Bharat Pakistan Terrorism United States USA War World

Pakistan May Use Iran as a Smokescreen to Spread Terror in India

Intelligence warnings are flashing red. The arrests are piling up. Pakistan does not need a reason to export terror to India. It needs an opportunity. And right now, with West Asia in open conflict, Pakistan’s deep state believes it has exactly that. Rahul PAWA | X – @imrahulpawa Every major world crisis has provided Pakistan’s terror machinery with operational cover to strike India, timed with cold precision to moments of maximum international distraction or diplomatic leverage. On March 20, 2000, the eve of Bill Clinton’s arrival in India, 35 Sikh men were lined up and shot dead in Chittisinghpora village in Jammu and Kashmir’s Anantnag district. The terrorists wore Indian Army uniforms and spoke Punjabi and Urdu, a calculated false flag designed to hand the visiting American president fresh images of fabricated Indian Army atrocities in Jammu and Kashmir. It was Lashkar-e-Taiba, operating under the Pakistan Army’s direction and its foreign intelligence agency ISI’s direct command. After 9/11, with American attention consumed by Afghanistan and the world watching Islamabad perform as a frontline ally in its “war against terror”, Pakistan’s deep state moved with characteristic audacity. On December 13, 2001, LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorists stormed the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, killing nine security personnel and nearly triggering a full-scale war. The attack was not opportunistic. It was a calculated attempt to internationalise Jammu and Kashmir at a moment when the world was already in crisis and the Islamic world was split. In November 2008, as Gaza descended into violent escalation and global Islamic outrage peaked, ten Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists sailed into Mumbai and held the city hostage for sixty hours, killing 166 people across multiple coordinated sites including the Taj Mahal Palace hotel, Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, and the Nariman House Jewish centre. The terrorist attack was meticulously planned, with Pakistan Army and its ISI providing training, logistics, and real-time operational guidance. This is not Pakistan-sponsored terrorism born of desperation. It was Pakistan Army strategy, executed with maximum cynicism. In 2001 it wore the mask of America’s indispensable ally against terror while simultaneously directing terror at India. Today it wears the mask of a responsible Islamic middle power and self-appointed Iran mediator while running active cells across Indian cities. The mask changes. The target never does. Domestically, the amendment of Article 370 of the Indian constitution in August 2019 began delivering what Pakistan had spent decades of propaganda insisting was impossible. Pakistani generals watched in horror as peace and normalcy returned to Jammu and Kashmir. Tourism surged. Investment flowed. A new generation of Kashmiris was experiencing connectivity and economic opportunity rather than terror branded as jihad. The Kashmir valley, whose civilisational roots run deep into Hindu tradition, whose saints and ancient temples reflect centuries of Hindu practice long preceding the region’s recent history, was beginning to rediscover itself on its own terms. The Pakistan Army could not allow this. A peaceful, prosperous Jammu and Kashmir demolished the foundational premise of Pakistan’s existence and its seventy-year investment in terror, war, and propaganda. So it recalibrated and struck. On April 22, 2025, three Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists armed with American M4 carbines, AK-47s, and a GoPro camera traced to a Chinese distributor and activated in Dongguan fourteen months before the attack, descended into Baisaran Valley and separated Hindu men from their wives and children before executing them in cold blood. They fled before Indian security forces arrived and were hunted down a few months later, with Home Minister Amit Shah confirming their elimination in Indian Parliament on July 29. From the bodies of attackers, investigators recovered Pakistani voter ID slips linked to Lahore constituency NA-125 and Gujranwala constituency NA-79, and biometric data from Pakistan’s National Database on a micro-SD card recovered from a broken satellite phone. The objective, as evidenced by the immediate operational claim on social media by The Resistance Front, a proscribed outfit and proxy of Lashkar-e-Taiba operating out of Muridke, was precise. Blame Hindus, declare Kashmir exclusively Islamic land, and manufacture an outsider and insider narrative implying that the very Hindus who form the civilisational core of Kashmir since its existence were settlers and occupiers. A fabricated narrative lifted directly from recent collaborators Hamas and Hezbollah’s playbooks in West Asia, designed to erase the Hindu soul of a valley Pakistan has spent decades trying to destabilise. India’s response was decisive and precise. Operation Sindoor struck nine confirmed terrorist training sites: Markaz Taiba in Muridke, LeT’s headquarters where the 26/11 Mumbai attackers were trained; Markaz Subhan Allah in Bahawalpur, Jaish-e-Mohammed’s nerve centre; the Masjid Syedna Bilal camp in Muzaffarabad; the Gulpur camp in Kotli; the Sawai Nala camp in Muzaffarabad; the Abbas camp in Kotli; the Mehmoona Joya facility of Hizbul Mujahideen in Sialkot; the Barnala camp in Bhimber; and the Sarjal facility at Tehra Kalan, a key weapons storage site. These were not arbitrary targets. They were the nerve centres behind decades of attacks on India including the IC-814 hijacking, the 2001 Indian Parliament attacks, and the 2008 Mumbai carnage. Pakistan’s response was to have its generals and senior officers attend the funerals of globally proscribed terrorists and then escalate. Pakistani forces deployed KARGU-2 loitering munitions and Bayraktar TB2 drones procured from Turkey and China in waves against Indian civilian and military targets. On the night of May 9 to 10, Indian air defence intercepted a Pakistani Fatah-II hypersonic ballistic missile over Sirsa in Haryana, aimed at targets near Delhi. In response to Pakistani escalation, Indian armed forces struck eleven Pakistani airbases including Nur Khan in Rawalpindi, the Pakistan Air Force’s central command and logistics hub, Rafiqui in Shorkot, Sargodha’s Mushaf Base, Murid in Chakwal, Skardu in Gilgit-Baltistan, and Bholari in Sindh, degrading frontline squadrons, runway infrastructure, drone hubs, and radar installations across the country. SEAD operations disabled air defence radars in Lahore and Gujranwala. The Indian Navy’s Western Fleet, including an aircraft carrier, repositioned in the northern Arabian Sea within operational range of Karachi. The intensity and reach of India’s strikes forced Pakistan’s DGMO to call his Indian counterpart and

Bharat Canada Geopolitics Hindus Human Rights Khalistan Policy

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Canada’s Bill C-9 and Its Implications for Hindus and Khalistani Extremism

With the enactment of Bill C-9 (Combatting Hate Act), Canada’s legislative stance on hate speech, extremist iconography and religious space protection underwent an important change. The law establishes penalties for intimidation at religious institutions motivated by hatred and makes it illegal to publicly display insignia associated with terrorist groups. The law is both a chance for legal protection and a test of the legitimacy of enforcement for Canada’s Hindu minority, which is dealing with an increase in temple destruction, intimidation, and hate speech related to Khalistan. The rule was passed in response to growing worries about targeted animosity toward Hindu populations, temple destruction, and radicalization of the diaspora.

Bharat Disinformation Hindus Human Rights Misinformation Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)

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Rebuttal of USCIRF India Entry and Issue Update on Alleged Religious Persecution

Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies (CIHS) has released a comprehensive rebuttal of the USCIRF Annual Report 2026 and its accompanying Issue Update on India. The rebuttal finds that USCIRF’s recommendation to designate India a Country of Particular Concern rests on methodological failures, unsourced assertions, and recommendations disconnected from the document’s own findings. Most strikingly, the report proposes sanctioning Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the world’s largest voluntary organisation and India’s Research and Analysis Wing without a single evidentiary basis anywhere in its text. CIHS concludes that documents of this kind, issued under the authority of a U.S. government commission, do not serve the cause of religious freedom. They damage the mutual respect on which one of the world’s most consequential democratic partnerships depends.

Bharat Hindus

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India’s Moral Diplomacy: Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam in an Age of Conflict

R K Raina India’s engagement with the world has never been guided solely by strategic calculations or economic interests. For millennia, the country’s outlook toward humanity has been shaped by a deeper civilisational ethic Sharanagata Rakshanam, the sacred duty to protect those who seek refuge. Rooted in the philosophy of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, the world is one family, this principle has repeatedly guided India’s actions across history. India’s recent humanitarian gesture toward the Iranian naval vessel reflects the principle that offering protection in times of distress transcends political differences. It demonstrates that India’s approach to international engagement remains rooted in compassion, restraint, and moral responsibility. Leadership Anchored in Civilisational Values In recent years, India’s leadership has increasingly emphasised the Bharatiya ancient civilisational ethos as a guiding principle of its global engagement. Concepts such as Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, prominently articulated during India’s global diplomatic initiatives, reflect the continuity of this worldview. By reaffirming these values in practice, the present government has highlighted that India’s foreign policy cannot be separated from its cultural and civilisational foundations. Actions rooted in humanitarian responsibility reinforce India’s credibility as a nation that combines strategic strength with moral conviction. Rather than acting as a power seeking dominance, India has often positioned itself as a bridge-builder, encouraging dialogue and stability while maintaining a high moral ground. At a time when conflicts and geopolitical rivalries are destabilising many regions, India’s civilisational values provide a moral compass that continues to shape its foreign policy and humanitarian responses. The recent decision to provide shelter to an Iranian naval vessel in Indian coastal waters during heightened regional tensions reflects not merely a diplomatic gesture but a continuation of a long-standing moral tradition. A Tradition Older Than the State India’s civilisational memory is filled with examples that emphasise the protection of those who seek refuge. Historical texts and folklore highlight that safeguarding a person who comes under one’s protection is a sacred duty. One of the most powerful illustrations of this ethos is the legend of King Shibi, who chose to sacrifice his own flesh to save a dove that had sought refuge from a pursuing hawk. The story symbolizes a moral ideal deeply embedded in Indian consciousness, the obligation of the protector toward the protected. This civilisational ethos later translated into real historical practice. Over centuries, India became a sanctuary for communities fleeing persecution and displacement. The Syrian Christians, escaping religious persecution in the Middle East, arrived on the Malabar Coast between the first and fourth centuries and were welcomed by local rulers. They were granted land, social recognition, and the freedom to practice their faith while becoming part of the broader cultural fabric of India. Similarly, Jewish communities such as the Cochin Jews and the Bene Israel lived in India for centuries without facing the systemic persecution that marked their experience in many other parts of the world. Historical documents, including the copper plate grants of the Chera rulers, gave them autonomy and the freedom to maintain their religious institutions. The arrival of the Parsis in the eighth century offers another powerful example. Fleeing the Islamic conquest of Persia, they sought refuge on the western coast of India. According to the well-known narrative of Qissa-i-Sanjan, the local ruler initially indicated that his kingdom was already full. The Parsi priest responded by adding sugar to a bowl of milk, symbolising that his community would blend peacefully into society while enriching it. The Parsis were welcomed and allowed to preserve their faith while adopting aspects of the local culture, eventually becoming one of India’s most dynamic and respected communities. These examples reflect a distinctive Indian approach coexistence with identity, rather than forced assimilation. Modern India and the Continuity of Civilisational Values Independent India carried forward this civilisational legacy into its modern statecraft. India has repeatedly demonstrated humanitarian leadership during major crises. During World War II, Maharaja Digvijaysinhji Jadeja of Nawanagar opened his kingdom to more than a thousand Polish children who had escaped the devastation of Europe. He treated them not as refugees but as members of his own family, famously telling them that they were no longer orphans. In 1959, when the 14th Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetans fled Tibet following the Chinese crackdown, India granted them asylum and enabled the Tibetan community to rebuild its cultural and religious life in exile. Today, the Tibetan presence in India stands as one of the most remarkable examples of cultural preservation in exile. Similarly, during the 1971 Bangladesh crisis, India opened its borders to nearly ten million refugees fleeing violence in East Pakistan. Despite severe economic constraints at the time, India provided shelter, food, and humanitarian assistance on a massive scale. These actions were not merely political decisions but expressions of India’s enduring civilisational ethos of Karuna compassion. India’s Civilisational Responsibility in Today’s Conflicts In today’s volatile geopolitical environment, particularly amid tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, India’s role assumes special significance. The region stretching from the Middle East to South Asia has deep historical and cultural connections with India. Instability in this region affects not only geopolitical alignments but also shared civilisational linkages built over centuries. A Bridge Between Civilisations India’s engagement with the Middle East and neighbouring regions has historically been rooted in cultural exchange, trade, and spiritual interaction rather than confrontation. In moments of crisis, this civilisational perspective allows India to occupy a unique moral space one that emphasizes dialogue, stability, and the protection of human life. The expectation from India today is therefore not only strategic but also moral. The region looks toward India as a country capable of combining strategic prudence with civilisational wisdom. A Message to the World In a world often driven by narrow geopolitical interests, India’s civilisational philosophy offers a different vision one where compassion, protection, and moral responsibility remain central to international conduct. The ancient dictum “Udaar Charitanam Tu Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” reminds us that for the noble-minded, the entire world is one family. India’s long history of sheltering the persecuted and supporting the

Bharat Hindus Human Rights Khalistan Pakistan

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Khalistani Terror Propaganda Put Bharat, US on Edge

Free run given to SFJ that equated Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Iran’s Khamenei reflect insensitivity of US & Canada. N. C. Bipindra Latest provocative images and videos posted on social media by Sikhs for Justice (SFJ) have triggered a controversy intersecting free speech, diaspora politics, territorial integrity, global diplomacy and international relations. SFJ frames its posts and messages as a free speech exercise asserting democratic rights within United States. But, the content portraying Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi alongside Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei killed in airstrikes by US and Israel on February 28, 2026 is of serious concern. Such messaging not only constitutes indecency and insensitivity but crosses limits and enters the realm of hostile propaganda, incitement of violence, deliberate misinformation and intolerable provocation. US authorities, particularly President Donald Trump, who calls Modi his good friend, should not turn a blind eye to such provocative content. For New Delhi, such freedom to propagate violence against India’s elected prime minister on US soil should have potential consequences for India-US relations. To understand why the SFJ’s post and its contents are contentious and objectionable, it is important to consider both the nature of messaging and broader political context in which the proscribed terrorist organisation operates. SFJ has no ground support in India, particularly the Sikh-majority Punjab province, but it operates freely in US and neighbouring Canada with impunity. SFJ advocates balkanisation of India, in particular, creation of imaginary Khalistan, a proposed independent theocratic Sikh state carved out of only Indian territories. An illegal Khalistan map that SFJ has released in last few years conveniently ignores territories that are now part of Pakistan but were historically ruled by Sikh emperors. But, the map includes present-day Indian provinces of Punjab, Haryana, Sikh-majority areas of Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh with Shimla as its future capital. The reasons for not claiming Pakistan’s Punjab and other provinces that were part of the erstwhile Sikh kingdom’s rule are not so difficult to fathom. Trump administration and Mark Carney government must read two key research reports released by US-based Hudson Institute and Canada-based Macdonald-Laurier Institute (MLI). Hudson Institute’s ‘Destabilisation Playbook: Khalistan Separatist Activism within the US’ authored by Aparna Pande, Husain Haqqani, C. Christine Fair and others present two main arguments that warrant attention of Trump administration. The Hudson Institute’s September 2021 report calls for investigations into Khalistani groups’ activities in US noting that these were directly involved in numerous terror attacks around the world including 1985 Air India’s ‘Kanishka’ bombing that left 329 people including Canadians dead and to shed reluctance to act on intelligence provided by India. MLI’s September 2020 report authored by senior Canadian journalist Terry Milewski, titled ‘Khalistan: A Project of Pakistan’ argues that the separatist movement was designed to subvert national security of both Canada and India, a serious threat that Carney’s government should be vigilant about. Those two reports would help Western democracies that are open to understand dangers of allowing SFJ and self-styled general counsel Gurpatwant Singh Pannun to be haughty. SFJ was banned in India in 2019 for threatening its sovereignty and territorial integrity. But, US and Canada are inviting such treacherous tendencies to grow within their territory without realising that the snake they feed would come back to bite them tomorrow, if not today. Indian proscription notwithstanding, SFJ continues to hold farcical “referendums” in US, Canada United Kingdom and Australia attempting to mobilise sections of Sikh diaspora around Khalistani cause. The latest social posts along with a video shared by SFJ are controversial due to their tone, tenor and intent. Equating Modi with Ali Khamenei is a clear attempt to draw parallels between a democratically elected popular leader of India and head of a theocratic state, often regarded as adversarial to West, particularly the US. This can’t be just criticism of Indian government or simply free speech, but rather a deliberate bid to delegitimise and demonise the Indian state, its political leadership and 1.4 billion Indians before the global audience and calling for destablising India through elimination of its prime minister or overthrowing the existing regime. Hudson Institute and Macdonald-Laurier Institute reports point to “playbook” and “project” against India, its political leadership and its people. In particular, use of “India’s Khamenei Alive” slogan juxtaposed with reference to Iran’s Ali Khamenei is a calculated attempt to evoke hostility, suspicion in US to frame India as a strategic adversary of West alongside Iran. Contrasting the phrase “Iran’s Khamenei dead” with “India’s Khamenei alive” is suggestive and goes beyond political free speech and commentary. It stops short of an explicit call to assassinate Indian prime minister. It normalises the idea of dastardly outcomes that can be interpreted as endorsement or glorification which is more troubling. Such rhetoric in democratic societies may not meet strict legal threshold for incitement but is nonetheless considered irresponsible and potentially vicious. SFJ’s post escalates issue by portraying India as an “enemy” of US. This messaging contradicts reality of India-US ties that have grown into a comprehensive strategic partnership since 2007 encompassing defence cooperation, economic ties and shared strategic interests in Indo-Pacific region grounded in values common to both nations. SFJ’s narrative-building is an attempt to influence public opinion and policy discourse in the West particularly United States. This messaging is sensitive, as it weaponises diaspora activism to advance geopolitical perceptions. The objection to such content is rooted in broader pattern associated with SFJ activities. Over the years, the proscribed fringe outfit has carried on inflammatory and divisive campaigns from controversial slogans to provocative demonstrations at Khalistan-related events. Its members have defaced Hindu temples in US and attacked Indian diplomatic missions. These actions have regularly pushed the boundaries of acceptable political expression and free speech. While some such instances have drawn condemnation in host nations, they highlight the fine line between activism and provocation that governments such as Trump’s and Carney’s should be mindful of. The US may have protection for free speech under First Amendment in its Constitution, but highly offensive and objectionable messages directly incite violence and

Bharat Defence Geopolitics International Policy United States War World

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A Fine Balancing Act!

Post-war uncertainty in West Asia pose serious challenges with jostle for control of oil assets, ruling Iran with an iron fist and Bharat has its task cut out. K.A.Badarinath US President Donald J Trump’s statement on ‘ending the war’ shortly cannot be taken on its face value. Nor do the markets, stakeholders expect the war on Iran unleashed by both US and Israel to end shortly. Also, consequences of this two-week war would be too enormous and spread across the globe even if it ended abruptly without key questions answered or objectives met with. For countries across continents, big and small, developed, developing or under-developed, the impact would be proportional whether one is a party to this war or stayed away. Beyond loss of lives in thousands, destruction of infrastructure built over a decade in West Asian countries, this war may not yield much substantively. Well, both Israel’s Benzamin Netanyahu and US President Trump’s ego of sizing up Iran may well be massaged while duo sport victory signs, offer interviews during and after the bloody conflict followed by jostle to win billions of dollars contracts to resurrect the American aligned assets of consequence. At least till now, the war has not achieved its primary objective of forcing current Shia leadership in Iran headed by Mojtaba Khamenei into submission and object surrender. While President Trump claims a ‘victorious end’ to the war, Iran’s leadership has been defiant and vows to bring the conflict to a close on its terms, timing and the way it deems fit. The rant that ‘there’s hardly anything left in Iran’ may be to mollify American oil lobby, GCC allies and calm down European Union partners that fear complete disruption of oil and gas supplies into their homes. Second objective was to install a new regime and completely dismantle the Shias’ religious rule. The stated position was to ring in a more democratic, open, flexible and American friendly regime in Tehran. But, that seems to be eons away. Most interesting is that youngsters’ hitherto opposed to religious leadership and revolutionary guards are not seen on streets of Iran rejoicing anymore. Instead, the overwhelming sentiment is that ‘Iran be ruled by Iranians’ and not outsiders. This nationalistic outburst amongst ordinary Iranians is something that President Trump and his key advisors did not foresee. Hence, there may not be another Trump-triggered Board of Governance for Iran like Gaza that will take reins in Tehran. Thirdly, President Trump’s war seems to have the potential to turn tide and bring both Shias as well as Sunnis apart from minority groups in Tehran on one platform as part of a rainbow alliance to take charge of Iranian affairs post-war. Differences notwithstanding, minorities like Azerbaijani Turks, Kurds, Lurs, Balochs, Arabs and Turkmens may consider joining this rainbow coalition. Till now, these minorities have not warmed up to Trump’s idea of taking charge in Tehran without participation of Shias. Fourthly, there’s a possibility that the rainbow coalition may not run as a puppet government in the hands of European powers and the US, assert itself and chart its own path. Fifthly, complete isolation of Iran in West Asia from its dozen neighbouring countries in West Asia also may not happen. Bombing of US assets in these countries may not lead to an anti-Iran campaign in the Muslim world. Instead, Islamist narrative may go the other way with Iran seen standing up alone against US and its allies. Will other West Asian countries rally behind Iran to resist takeover by US is a billion dollar question? Sixthly, anti-American sentiment may trigger larger participation of China, Russia and others in West Asian affairs going forward. Even in reconstruction of Iran, these powers may play a vital role with resources, investments given the strategic importance of pursuing an anti-US line. Seventhly, in post-war scenario, biggest issue would be exercising control over Iran’s enormous oil and gas assets and Gulf of Hormuz thereby key shipping lines, movement of energy supplies, cargo etc. Eighthly, post-war, 57-member Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) that positioned itself as united progressive voice of Muslim world may undergo big change to reflect new realities in West Asia. Rupture in this mega conglomeration is bound to deepen in case the member-countries adopted a radical Islamist agenda, promoted terror and created infrastructure to further such forces of disruption. Ninthly, reforming banks and financial institutions hitherto run on Sharia principles, neck deep in ‘islamizing the world’ would make Muslims more acceptable as a religious group especially in Western framework. For countries like Bharat that have not jumped blindly into war hysteria has an opportunity and equivalent challenges in West Asia engagement. About 10-million plus diaspora that are mostly employed with services industry, corporates, financial sector and elsewhere would play a larger role in post-war Iran and other West Asian capitals. As a peacenik opposed to violence and war, Bharat maintained ‘strategic autonomy’, kept equidistant in the conflict and attempted at bringing warring parties on to one table. When the war ends, Bharat would be most acceptable to play the role of ‘a big balancing power’ in Gulf’s renewed engagement with US and European Union. On economic and development front, Bharat can partner with Tehran sans hesitation. It’s in the interest of both West Asian economies and India that stability quickly returns to the region and start afresh in Iran’s engagement internationally. (Author is a veteran journalist, Director & Chief Executive of non-partisan think-tank based in New Delhi, Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies)

Bharat Cyber Security Defence Geopolitics Security Technology United States USA War

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US Tech Stack That Took Out Khamenei and Why It Matters to India

The joint US-Israeli strike of February 28, 2026 that killed Khamenei was full-spectrum corporate warfighting; satellites, AI, cloud, autonomous swarms, and information dominance working as one lethal system. India watched. It must now evolve. Rahul PAWA | x – iamrahulpawa In the predawn hours of Saturday, February 28, 2026, something extraordinary happened in the Shemiran district of northern Tehran. Khamenei, Iran’s Leader for 37 years, the man who had survived assassinations, wars, and decades of sanctions, was killed not primarily by a bomb, but by an algorithm. The operation, codenamed Epic Fury, was the first high-level decapitation strike in military history to be substantially driven by artificial intelligence across the kill chain. By the time Israeli aircraft and American munitions found their target, Palantir’s software had fused the intelligence, Anduril’s autonomous drone swarms had penetrated Iran’s air defences, Starlink had held communications together across a contested electromagnetic environment, and Claude’s Anthropic’s AI model, deployed on classified US defence networks had processed petabytes of intercepted Persian-language communications and generated targeting scenarios that human analysts would have taken weeks to produce. Ukraine had proved that Silicon Valley could hold a frontline. Venezuela had proved it could topple a government and secure an oil state. Iran was where both lessons converged into a single, decapitating strike. Invisible Architecture of a Visible Strike When news of Khamenei’s death broke, global attention fixed on the ordnance: 200 Israeli fighter jets in the largest military flyover in Israeli Air Force history, US bunker-busters, strikes across 24 Iranian provinces. What received less coverage was the invisible architecture that made it possible. Starlink was central long before the first missile launched. The Trump administration had covertly smuggled thousands of Starlink terminals into Iran in the months prior, sustaining a communications corridor for intelligence sources inside the country even as the Iranian regime drove national internet connectivity down to 4% of normal levels. When Iranian forces shut down Starlink networks, they were confiscating the same infrastructure that was feeding real-time intelligence upstream to US planners. Satellite connectivity was not a supporting element; it was the nervous system of the operation. Palantir provided the operational software layer; sensor fusion, targeting architecture, and the command-and-control framework that translated intelligence into actionable strike packages. Its Lattice system enabled autonomous drone swarms to communicate threat data laterally: when Iranian air-defence radar locked onto one drone, the entire swarm adapted, dispatching subgroups for electronic deception and anti-radiation strikes in real time. This is software-driven warfare weapons that are, as defence-tech investors now openly describe them, “code wrapped in aluminium shells.” Anduril’s YFQ-44A drones, operating through Hivemind AI pilots capable of executing complex missions without GPS, satellite communication, or human operators, demonstrated capabilities that rendered Iran’s hardware-centric air defences clumsy against algorithmic iteration. Shield AI’s autonomous systems operated in environments where traditional military drones would have been jammed and blinded. Amazon Web Services provided the cloud backbone, data continuity, logistics support, and the secure infrastructure that kept coalition planning intact against Iranian cyber-retaliation, which simultaneously targeted US military bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. Anthropic’s Claude AI, which had already proven itself in Venezuela processing intelligence, mapping command chains, and generating scenario simulations that compressed weeks of human analysis into hours, ran the same playbook on Iran, this time trawling Persian communications and mapping fractures in the Revolutionary Guard’s targeting structure. Trump banned Anthropic the day before the strikes. US Central Command used Claude anyway, through Palantir and AWS, as bombs fell on Tehran. The corporate stack had become so load-bearing that a presidential order could not sever it mid-operation. It was not peripheral to American military power. It was the operation. From Sindoor to Stack For Indian strategic planners watching the war in West Asia unfold, the lesson is not comfortable. India has pieces of this architecture. It does not have the stack. India’s defence-industrial base is strongest where the old model still dominates: physical production. Native manufacturing capability is real, and Atmanirbhar Bharat has added momentum. But industrial production is the bottom layer of the stack US operation in West Asia demonstrated. Everything above it; connectivity, cloud, AI, autonomous systems, information operations is where India’s ambition is still catching up with requirement. India is building a commercial space sector, with domestic satellite launches accelerating and a small but growing constellation in development. It is not yet capable of blanketing a contested theatre with resilient satcom, let alone covertly sustaining intelligence networks inside an adversary state but the foundation is being laid. In operational software and autonomous systems, an iDEX-incubated startup ecosystem is producing native drones and ISR platforms, promising early capability, not yet embedded in classified pipelines at wartime depth. In frontier AI, India has launched sovereign large language model initiatives and is developing government-facing AI infrastructure but the institutional pathway from commercial deployment to classified defence integration remains nascent. In the information domain, digital public infrastructure is maturing, though platform-level influence at global strategic scale remains beyond reach. Iran’s near-total internet blackout could not sever the intelligence flow because a commercial satellite alternative existed. India is working toward equivalent resilience. However, it is not there yet. The operation that killed Khamenei was not a triumph of numbers. Iran was never going to match US and Israeli firepower. It was a triumph of the stack; satellites, AI, autonomous systems, cloud, and information dominance mobilised as one unified architecture. India already knows this, because it has lived it. Operation Sindoor 2025 was India’s own inflection point. AI fused multi-source battlefield data in real time. Native electronic intelligence software evolved mid-operation to pinpoint and rank threats. Over 600 drones were defeated in a single wave. Loitering munitions and FPV strike drones executed precision hits on high-value targets. The instinct was right. The native capability was real. But Sindoor also exposed the distance still to travel. The stack America deployed over Tehran was embedded in doctrine. India’s is battle-proven but not yet fully built. India need not replicate America’s model. But the underlying

Bharat Defence Security Technology

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VSHORADS Delivers India Its Own Aerial Firepower

Three flawless trials at Chandipur signal that India’s last line of aerial defence is no longer foreign. Rahul PAWA | x – iamrahulpawa On the evening of 27 February 2026, along the windswept test ranges of Chandipur on Odisha’s coastline, India wrote a new chapter in its quest for aerial self-reliance. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) conducted three successive, flawless flight trials of the Very Short-Range Air Defence System or VSHORADS, a fourth-generation Man-Portable Air Defence System (MANPAD) that has been years in the making. The results were unambiguous: a 100% interception rate against fast-moving aerial targets that mimicked the full spectrum of modern aerial threats. What made these trials extraordinary was not simply the precision of the kills, but the conditions under which they were achieved. For the first time, the system was operated not by DRDO scientists in lab coats, but by soldiers who will one day carry this very weapon into India’s most hostile frontiers. Targets were engaged at varying speeds, ranges, and altitudes, including aerial vehicles engineered to simulate the low thermal signatures of the surveillance and kamikaze drones that have fundamentally altered modern warfare from Ukraine to the Middle East. Technology Inside the Tube To appreciate why VSHORADS matters, one must understand what sets it apart, not just from the Russian Igla-M systems it is designed to replace, but from the world’s most battle-proven MANPADs. The American FIM-92 Stinger, for all its combat pedigree from Afghanistan to Ukraine, requires a coolant gas cylinder to chill its seeker head before firing, adding weight, complexity, and critical seconds to the launch sequence. The British Starstreak, while blindingly fast at Mach 3+, demands a highly trained operator to guide it manually onto the target, making it unforgiving under battlefield stress. VSHORADS sidesteps both limitations. At its heart sits an uncooled Imaging Infrared (IIR) seeker that needs no gas kit and no operator hand-holding. It locks, it fires, it hunts. Where the Stinger and the Igla-M track a point of heat and can be fooled by a magnesium flare, the IIR seeker builds a high-resolution thermal picture of its target. A jet engine looks nothing like a burning flare in thermal resolution, and VSHORADS knows the difference. The system further incorporates a miniaturised Reaction Control System (RCS), using small directional thrusters rather than fins alone to change course mid-flight, granting it the agility to chase a drone executing a sudden corkscrew or a cruise missile hugging a valley floor. Combined with dual-thrust solid propulsion, it keeps pace with whatever the modern battlefield throws at it. Engineered for India’s Terrain Unlike Western or Russian systems designed primarily for European plains or desert theatres, VSHORADS has been engineered from the outset to function in India’s uniquely demanding environments. Himalayas present challenges that most military hardware simply was not designed to overcome: oxygen-thin air that degrades aerodynamic control, sub-zero temperatures that drain batteries and fog optical seekers, and rugged mountain passes where a soldier must carry everything on their back. DRDO has hardened the electronics, optimised the battery systems, and ensured the seeker functions without the coolant gas cylinders that legacy MANPADs require. In Ladakh, where a soldier cannot afford to carry extra weight, that elimination of the coolant bottle is a logistical blessing. The system can be shoulder-fired, tripod-mounted, or integrated onto vehicles, giving commanders tactical flexibility across mountainous, desert, and maritime environments. With an operational range of approximately six to seven kilometres, it comfortably outreaches the American FIM-92 Stinger and is competitive with the Igla-S, while offering superior guidance technology against modern threats. The Strategic Picture: Mission Sudarshan Chakra The February trials are the final milestone before full induction. Production has been assigned and the Indian Army placed an initial procurement order in June 2025. The Ministry of Defence has already issued a Request for Proposal for a next-generation VSHORADS-NG variant, signalling confidence that this platform will evolve with the threat landscape for decades to come. VSHORADS is a cornerstone of Mission Sudarshan Chakra. India’s ambitious roadmap to build native “Iron Dome” style, multi-layered air defence network by 2035. Named after the discus of Hindu deity Vishnu, the mission envisions an unbroken, spinning shield over Indian territory, from the highest Himalayan ridgelines to the coastal perimeter. Within this architecture, VSHORADS fills the most dangerous gap, the first 10,000 feet of airspace, where radar coverage is patchy, and response windows are measured in seconds. Alongside the Quick Reaction Surface to Air Missile (QRSAM) for mid-range threats and emerging laser-based directed energy weapons for close-in interception, VSHORADS forms the innermost and most mobile ring of the shield. The successful trials at Chandipur are proof of concept that Indian ambition, when given the time and resources to mature, can produce systems that stand at the global technological frontier. India’s skies, from the frozen passes of Ladakh to the mangrove coastlines of the Bay of Bengal, will soon be guarded by a weapon born entirely on Indian soil. When VSHORADS finally takes its place in the inventory, it will represent far more than a missile, it will be the outermost blade of the Sudarshan Chakra, finally spinning. (Rahul Pawa is an international public lawyer and Director of Research at the Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies, New Delhi.)

Bharat Canada Disinformation Geopolitics Hindus Human Rights Pakistan Security

361

Did SOAS Institutionalise Hinduphobia on behalf of George Soros?

The Leicester unrest of 2022 generated a crowded and contested reporting ecosystem. By the time the SOAS commission published Better Together: Understanding the 2022 Violence in Leicester in February 2026, the evidential field already included rapid-response briefs, computational forensic analysis, fact-finding reports, media investigations, and an ongoing UK government-commissioned review. The key analytic question, therefore, is not whether the SOAS report entered a vacuum. It did not. The real question is whether it fairly integrated the prior evidential landscape, or whether it reorganised that landscape through a pre-set ideological frame. Across the pre-2026 reporting ecosystem, a striking convergence is visible. Reports issued by CIHS, NCRI, CRT/Charlotte Littlewood, and CDPHR differ in method, tone, and institutional location, yet they repeatedly arrive at two common findings. First, disinformation and influencer amplification were not incidental features of the Leicester violence; they were causal drivers in escalating tensions, shaping perceptions, and mobilising individuals towards real-world confrontation. Secondly, Hindus were not merely one community among many caught in a diffuse breakdown of cohesion. They were, in significant respects, targets of online incitement, doxxing, false attribution, intimidation, and attacks on property and religious symbols, much of which these reports attribute to Islamist factions and allied misinformation ecosystems operating in and around Leicester. This matters because media gatekeeping failed at a critical moment. The prior reports, especially NCRI, CIHS, and CRT, converge on the claim that unverified influencer narratives were elevated into mainstream discourse without sufficient due diligence. In that environment, misinformation ceased to be rhetorical noise and became operationally consequential. False claims about “RSS terrorists”, “Hindutva thugs”, or organised Hindu extremism were not simply descriptive errors; they shaped how violence was interpreted, whom authorities and media treated with suspicion, and which communities were left exposed. The result was not neutral confusion, but a reputational inversion in which Hindu victims could be reframed as presumptive aggressors. It is against that background that the SOAS commission report must be read. The report adopts the formal language of inquiry, relies on mixed methods, and includes an express statement that Open Society Foundations had no influence over its methods or findings. Yet the report was privately funded, publicly linked to a reported £620,000 OSF grant, and conducted in parallel with an already existing UK government review. In a politically charged communal context, that institutional configuration was always likely to attract scrutiny. Even if one accepts the non-interference disclaimer at face value, such statements do not settle the deeper question of whether funding relationships, institutional culture, or ideological priors shaped the report’s framing, priorities, and recommendations. The central criticism advanced in this paper is not that the SOAS report contains no useful material. On the contrary, its own descriptive sections document anti-Hindu harm in serious terms, including intimidation, attacks in Hindu neighbourhoods, and the Shivalaya Mandir incident. The problem lies elsewhere: in the report’s interpretive and policy architecture. While acknowledging anti-Hindu targeting and admitting verification limits around some claims concerning alleged Hindutva-linked organisational involvement, the report nonetheless elevates “Hindutva extremism” into the principal prescriptive concern. In doing so, it produces a structure in which Hindus are descriptively recognised as having suffered harm, yet prescriptively positioned as the primary object of suspicion and institutional management. That asymmetry is the report’s most serious flaw. A report can document harm accurately and still institutionalise bias through the categories it privileges and the remedies it recommends. In the Leicester case, the cumulative evidential landscape pointed first towards protection: countering disinformation, recognising anti-Hindu prejudice, scrutinising Islamist mobilisation, and repairing failures of media and civic response. The SOAS commission instead shifts the centre of gravity toward the ideological containment of “Hindutva”. That is not a neutral synthesis of the evidence. It is a policy reorientation with downstream consequences for safeguarding, public discourse, community recognition, and the equal treatment of Hindus in Britain. This report therefore proceeds from a narrow but important contention: the SOAS commission should not be assessed only by what it says, but by what it does institutionally. Read against the wider evidential record, it raises a serious question as to whether a privately funded, politically salient inquiry helped recast a pattern of anti-Hindu victimisation into an official-sounding framework of Hindu suspicion. If so, the issue is larger than one report. It is whether elite institutions, media ecosystems, and donor-linked inquiry structures together contributed to the normalisation of a one-sided narrative of Leicester—one with damaging implications for public trust, social cohesion, and the recognition of Hinduphobia in the United Kingdom. Prior reports and what they establish The pre-2026 report ecosystem is largely overlapping. It contains briefs, computational forensics, and fact-finding studies. The correct analytic method is to compare what each report credibly establishes, given its methods, and then evaluate whether the SOAS commission report fairly integrates that evidential landscape or reorganises it into a pre-set ideological frame. The Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies (CIHS), an independent Delhi-based think tank issued rapid-response briefs in September 2022. Its Leicester briefs highlights that organised Islamist entities and individuals targeted Leicester’s Hindu population and that over fifty Hindu properties and vehicles were damaged in targeted attacks; it further records that Leicester police refuted the kidnapping narrative, and it names Majid Freeman as a prominent misinformation disseminator. CIHS reports there after have been tested against the computational and police-referenced work in NCRI and CDPHR. The Network Contagion Research Institute (NCRI) report is the most technologically explicit computational study. It describes multi-platform data collection and applies machine learning, natural language processing, network analysis and OSINT to build a timeline of malicious narratives and mobilisation patterns. Its headline figures include that AI models detected calls for violent action on Twitter during the Leicester events, with 70% of those calls directed against Hindus and 30% against Muslims. Crucially, NCRI also states that disinformation about Hindus as “bloodthirsty and genocidal” motivated attacks by recruiting online reinforcements to real-world engagements, and it explicitly criticises mainstream outlets for failing due diligence and amplifying Majid Freeman as a “central agitator”. This is not an aesthetic

Bharat Business Economy Geopolitics International Policy Politics Trade United States USA

285

Trump, Tariffs & Tumult

Uncertainty in global trade got new lease of life with US President Trump insisting on weaponising tariffs with no signs of easing down. K.A.Badarinath President Donald Trump is going bonkers. Tariffs or weapons of mass destruction, it makes no difference to him or the Republican White House that he runs. It’s with the same vigour that deadly arms to different parts of the world are supplied or sold, tariffs slapped or reviewed. In one of my earlier write ups, I did say that Donald Trump would be one of the ‘biggest disruptor’ of global order, be it geo-political, economic and trade relations. This has been proved beyond doubt in recent days. US Supreme Court order of last week may have been just a few hours of pause on weaponised tariffs that’s central to Donald Trump’s economic policy formulation. In those few hours, he switched statutes, juggled acts, related provisions and then slapped 15 per cent import tariffs on each and every country that America trades with, be it an ally or a foe. Well, reciprocal tariff regime of President Trump under his emergency economic powers may have ended. But then, he opened another line to slap tariffs for 150 days pending approval from US Congress. Even as new tariff regime comes into operation beginning Tuesday that are over and above most favoured nations (MFN) duties, uncertainty in global trade continues to reign supreme with nations’ capital across seven seas trying to make sense of the new tariffs, their future and what’s in store for each one of them. By weaponizing tariffs to force both allies and enemies alike into submission, Donald Trump opened a new untested model of building relationships. In the process, President Trump has addressed his domestic white core political constituency who perceive him as a ‘decisive leader’ who’s just going about his job of governing America. From provisions relating to balance of payments, discrimination against American interests to several substantive clauses of Trade Acts in US may be invoked by President Trump to carry forward what he describes as part of his campaign to Make America Great Again (MAGA). President Trump is going gaga to leave his imprint on America’s governance come what may. He shows no signs of backing off any time now. But, what essentially happens is that period of uncertainty would extend, most countries will use this timeframe to recalibrate to redefine their negotiation strategy. While China is better off as it secured one-year negotiation time to sign upon a new trade deal, Bharat has kept its options open and may need more fresh air in the room before a pact is clinched with Washington DC. Now, the proposed18 per cent reciprocal duty to be part of free trade agreement with US becomes infructuous as use of International Economic Emergency powers have been struck down by US Supreme Court. Fresh negotiations for a deal between Bharat and US seem inevitable at much below 18 per cent impost though President Trump continues to insist that nothing has changed for Bharat. Postponing current round of negotiations on FTA for a later date would work well for both India and US as Washington DC. Secondly, keeping all options open would work in best interest of Bharat and its 1.4 billion citizens. Reworking the entire deal with US in totem over next six months is not a bad idea with ‘strategic autonomy’ being central to engagement. In this context, taking a common approach on US tariffs with like-minded partners as suggested by Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva may be explored. Building blocks or unions against America may not be an option for Bharat though the visiting President Lula has postulated such a strategy. Similarly, putting a full stop to purchase of oil and gas from Russia cannot be an option as Bharat continues to diversify its energy basket, sources and undertakes rework of energy matrix. Diversifying its markets for selling its goods and services beyond European Union should be seriously considered by Bharat’s negotiators. Speciality minerals deal with Brazil is a fine example like the ‘strategic relations’ entered into France is unique and specific to Bharat. Similarly, arriving at a working understanding with China be seriously considered notwithstanding the aggressions, transgressions made by the people’s liberation army on the borders. Containing border conflicts, China giving up its falsified claims in Indo-Pacific should be integral to the working arrangement with Beijing. Thirdly, Bharat should aggressively play the role of a peacenik in conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Israel & Iran apart from taking an aggressive ‘zero tolerance’ posture against radicalism, religious terror and overseas interferences on the sly. Fourthly, achieving a fine balance in our global engagement in the medium to long term to safeguard Bharat’s security interests that are non-negotiable should be the objective. Republican or Democratic White House is no patronizing friend of Bharat. Bharat must safeguard her own interests. (Author is a veteran journalist, writer & blogger, director & chief executive at non-partisan New Delhi based think-tank, Centre for Integrated & Holistic Studies)

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