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Tiananmen Square: Silenced Memory, Bloody Mirror to CCP Legacy

History, if buried, becomes a tool of tyranny. Memory, if preserved, becomes a weapon of liberty. The ghosts of Tiananmen still march in silence. It is up to the world to give them voice. Pummy Pandita On June 3rd and early morning of June 4th, 1989, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) showed its draconian fangs and massacred the country’s youth and workers at Tiananmen Square. Thousands of unarmed workers and students protesting for democratic reforms and freedom from corruption were confronted with tanks, bullets and ferocity. Thirty-six years on, the Chinese dictatorship continues to erase, censor and sanitize that blood-soaked chapter from national psyche. But for the world at large, Tiananmen is still a beacon of defiance and a cautionary tale of enduring authoritarian rule. Although the death toll is veiled by censorship, estimates vary from hundreds to several thousand. What is undeniable is that CCP directed People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to suppress peaceful protests with iron fists and running the tanks over protestors. The iconic image of “Tank Man”, a solitary protester facing a line of tanks, was not mere momentary bravery. It was condemnation of a ruthless regime that perceived students waving placards as a danger to state security. Now, Chinese internet censors even suppress digits “64” and “1989.” Victims’ families, Tiananmen Mothers are subjected to surveillance, harassment and house arrests each anniversary. The attempt by state to rewrite history is a testament to its own fear: that memory is revolutionary and truth is subversive. Tiananmen was not an aberration; it was harbinger of CCP’s authoritarianism that changed but did not disappear. The censorship technologies, surveillance knowhow and suppression tactics that spawned in the wake of 1989 have since metastasized into contemporary surveillance state we witness in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Tibet and increasingly within mainland China. The party that ran over students in Beijing constructed virtual concentration camps in Xinjiang in the name of “counter-terrorism.” And, the regime that shook at placards in 1989 now shakes at hashtags, virtual dissent and international scrutiny. Tiananmen was the bloody blueprint. Refinement, not remorse, followed. The world witnessed Tiananmen with horror in 1989. But it wasn’t long before trade interests and geopolitical convenience swept the outrage away. Within a few years, China was mainstreamed into global economy. In 2001, it was admitted to the WTO. Western firms poured in, drawn by cheap labour and state-forced exploitation, even as dissidents went missing and Nobel Peace laureates like Liu Xiaobo died in detention. This ideological bankruptcy, where democratic nations get friendly with the totalitarian ones in the interests of immediate gain, has only encouraged Beijing. West’s dependency on Chinese markets has made it an accessory to muffling Tiananmen’s memory. Why recall Tiananmen today? Because China’s political system, techno-authoritarian one-party rule with economic influence, is being shipped out; Chinese young people are coming off age in a state that not only revises the past but eliminates it and the struggle over narrative sovereignty is a battleground in the greater war for liberty in 21st century. Remembering Tiananmen is not about nostalgia. It is about marking the line in red between authoritarianism and civilization. It is about remembering that CCP’s “rise” rests upon coffins of protestors, bones of those it muzzled. The tanks are no longer rolling down Chang’an Avenue, but the infrastructure of fear, censorship and ideological control remains. For a world in which China’s economic influence and digital footprint become increasingly dominant, remembering Tiananmen is not merely historical amnesia—it is geopolitical suicide. It is imperative that governments, civil societies and international institutions not only to remember but act to raise voices that Beijing wants to suppress, to respond to Beijing’s international narrative warfare with unyielding truth and to see to it that those who stood in Tiananmen Square – armed with nothing but ideals and signs – did not die for nothing. (Author is head of operations at Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies, a non-partisan think tank based in New Delhi)

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