Bharat Disinformation Hindus Misinformation Security

Dismantling Hindutva: Unfinished Balkanisation of Bharat!

Vinod Kumar Shukla Push to break up Hindus is not a standalone debate; it reflects a broader, coordinated effort to reshape the civilisational identity of Bharat. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, proponent of two-nation theory started Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College in Aligarh in 1875 that evolved to Aligarh Muslim University in 1920. It took just 66 years for the university to turn into an arsenal of Muslims and students as its best soldiers. This is what Mohammad Ali Jinnah told students of the university in March 1941. Under Jinnah’s tutelage, a committee of writers from All India Muslim League was constituted with Jamil Uddin Ahmed, a teacher at AMU as its convener to bring out ‘Pakistan Literature Series’ to push for a separate homeland for Muslims. The importance that Muslim League gave to AMU students can be discerned from the fact that ‘Muslim University Muslim League’ was given the status of a separate unit. The target was obviously Hindus and the project was to seek a separate land for Muslims. In this backdrop, AMU or any other institution seeking to ‘Dismantle Hindutva’ or hold campaigns or seminars on hateful discourse like ‘Annihilate Hinduism’ should not come as a surprise. It’s part of a larger design. Through these campaigns, unfinished Balkanisation project of India seem to be pursued rampantly. Under the guise of ‘freedom of speech and expression’ and hiding behind hyperbolic academic jargons, a section of people not only target multi- millennia old ‘way of life’ Hindutva but dog-whistle against the faith they practice. There seems to be a systemic onslaught from outside Bharat and within through corporate funding mechanisms. Exploiting faultlines within Hindu society seem to be the way to go. Several educational institutions like AMU have become a tool to propagate anti-Hindu narrative and now technology has come handy to amplify these messages across platforms. A sari-clad man with beautiful ear pieces on a poster with ‘Annihilate Hinduism’ in the background at Azim Premji University went viral on social media last week. Some claim that the poster was old. But that is irrelevant as such campaigns surface periodically with new plans. Otherwise how does one explain Tamil Nadu Progressive Writers and Artists Association’s ‘Sanatana Abolition Conference’ on September 2, 2023. The event was graced by then minister in Tamil Nadu government Udhayanidhi Stalin, son of M K Stalin. Udayanidhi equated Sanatana Dharma to “dengue” and “malaria”, calling for its complete ‘eradication’. This extreme Hindumisia is institutionalized and such events happen routinely at institutions like Ashoka University, O P Jindal Global University, a few IITs and even some central universities. There is another set of institutions like AMU, Jamia Millia Islamia, Osmania University and Jadavpur University where ‘a reform agenda’ to ‘Sanatan dharma’ is articulated. Can such reforms be pursued say with Muslims or Christians? Palestinian [Hamas] terrorists were glorified in November 2023 at IIT Bombay during an online talk delivered by radical Leftists. Ashoka University witnessed anti-Hindu hate speech when students demanding caste census and reservation raised slogans like “Brahmin – Baniyawaad Murdabad”. In February 2024, a programme, “Ram Mandir: A Farcical Project of Brahmanical Hindutva Fascism” was held at O P Jindal University. A group which goes by Revolutionary Students League claimed that Pran Pratishtha Ceremony at Ayodhya Ram Temple on January 22, 2024, exposed “the inherent violence and anti-people nature of the Brahmanical Hindutva fascist state”. Global push on “Dismantling Global Hindutva” (DGH) is equally strong and gets a big pat from their friends in India and vice versa. The DGH campaign was a three-day online academic conference in September 2021 seeking to mobilize scholars from dozens of US and other universities. These self-styled scholars were to examine Hindutva as a political ideology. Hindu advocacy groups labelled the campaign as Hinduphobic which was backed by assorted forums in universities including Harvard, Stanford, Princeton, and Columbia. Employees at Tata Consultancy Service (TCS) were allegedly found to be involved in ‘Love Jihad’ and conversion activities was the unstated agenda of ‘Ghazwa e Hind’. Azim Premji University, whose parent company is Wipro, ran a campaign to annihilate Hinduism. But, the university claimed that it did not host any event titled ‘Annihilate Hinduism,’ explaining that offending images came from a talk on ‘Politics of Emotions’ and were taken out of context. Employees of IT behemoths, whether shouting slogans to Annihilate Hindutva or involving in conversion by deceit and management turning a blind eye on the cases of targeting Hindus, smacks of conspiracy at certain level. It’s also clear that conversion by any means is part of ‘Annihilate Sanatan’ agenda. ‘Smash Brahmanical [Hindutva] Patriarchy is universal woke symbol of modernity and liberation as former CEO of X (the then Twitter) Jack Dorsey posed with a group of journalists, activists and writers during his 2019 visit to Bharat. These activists held placards that read “Smash Brahmanical Patriarchy”. Institutionalizing dismantling of Hindutva is getting bigger with institutes like Azim Premji University, AMU, Ashoka, TCS, Accenture and Tech Mahindra besides many foreign institutions becoming the hotspots. Universities like JNU celebrate demons like Mahishasura just to mock at Hindu deities like Goddess Durga. In several institutions students pursuing social sciences get roped in for anti-Hindu propaganda. These incidents revolve around insults heaped on Hindu deities, portraying Hindu traditions negatively and academic discussions that are blatantly biased. IIT Bombay students staged a play titled “Raahovan” in 2024 that was derogatory and portraying characters in the Ramayana vulgarly. In a PhD entrance exam question paper of 2024, IIT Bombay asked students to discuss if “Hindutva is hegemonic or counter-hegemonic.” A faculty member in humanities department of IIT Delhi told a foreign media outlet in 2023 that future of India would be without Hinduism. A conference at IIT Delhi faced intense backlash for promoting one-sided, anti-Hindu narratives and western critical race theory. IIT Gandhinagar has been in news for its disproportionate focus on Islam-related topics while holding anti-Hindu viewpoints. A campaign initiated by a pseudonymized user alleged that a project named “DeepFaith,” described as an AI-powered Islamic research initiative

Bharat Pakistan Policy Security Terrorism

259

Indus Treaty in Abeyance: India, Pakistan, and International Law

Pakistan’s resort to the UNSC on the Indus Waters Treaty collapses on contact with the law of treaties, the law of state responsibility, and the Charter regime on the use of force. Rahul Pawa | x: @imrahulpawa On 22 April 2025, in the Baisaran meadow above Pahalgam, terrorists separated tourists by faith and shot twenty-five of them and one local. The Resistance Front, a proxy of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, claimed the attack. The following day, India announced that the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 would be held in abeyance until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abandoned its support for cross-border terrorism. On 7 May 2025, Indian forces struck terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan. A cessation of firing followed on 10 May 2025. The abeyance remained. From the start, Pakistan’s response was rhetorical. The abeyance was cast as an act of war, branded “water weaponisation,” and equated with terrorism. A year on, on the first anniversary of the Baisaran massacre, Pakistan has carried that posture to the United Nations Security Council, demanding that India “restore full implementation” of the Treaty and warning of “grave humanitarian consequences.” The recourse asks the Council to examine India’s abeyance in isolation from the conduct that produced it. The framing has a certain neatness. Tested against the law of treaties, the law of state responsibility, and the Charter regime on the use of force, it does not survive contact. The Security Council, under Article 24 of the Charter, holds primary responsibility for international peace and security. It is not a treaty-interpretation body, nor a tribunal over the performance of a 1960 bilateral instrument. The Treaty supplies its own graded dispute mechanism under Article IX: Permanent Indus Commission, Neutral Expert, Court of Arbitration. Article XII(3) requires that any modification proceed by duly ratified treaty. India invoked that provision twice, on 25 January 2023 and 30 August 2024, seeking review of the Treaty in light of changed circumstances and Pakistan’s obstruction of permissible Indian projects on the Western Rivers. Pakistan declined to engage. Its decision to bypass this architecture and approach the Council is itself an admission that the bilateral machinery cannot deliver the political outcome Islamabad seeks. “Grave humanitarian consequences” is rhetoric in search of jurisdiction, not jurisdiction itself. The Treaty is not a static allocation of water. Its Preamble grounds the instrument in “goodwill, friendship and cooperation.” Article VIII establishes a Permanent Indus Commission that presupposes ongoing good-faith engagement. Article IX presupposes a working bilateral relationship. Article XII(3) presupposes that modification proposals will receive serious response. A state that refuses to engage with lawful modification cannot credibly claim the high ground of treaty fidelity. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties binds parties to perform every treaty in force in good faith. Good-faith performance is not discharged by partial compliance with allocation rules while the foundational conditions of peaceful coexistence are torn up beneath them. India’s position, that sustained Pakistani sponsorship of cross-border terrorism, culminating in Baisaran, ruptured the premise on which cooperation rests, is not creative interpretation. It is the black-letter application of pacta sunt servanda (treaties must be performed in good faith). Two further VCLT doctrines support, though do not exhaust, India’s measure. Article 60 permits suspension for material breach, including violation of provisions essential to a treaty’s object and purpose. Where that object includes cooperative water-sharing premised on peace, state-supported terrorism is not collateral conduct; it breaches the animating premise. Article 62, on fundamental change of circumstances, supplies a narrower but reinforcing ground. The doctrinal home for abeyance lies in the law of countermeasures. Articles 22 and 49 to 54 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility require that countermeasures be non-forcible, proportionate, directed at the responsible state, taken to induce compliance, and, where possible, reversible. India’s measure meets each. It is non-forcible, targeted, proportionate to the breach it answers, and reversible: the Treaty stands, and the condition for restoration is on the public record. Pakistan must credibly and irrevocably abjure support for cross-border terrorism. It is also purposive, directed at the customary obligation, reinforced by Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), that every state prevent the use of its territory for terrorist acts against others. India’s strikes of 7 May 2025 rest on a separate footing. Article 51 of the Charter preserves the inherent right of self-defence. Post-2001 practice, anchored in Resolutions 1368 and 1373, accepts that armed attacks may emanate from non-state actors, and that defensive action may extend to the bases from which they are mounted where the territorial state is unwilling or unable to suppress them. The cessation of firing on 10 May 2025 left the abeyance untouched. The Treaty position is doctrinal, not transactional; it does not rise and fall with the tempo of military exchanges. Pakistan’s “weaponisation” claim conflates the Treaty’s cooperative scaffolding with its physical entitlements. India has not diverted, dammed, or interdicted Pakistani waters in violation of Articles II and III. What it has suspended is the cooperative apparatus: data exchange, Commission engagement, treaty-level dispute mechanisms. If Pakistan’s grievance were that India had unlawfully constructed or operated works, that would be a Treaty-internal dispute, amenable to Article IX. The choice of the Council rather than the Treaty’s own forum is not a performance dispute. It is a narrative posture. The legal contest is not between treaty sanctity and treaty derogation. It is between two readings of obligation. The first is integrated: good faith and reciprocity are constitutive of the duty to perform. The second is fragmented: a state may sponsor armed attacks against its neighbour while demanding uninterrupted strategic benefit. The first is the black-letter of international law. The second is a position no treaty regime has ever sustained. India’s stand is principled, conditional, proportionate, and reversible. It does not weaponise water; it withholds cooperation from a party that has weaponised territory. The path back to the Treaty is open. It runs through Pakistan’s credible, irrevocable, and verifiable abandonment of cross-border terrorism, through no other forum, and certainly not the Security Council. The

Bharat Hindus International Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) United States USA

270

RSS Addresses US Forums on Technology, Innovation and Leadership: A Civilisational Vision for the Future of Humanity

Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies (CIHS) is pleased to release its latest brief, RSS Addresses US Forums on Technology, Innovation and Leadership: A Civilisational Vision for the Future of Humanity, documenting the engagements of RSS Sarkaryavah Dattatreya Hosabale at THRIVE 2026, Stanford Faculty Club, and at the Hudson Institute, Washington D.C., in April 2026. Coinciding with the centenary of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), these engagements marked one of the most substantive transatlantic conversations on Indian civilisational thought in recent years. The brief brings together, in considered depth, the views articulated by RSS Sarkaryavah Dattatreya Hosabale across both forums: the philosophy of oneness rooted in Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, the coexistence of tradition and modernity, the three-fold lens of economy, ecology, and ethics for evaluating technology, the distinctive ethos of seva (service), the centenary vision of Panch Parivartan, and the role of the Indian diaspora as a natural bridge between two democracies.Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), these engagements marked one of the most substantive transatlantic conversations on Indian civilisational thought in recent years. The brief brings toge We invite scholars, policymakers, and engaged readers to download the full brief below. [Download the full brief here]

Bharat Geopolitics Kashmir Pakistan Policy Politics Security Terrorism

508

Indus Waters Treaty After Pahalgam

India’s post-Pahalgam position on the Indus Waters Treaty is not a water dispute. It is a sovereign response to Pakistan’s sustained use of cross-border terrorism while continuing to demand the full benefits of a cooperative treaty. The Treaty was premised on goodwill, peaceful conduct and reciprocal confidence. Pakistan’s conduct, culminating in the Baisaran, Pahalgam terrorist attack of 22 April 2025, shattered that premise. India’s decision to hold the Treaty in abeyance was therefore not an abandonment of legality, but a principled assertion that treaty cooperation cannot be insulated from state-sponsored terrorism. India’s response was deliberately cross-sectoral. It combined diplomatic downgrading, border and visa restrictions, suspension of treaty normalcy, and later, precise military action through Operation Sindoor against terrorist infrastructure. This sequencing matters. India did not begin with indiscriminate escalation. It first imposed sovereign, administrative and diplomatic costs, and only after Pakistan-backed terrorism crossed a grave threshold did it move to targeted counter-terror action. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s formulation, that “water and blood cannot flow together”, captures the Indian sentiment: Pakistan must choose between normal interstate cooperation and the continued use of terror as an instrument of state policy. Pakistan’s response has followed a familiar pattern: denial of culpability, reciprocal escalation, threats over water, and internationalisation through the United Nations and treaty forums. Yet none of this answers the central question. If Pakistan seeks the benefits of the Indus Waters Treaty, it must first restore the minimum conditions that make such a treaty workable. India’s stand is therefore principled, conditional and proportionate: the path back to treaty normalcy remains open, but only after Pakistan credibly, irrevocably and verifiably abandons support for cross-border terrorism.

Bharat Defence Geopolitics Pakistan Policy Security

512

Looking for Relevance?

Pakistan’s ‘Mediator Moment’ in Iran Crisis may turn out to be more of diplomatic outreach rather than Strategic Opportunism. N. C. Bipindra Pakistan’s most visible foreign policy gambits in recent years are its attempts to position as a mediator in the conflict between US, Israel and Iran. Pakistan has stepped forward to host talks, relay messages and project itself as a bridge between adversaries as tensions between US and Iran oscillate between ceasefire diplomacy and brinkmanship. Yet, beneath optics of shuttle diplomacy lies a more complex reality. Pakistan has limited credibility, constrained leverage and competing internal and external pressures. Optics versus Substance: Pak’s Mediation limits In recent days, Pakistan has actively facilitated dialogue between Washington DC and Tehran. It is even prepared to host rounds of negotiations. But, the substance of this engagement remains uncertain. Iran has shown hesitation in committing to talks in Islamabad. At critical moments, it has not confirmed participation. This hesitation reflects a broader scepticism. Mediation requires trust from both sides and Pakistan’s track record does not necessarily inspire it. Islamabad has maintained relations with Tehran and avoided overt alignment with Israel or US military frameworks. Its strategic dependence on Gulf allies especially Saudi Arabia raises questions about neutrality. The result is a paradox. Pakistan is visible but not indispensable. Trump Factor: Mimicry as Strategy One most striking features of Pakistan’s current posture is its alignment with Trump’s transactional diplomacy style. Islamabad has reportedly tailored its outreach to appeal to Trump’s preferences. It has offered cooperation on counter-terrorism, economic deals and even taken recourse to public praise. This approach has yielded short-term gains. Pakistan has secured a seat at the diplomatic table. Some stakeholders have even described Islamabad as a “central mediator.” Yet, such gains are fragile. They hinge on personal rapport rather than institutional trust. This makes Pakistan’s role vulnerable to shifts in US policy or leadership. More critically, aligning too close with Trump risks alienating other actors particularly Iran. Tehran remains wary of US pressure tactics and sceptical of intermediaries perceived as extensions of Washington. OIC Platform: Visibility Not Influence Pakistan has leveraged Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to project diplomatic relevance. The grouping has publicly acknowledged Pakistan’s “effective role” in de-escalation efforts. However, OIC’s structural limitations undermine its utility. Deep divisions within Muslim world especially between Sunni-majority states like Saudi Arabia and Shia-led Iran limit the organisation’s capacity to act as a unified diplomatic bloc. These internal fractures mean that Pakistan’s use of OIC serves more as a signalling tool than a mechanism for tangible conflict resolution. In effect, OIC amplifies Pakistan’s voice but does not necessarily enhance its negotiating power. Asim Munir eclipses elected govt Another defining feature of Pakistan’s mediation bid is the growing prominence of Army chief Asim Munir. Reports suggest that Munir has cultivated direct ties with US leadership even earning personal praise from President Trump. This dynamic underscores a familiar pattern in Pakistan’s governance. The military is dominant in foreign and security policy. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif while publicly leading diplomatic outreach, appears overshadowed by army chief’s influence. Such a configuration carries risks. While military backing can lend coherence and decisiveness, it also complicates perceptions of Pakistan as a neutral mediator. For Iran and other regional actors, prominence of the military, given its historical alignments, may reinforce doubts about Islamabad’s impartiality. Navigating Sunni–Shia Fault Lines Pakistan’s mediation attempt is further complicated by its need to balance Sunni–Shia dynamics. The country has longstanding ties with Saudi Arabia, including defence commitments while sharing a border and cultural links with Iran. This dual alignment creates structural constraints. Supporting Saudi Arabia too overtly risks alienating Iran. Leaning toward Tehran could jeopardise economic and financial support from Sunni-majority Gulf states. The challenge is not merely diplomatic but existential, given Pakistan’s economic vulnerabilities and reliance on Gulf remittances and energy supplies. Domestically, the stakes are equally high. Sectarian tensions within Pakistan could be inflamed by perceptions of bias in the Iran conflict, adding another layer of complexity to its external posture. Pakistan’s Credibility Deficit Despite its proactive diplomacy, Pakistan’s credibility as a mediator remains contested. Critics, including former US officials such as ex-adviser to Secretary of Defence Col Douglas Macgregor (Retd), have dismissed its role as unrealistic or overstated. Even where Pakistan has achieved visibility, questions persist about its capacity to deliver outcomes. The gap between hosting talks and shaping agreements is significant. Islamabad has yet to demonstrate the leverage needed to bridge it. At the same time, some analysts argue that Pakistan’s emergence as an interlocutor reflects a broader shift in global diplomacy, where middle powers exploit geopolitical flux to carve out roles. From this perspective, Pakistan’s mediation bid is less about immediate success and more about long-term positioning. Crisis at Home, Ambition Abroad Pakistan’s diplomatic activism also contrasts sharply with its domestic challenges. Iran conflict has triggered economic disruptions, including energy shortages and inflation, underscoring Islamabad’s vulnerability. These internal pressures raise an important question. Is mediation a strategic necessity or a diversionary tactic? Pakistan may be seeking to offset domestic instability and enhance its international standing by projecting itself as a peacemaker. Without requisite economic and institutional strength, Pakistan’s ambitions to turn a key mediator may not work. Mediate or Messenge? Pakistan’s emerging posture in Iran crisis reflects a blend of opportunism, necessity and ambition. It has successfully inserted itself into high-level diplomatic processes. Islamabad has leveraged relationships with both Western and Muslim-world actors. Yet, its role remains constrained by credibility deficit, structural dependencies and internal contradictions. At its core, Pakistan’s mediation effort may be better understood not as a decisive diplomatic intervention but as a bid for relevance in a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape. Whether it evolves into a genuine broker of peace or remains a peripheral messenger will depend on its ability to translate visibility into trust and presence into influence. (Author is Chairman, Law and Society Alliance, a New Delhi-based think tank, and guest columnist with CIHS)

Bharat Hindus Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) World

273

RSS in US: Civilizational Bridge @100

Without losing Bharatiya identity, diaspora can become vital link with host nation by demonstrating its complete commitment. Arun Anand Commemorating its centennial, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh has begun a serious conversation with a bevy of stakeholders in the West especially the United States and Europe. As part of its global outreach, RSS General Secretary Dattatreya Hosabale undertook a significant visit to United States in April 2026. It’s more than a routine diaspora engagement. This tour represented a carefully crafted civilisational outreach—one that combined reflection on a hundred-year journey with a forward-looking articulation of Bharat’s intellectual and cultural role in a rapidly transforming world. At a time when global discourse is increasingly shaped by technology, geopolitics and identity debates, Hosabale’s visit sought to position the RSS not merely as an Indian organisation but as a participant in a wider philosophical conversation about humanity’s future. Civilizational Dialogue in Silicon Valley The intellectual centre piece of the visit was Hosabale’s address at Stanford University during the Thrive 2026 conference. Speaking before an audience comprising technologists, entrepreneurs and members of the Indian diaspora, he framed his intervention around a central proposition: that modern technological advancement must be guided by deeper ethical and civilisational wisdom. Drawing from Indic traditions, he argued that knowledge systems in India have historically refused to separate the spiritual from the scientific. Ancient texts, including the Upanishads, were presented not merely as theological works but as repositories of inquiry into the nature of the human mind, the cosmos, and existence itself. In this view, the fragmentation of knowledge into rigid categories science versus spirituality is a relatively recent phenomenon. Hosabale suggested that this integrated approach offers valuable insights in an age defined by artificial intelligence, ecological stress, and social inequality. He advocated what he termed a “holistic lifestyle,” contrasting it with excesses of consumerism and unchecked technological ambition. The emphasis was not on rejecting modernity, but on anchoring it within a broader ethical framework. At the heart of this framework lies the idea of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, the belief that the world is one family. Hosabale presented this not as a rhetorical flourish, but as a practical principle for navigating global fragmentation and conflict. Science, Knowledge & Civilisation A key theme that ran through his address was the need to revisit and revitalise Indic knowledge systems. Centuries of disruption particularly during protracted periods of foreign rule led to erosion and marginalisation of indigenous intellectual traditions, he averred. As a result, many scientific ideas embedded within cultural and spiritual texts were either forgotten or dismissed as superstition. Today, he argued, there is a renewed effort in India to recover and systematise this knowledge. Education, in this context, becomes central, not merely as a means of economic advancement but as a tool for reconnecting society with its intellectual heritage. Hosabale emphasised that scientific inquiry and spirituality were not opposing forces. Rather, they complement and enrich each other. Historically, scholars engaged in both domains simultaneously, integrating empirical observation with philosophical reflection. This integrated approach also carries ethical implications. He proposed that any technology intended for human welfare must be evaluated on three touchstones: economy, ecology and ethics. Technological progress that generates inequality, exploits nature or violates moral norms, he warned, ultimately undermines both society and the environment. Equally significant was his emphasis on democratization of knowledge. While knowledge production has accelerated globally, access to it remains uneven. A truly equitable world, in his view, requires insights from all civilizations that be shared widely, enabling a more balanced and inclusive global order. Redefining Diaspora Role Beyond intellectual discourse, Hosabale’s engagement with Indian diaspora carried a clear and pragmatic message. Addressing gatherings in Silicon Valley, he urged Indian-origin communities to demonstrate complete commitment to countries they inhabit. For the diaspora, he stated, contributing to progress and well-being of their host nation is basic dharma. This articulation is significant in contemporary debates around identity and belonging. Rather than encouraging a divided loyalty, Hosabale advocated a model of integration rooted in responsibility and participation. At the same time, he encouraged diaspora to remain connected to Bharat’s cultural and civilisational values. This dual identity, being fully American while retaining an Indian cultural consciousness was presented as strength rather than a contradiction. In effect, the diaspora becomes a bridge: grounded locally, yet carrying a global civilisational perspective. Path Ahead: Balancing Extremes A recurring thread throughout the visit was call for balance. Hosabale warned against dangers of an unrestrained race for technological dominance, one that prioritises speed and scale over sustainability and human well-being. He argued that traditional Indian thought offers a corrective: a worldview that emphasises harmony with nature, respect for all forms of life and an understanding of interconnectedness of existence. This perspective, he suggested, is particularly relevant in addressing contemporary challenges such as climate change and social fragmentation. The concept of “knowledge guided by wisdom” emerged as a central motif. Knowledge, when divorced from ethical judgment, can lead to arrogance and exploitation. When guided by discernment, viveka, it becomes a force for collective good. Conclusion Dattatreya Hosabale’s 2026 visit to the United States was not merely a commemorative exercise marking RSS centenary. It was an attempt to articulate a vision, one that situates Indian civilizational thought within global debates on technology, ecology and human coexistence. By engaging with Indian diaspora and intellectual communities in Silicon Valley, RSS signalled its intent to participate more actively in shaping global narratives. The emphasis on loyalty to host nations, cultural rootedness and ethical balance reflects a nuanced approach to globalisation, one that seeks integration without loss of identity. (Author is a senior journalist & columnist. He has authored more than a dozen books)

Bharat Disinformation Hindus Media Misinformation World

308

Reheating the “Fascist” Leftovers: A Methodological Deconstruction of the TNI “Global Far-Right” Narrative

The Transnational Institute (TNI) report, “Hindutva as a Global Far-Right Project” (Shayan Shaukat, 2026), represents a quintessential exercise in Polemical Historiography. It is a document that uses the veneer of academic/scholarly inquiry to pursue a pre-determined political objective, failing the fundamental tests of Mechanism Demand and Inferential Necessity. By imposing Western socio-political categories – specifically 20th-century European Fascism, Neoliberalism, and Surveillance Capitalism onto a decentralised Indian civilizational phenomenon, the author commits a series of persistent category errors. Additionally, the report appears to have been created, as is the research pre-work, in isolation by compiling publicly available information into a bouquet of tropes. The report does not cite a single first-person interaction or provide even an orthogonal quote, which suggests the ends were established before the means. This essay demonstrates that the “global fascist nexus” described by the TNI is an analytical mirage created by Adversarial Semantic Laundering – a process where organic cultural affinity is recoded as a centralised command-and-control conspiracy. Utilizing the Starfish model in Organisational Theory, we show that the phenomenon is better explained as a distributed, open-source cultural protocol rather than a monolithic “Spider” hierarchy. The following deconstruction identifies the persistent evidentiary voids and logical contradictions that render the TNI’s thesis analytically inert, offering instead a superior/better model grounded in civilizational sociology and state capacity restoration.

Bharat Media Misinformation United States

630

Bias or Blind Spot?

Freedom House’s Western Biases, Methodological Flaws & Lack of Understanding of India’s Democratic Realities N. C. Bipindra American think tank Freedom House’s latest 2026 annual report rates India as “Partly Free” with a score of 62 on maximum 100 points. This has once again triggered a debate on how global democracy indexes assess nations, particularly large and complex ones like India. The report posits India within the broader narrative that Freedom House is building off twenty-year global decline in freedoms. A closer look at the assessment shows that Freedom House conclusions rest on methodological limitations, normative biases and insufficient contextualisation of India’s democratic ecosystem. The Freedom House’s methodological framing aggregates diverse indicators such as political rights, civil liberties, media freedom and minority protection into a single numerical score. While Freedom House may be targeting simplicity while quantifying the complex study, this clearly risks obscuring the immense heterogeneity of India’s federal structure. India’s governance standards, political competition and civil liberties vary significantly in different states and the entire nation is not universally governed by one single political formation or a uniform demographic composition. India is not a monolithic political entity but a vast and layered democracy of over 1.4 billion people. Reducing its democratic health to a single number inevitably leads to analytical compression or deviations where localised or episodic concerns are interpreted as systemic decline. Moreover, critics have long argued that Freedom House’s framework reflects a Western and liberal template of democracy, shaped by political and historical experience of United States and Europe. This raises questions about whether the same benchmarks can be uniformly applied to societies grappling with different challenges, including post-colonial state-building, socio-economic inequality and persistent security threats. In India’s case, the need to balance civil liberties with national security concerns, particularly in the context of cross-border terrorism and internal insurgencies, complicates any straightforward classification. The report’s broader claim of a continuous global decline in freedom over two decades also warrants scrutiny. While there is no denying the rise of authoritarian tendencies in certain regions, such a sweeping narrative risks over-generalisation. It tends to overlook democratic resilience in parts of the Global South and conflates governance challenges with democratic backsliding. In India, visible tensions within the political system may, in fact, reflect democratic contestation rather than erosion. A noisy, conflict-ridden public sphere is not necessarily evidence of authoritarianism; it can also indicate a system where competing interests continue to be negotiated in the open. One of the central concerns raised by the report is the alleged harassment of journalists, civil society organisations and political opponents. While individual cases and controversies undoubtedly exist, it is important to situate them within the broader landscape of Indian public life. India hosts one of world’s most expansive and diverse media ecosystems, spanning print, television and digital platforms. Critical reporting on government policies is widespread and investigative journalism continues to shape public discourse. Legal actions against media entities or non-governmental organisations are often framed in the report as politically motivated. But in many instances, they are rooted in regulatory compliance issues, particularly concerning financial transparency and foreign funding norms. The distinction between the enforcement of law and the suppression of dissent is crucial and often blurred in external assessments. Similarly, the claim that political opposition is under systematic pressure must be weighed against empirical realities. Opposition parties continue to win elections at the state level, govern key regions and mount significant electoral and political challenges. The regularity of elections, high voter turnout and peaceful transitions of power underscore the continued vitality of India’s democratic framework. Institutions such as the Election Commission of India play a central role in ensuring electoral integrity and despite criticisms, they remain broadly functional and credible. All criticisms of India’s Election Commission haven’t stood judicial scrutiny in the last decade. This goes on to prove that the poll body’s institutional functioning met quality standards in consonance with the constitutional framework and election laws. The report’s emphasis on the marginalisation of minority communities, including Muslims, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, touches upon a deeply important issue. However, it is essential to distinguish between structural socio-economic inequalities and deliberate state-led democratic regression. India’s social fabric has long been shaped by hierarchies and disparities that predate contemporary political developments. Successive governments have implemented policies aimed at addressing these challenges, including affirmative action, targeted welfare schemes and financial inclusion initiatives. While gaps remain and must be addressed, framing these issues solely as indicators of declining freedom risks overlooking both historical context and ongoing policy interventions. Another area of concern highlighted in the report is the perceived weakening of political pluralism, including practices such as “resort politics” and challenges in implementation of the Right to Information framework. Yet, these phenomena are not unique to India and are often characteristic of competitive democracies. Political manoeuvring, party defections and coalition instability are features seen in many parliamentary systems. Crucially, such developments in India are subject to legal scrutiny and institutional oversight. The Right to Information Act, despite implementation challenges, continues to empower citizens and remains one of the most robust transparency mechanisms globally. Isolated administrative bottlenecks do not necessarily amount to a systemic erosion of accountability. The report also draws attention to the controversial practice of punitive demolitions, sometimes described as “bulldozer justice,” and references a 2024 ruling by the Supreme Court of India that deemed such actions unconstitutional. While the concerns surrounding due process are valid, the very fact that the judiciary intervened to check executive overreach highlights the resilience of India’s institutional framework. The availability of legal remedies, the role of an independent judiciary and the intensity of public debate all point to a system capable of self-correction. Rather than indicating authoritarian drift, such episodes demonstrate the dynamic tension between different arms of the state, which is intrinsic to a functioning democracy. A comprehensive evaluation of India must also take into account the scale and complexity of its electoral processes. Regular elections involving hundreds of millions of voters are conducted with remarkable logistical

Bharat Defence Security Technology

308

INS Aridaman: Designed, Built and Armed at Home

No foreign blueprints. No borrowed reactor. No licensed hull. India built its third nuclear-powered submarine from scratch.Rahul PAWA | X – @imrahulpawa The commissioning of INS Aridhaman on 3 April 2026 completes a threshold that India’s strategic community has been working toward for the better part of three decades. With three nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines now in the active fleet, India crosses from a state that possesses a nuclear triad in principle to one that can sustain it in practice. The distinction matters more than it might appear. A single hull proves a concept. Two hulls suggest a programme. Three hulls represent a fleet, with the rotation depth, maintenance margins and operational flexibility that serious continuous deterrence requires. That this fleet was designed, engineered and built within India, without a foreign prime contractor and without publicly acknowledged technology transfer, places the programme in a category occupied by very few states. The platform’s sovereign character is not peripheral context. It is central to understanding what Aridhaman’s induction actually signals, both regionally and globally. To appreciate what Aridhaman represents, the fundamentals of Submarine Submerged Ballistic Nuclear (SSBN) strategy are worth stating plainly. A nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine is the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad, and among the three legs, land, air and sea, it is the one that gives deterrence planners the most confidence and adversaries the least. Land-based missiles are fixed, mappable and theoretically destroyable in a coordinated first strike. Aircraft require airfields that can be struck before bombers scramble. A submarine running silent at operational depth in three-dimensional oceanic space presents an entirely different targeting problem. It cannot be located with confidence, which means it cannot be neutralised with confidence, which means any adversary contemplating a nuclear first strike against India must factor in near-certain retaliation from a platform they cannot find. That is the essence of second-strike credibility, and it is the foundation upon which India’s No First Use doctrine ultimately rests. Aridhaman makes that foundation harder to crack and India built it entirely herself. The boat emerged from the Advanced Technology Vessel programme, one of the most closely guarded and strategically consequential defence programmes India has ever run. Displacement is reported at approximately 7,000 tonnes. The propulsion plant is a pressurised water reactor, almost certainly an evolved version of the 83-megawatt unit fitted in INS Arihant, itself designed and built in India. The missile payload architecture is where Aridhaman steps forward most visibly. The boat carries both the K-15 Sagarika, a two-stage solid-fuel submarine-launched ballistic missile with a range of approximately 750 kilometres, and the considerably more capable K-4, with an estimated range of 3,500 kilometres and a nuclear warhead in the sub-tonne class. Both missiles are Indian. Critically, some reporting attributes eight vertical launch tubes to Aridhaman, against the four fitted in INS Arihant. If accurate, this doubles the platform’s operational magazine, a meaningful increase in what India can hold at risk from a single submerged hull, and a significant qualitative step beyond its predecessors. The strategic arithmetic follows directly from that technical baseline. A submarine carrying eight K-4 missiles, operating from the Bay of Bengal at patrol depth, can range targets across virtually the entire Chinese landmass. India’s nuclear posture against Pakistan has long been addressed adequately by land-based Agni variants and air-delivered weapons. China presents a structurally different problem. The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force fields a large and increasingly survivable land-based arsenal. The People’s Liberation Army Navy operates its own SSBN fleet, with Type 094 Jin-class boats based at Yulin Naval Base on Hainan Island, armed with the JL-2 with range sufficient to cover major Indian cities. For India to maintain credible deterrence against a nuclear adversary of that scale and sophistication, it requires a platform that can hold Chinese strategic assets at risk from a position Beijing cannot locate or neutralise in advance. A submerged SSBN operating in the eastern Indian Ocean addresses that requirement on India’s own terms, with India’s own technology. The question of sustainability is where Aridhaman’s induction carries the most analytical weight. INS Arihant, commissioned in 2016, established that India possessed the scientific and industrial capacity to build and operate a nuclear submarine indigenously, an achievement that took decades of investment to realise. INS Arighaat, commissioned in August 2024, demonstrated that the capability was replicable and that a production line existed. Aridhaman now gives India three hulls in the active fleet, which is the threshold at which Continuous At-Sea Deterrence becomes operationally achievable. CASD, the standard maintained by the United Kingdom and France among others, requires a minimum one submarine on patrol at all times. With three hulls, accounting for maintenance cycles, crew rotations and refit schedules, that standard moves from aspirational to realistic. India has not formally declared CASD status, but the structure of the programme makes the intent evident. The strategic signalling embedded in Aridhaman’s commissioning operates across multiple audiences simultaneously. For Pakistan, it reinforces an already understood reality: India’s second-strike capability is secure and expanding. For China, it introduces a more capable and considerably harder-to-track underwater threat at strategic depth, one armed with missiles of Indian design and sufficient range to cover targets deep within Chinese territory. For Washington and its partners, it underscores the character of India’s deterrent posture, sovereign in the most complete sense, designed, built and operated without dependence on any external power, which has direct implications for how India’s strategic autonomy is read within the broader Indo-Pacific architecture. Reports of a fourth and fifth SSBN in various stages of development indicate the programme’s ambition has not peaked. In deterrence theory, credibility rests on two pillars: capability and survivability. India has now demonstrated both, and it has done so entirely on its own terms. The author is an international criminal lawyer and director of research at New Delhi based think tank Centre for Integrated and HolisticStudies (CIHS).

Bharat Geopolitics

385

From Vision to Strategy: India-Japan Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

Vivek Raina The partnership between Japan and India has developed into a key component of modern Indo-Pacific geopolitics, signifying a change from an economic partnership to a full strategic alignment. This collaboration, which is based on a commitment to a rules-based system, mutual trust and shared democratic principles, is now crucial in tackling new regional issues. This document highlights how India and Japan are changing their engagement from transactional cooperation into a forward-looking strategic enterprise by further aligning their views and capacities to foster stability, resilience and inclusive prosperity as the Indo-Pacific power dynamics continue to change. Context India-Japan collaboration has become one of the key strategic alliances of the twenty-first century, with results that go well beyond bilateral interaction. A fully institutionalised, all-encompassing strategic alliance based on common democratic ideals, the rule of law and a shared commitment to regional stability has developed from what started as an economic association focused on the trade of cars and electronics. These days, this partnership is motivated by a distinct convergence of geopolitical interests, especially in reaction to the Indo-Pacific region’s changing power dynamics. Its fundamental goal is to maintain a rules-based international order and guarantee the continued freedom, openness, inclusivity and security of the Indo-Pacific region. In addition to enhancing bilateral relations, India and Japan are influencing the larger regional architecture through collaboration in vital areas like supply chain resilience, infrastructure development, maritime security and emerging technologies. As a result, this collaboration is now transformational rather than transactional, establishing both countries as key players in preserving security and prosperity throughout the Indo-Pacific. Strategic Importance of the Indo-Pacific Indo-Pacific region has emerged as a central pillar of global geopolitics and economics, making it critically important for both India and Japan. Spanning Asia, Africa, Australia, and the Americas, it accounts for over 60% of global GDP and nearly 65% of the world’s population, positioning it as the core of global economic activity. The region hosts vital Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) and key maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca, through which a significant portion of global trade and energy supplies flow, making maritime security and stability in areas like the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal essential. For India and Japan, the Indo-Pacific is also a strategic space to counterbalance China’s growing influence, particularly through coordinated infrastructure and connectivity initiatives in countries like Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as alternatives to the Belt and Road Initiative, alongside cooperation with partners such as the United States, Australia, Indonesia and the Philippines. Both countries advocate a Free and Open Indo-Pacific based on rule of law, freedom of navigation and an inclusive, rules-based economic order. The region’s strategic importance is further reinforced by ASEAN’s central role in linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans, with India supporting a unified ASEAN to ensure regional stability and prevent fragmentation. Additionally, the Indo-Pacific sits at the crossroads of global energy flows and supply chains, with a substantial share of global exports and millions of barrels of crude oil transiting through it annually, making its security vital for economic resilience. Together, these factors underscore why the Indo-Pacific is not only a geographic construct but a strategic imperative for India and Japan in shaping a stable, balanced, and prosperous regional order. India–Japan Partnership in the Indo-Pacific Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision has emerged as one of the most influential strategic frameworks shaping regional geopolitics over the past decade. Conceived to ensure that the Indo-Pacific remains free, inclusive, rules-based, and open to commerce, FOIP reflects Tokyo’s response to shifting power balances, maritime insecurity and the growing salience of connectivity and economic resilience. For India, FOIP has not only complemented its own strategic outlook but has also deepened one of its most consequential partnerships with Japan. At its core, FOIP is anchored in three principles: the rule of law, freedom of navigation and the promotion of connectivity through quality infrastructure. These principles resonate strongly with India’s own vision of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) and its broader Indo-Pacific policy. The convergence is not accidental. Both India and Japan are maritime democracies with a shared interest in maintaining stability across vital sea lanes that carry energy supplies, trade and digital connectivity. The India–Japan partnership has evolved significantly in tandem with FOIP. What began as an economic relationship has matured into a comprehensive strategic partnership encompassing defence, infrastructure, technology and multilateral coordination. The institutionalisation of this partnership is evident in regular 2+2 ministerial dialogues, defence exercises such as Malabar and increasing interoperability between the Indian Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. These developments are not merely symbolic; they reflect a shared understanding that maritime security is central to regional stability. A key dimension of FOIP is connectivity, where Japan has played a pivotal role in supporting infrastructure development across the Indo-Pacific. In India, Japanese investments in projects like the Mumbai-Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail Corridor and industrial corridors underscore a commitment to high-quality, transparent and sustainable infrastructure. Beyond India, both countries have collaborated in third-country projects, particularly in South Asia and Africa, offering alternatives to debt-driven infrastructure models. This cooperative approach strengthens regional resilience while reinforcing norms of transparency and sustainability. FOIP also intersects with the evolving role of minilateral groupings, most notably the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), comprising India, Japan, the United States, and Australia. While FOIP predates the revival of the Quad, it has provided an intellectual and strategic foundation for its agenda. For India and Japan, the Quad is not a military alliance but a platform for coordinating responses to shared challenges, including maritime security, disaster relief, supply chain resilience and emerging technologies. This flexible, issue-based cooperation reflects the pragmatic nature of FOIP. The economic dimension of FOIP is equally significant. The Indo-Pacific accounts for a substantial share of global GDP and trade and disruptions in this region have far-reaching consequences. India and Japan have increasingly aligned their economic strategies, particularly in supply chain diversification. Initiatives such as the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) aim to

Blog Post