CIHS – Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies

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Referendum Farce: Story Written in Karachi, Staged in New York

Rohan Giri On April 29, 2026, Gurpatwant Singh Pannun announced a Khalistan Referendum voter registration drive from the Karachi Press Club. He was speaking via video link from New York. He was targeting Sikhs who live inside Bharat. The venue, the man and the medium together tell a story that his words never could. There is a particular kind of political performance that is designed not to succeed, but to persist, not to achieve a goal, but to manufacture the appearance of. On April 29, 2026, Sikhs for Justice (SFJ) chief Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, a man proscribed under Bharat’s Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act along with his organisation, delivered precisely such a presentation from the Karachi Press Club. Speaking via video link from New York, he announced that SFJ would launch a phased voter registration drive for the purported Khalistan Referendum targeting Sikhs residing across all Bharatiiya states. Beginning in Delhi, moving to Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, and ending the registrations in Punjab itself. The sequencing was revealing. A movement that claims Punjab as its spiritual and political homeland does not begin its campaign there. It begins in Delhi, because it knows Punjab will not listen. Bharatiya officials did not miss the significance of the venue. Pakistan’s establishment was openly offering its platform to an organisation that has called for violent attacks inside Bharat and the assassination of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The SFJ has glorified terrorist Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and treated perpetrators of the Air India Kanishka bombing in which 329 people were killed, as heroes. That Pakistan now provides this group a podium at one of Karachi’s most visible press institutions is not coincidence. Pakistan is playing this game out in the open and is not even bothering to conceal its backing to a terrorist organisation. The brazenness is itself the message, a message directed not at Sikhs in Bharat, but at the ISI’s own operatives, diaspora handlers and global media amplifiers, telling them that the Khalistan project retains state-level patronage. One has to look at trail of its failures in order to comprehend why Karachi has now again emerged as this campaign’s operational hub. In order to undermine and divert Indian government, the ISI started protracted proxy war by aiding the Khalistan movement in Punjab, as this timeline already makes clear. Since 1980s, this tactic has never been formally discontinued. What has changed is the terrain. Operations for SFJ have become significantly harder in Canada and United Kingdom where governments have come under growing domestic and diplomatic pressure to scrutinise separatist activities more carefully. With Western soil getting increasingly inhospitable, Rawalpindi has fallen back on what it controls directly. Offering Karachi Press Club to Pannun is a desperate move to rake up the movement in Bharat after multiple attempts have failed, as officials have assessed. Timing of April 29 announcement was again not coincidental. That same week, Punjab Police dealt another significant blow to ISI – Khalistan terror network recovering a cache that included a rocket-propelled grenade, two packs of RDX, a metallic improvised explosive device, hand grenades, detonators, high-end pistols, wireless sets and timer switches which meant to be used in massive attacks across the state. Director General of Police Gaurav Yadav confirmed the recovery was linked to an ongoing investigation into the Shambhu railway track IED blast case, as well as grenade attack on the Crime Investigation Agency (CIA) office in Moga in 2025. This was not an isolated seizure. In prior weeks, Punjab Police had busted two separate ISI-backed Babbar Khalsa International terror modules recovering RPG launchers, additional IEDs, RDX and a fleet of vehicles with accused persons linked to Pakistan-based handler Harvinder Singh Rinda. The farce of referendum announcement and arms consignments are not parallel stories. They are part of same story, one being propaganda arm and the other as operational arm of the same ISI-directed network. Pannun’s remarks at Karachi press conference stripped away whatever pretence of a civic movement SFJ has had claimed till date. He also claimed that 1.8 million people had participated in the referendum worldwide (a figure that Intelligence Bureau officials dismissed as fabricated, noting that the SFJ has consistently fudged numbers in the past, putting out exaggerated figures to give the impression of traction for a movement that demonstrably lacks it). He pledged to back Pakistan to the fullest in the event of any future tensions with Bharat. He heaped praise on Pakistan Army chief Asim Munir, the same officer who, after Bharat’s Operation Sindoor in May 2025, was promoted to Field Marshal by the Pakistani government for his role in the conflict. A designated terrorist, operating out of New York, cheering a Pakistani general from a Karachi press club, Pannun promised to stand with an adversarial state against Bharat. One must ask: who precisely is Pannun speaking for? The answer is not the Sikh community. The referendum in itself carries no significance whatsoever. SFJ held the first phase of its unofficial and non-binding referendum exercise in London in October 2021. Since then, it has conducted similar theatrics in Canada, Switzerland and Australia, each time claiming record numbers that no independent body has verified. Not one government has moved a single step towards recognising outcome. The reason is structural given that international law’s right to self-determination applies to peoples under colonial domination or foreign military occupation. Bharat’s Sikhs meet neither criterion. They are full citizens of the world’s largest democracy, represented at every level of Bharatiya state from Parliament to judiciary, armed forces to highest office on the land. The legal and philosophical scaffolding for the farcical Khalistan referendum does not exist anywhere in serious jurisprudence. What SFJ produces instead is theatre, elaborate, expensive and entirely hollow. Punjab’s own ballot boxes deliver most decisive verdict. The 2022 Punjab Assembly elections saw Aam Aadmi Party win 92 of 117 seats, majority 79 per cent on an agenda of governance, farmers’ welfare, and electricity. The demand for a separate Sikh homeland did not feature in that mandate. The trauma of

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Dismantling Hindutva: Unfinished Balkanisation of Bharat!

Vinod Kumar Shukla Push to break up Hindus is not a standalone debate; it reflects a broader, coordinated effort to reshape the civilisational identity of Bharat. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, proponent of two-nation theory started Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College in Aligarh in 1875 that evolved to Aligarh Muslim University in 1920. It took just 66 years for the university to turn into an arsenal of Muslims and students as its best soldiers. This is what Mohammad Ali Jinnah told students of the university in March 1941. Under Jinnah’s tutelage, a committee of writers from All India Muslim League was constituted with Jamil Uddin Ahmed, a teacher at AMU as its convener to bring out ‘Pakistan Literature Series’ to push for a separate homeland for Muslims. The importance that Muslim League gave to AMU students can be discerned from the fact that ‘Muslim University Muslim League’ was given the status of a separate unit. The target was obviously Hindus and the project was to seek a separate land for Muslims. In this backdrop, AMU or any other institution seeking to ‘Dismantle Hindutva’ or hold campaigns or seminars on hateful discourse like ‘Annihilate Hinduism’ should not come as a surprise. It’s part of a larger design. Through these campaigns, unfinished Balkanisation project of India seem to be pursued rampantly. Under the guise of ‘freedom of speech and expression’ and hiding behind hyperbolic academic jargons, a section of people not only target multi- millennia old ‘way of life’ Hindutva but dog-whistle against the faith they practice. There seems to be a systemic onslaught from outside Bharat and within through corporate funding mechanisms. Exploiting faultlines within Hindu society seem to be the way to go. Several educational institutions like AMU have become a tool to propagate anti-Hindu narrative and now technology has come handy to amplify these messages across platforms. A sari-clad man with beautiful ear pieces on a poster with ‘Annihilate Hinduism’ in the background at Azim Premji University went viral on social media last week. Some claim that the poster was old. But that is irrelevant as such campaigns surface periodically with new plans. Otherwise how does one explain Tamil Nadu Progressive Writers and Artists Association’s ‘Sanatana Abolition Conference’ on September 2, 2023. The event was graced by then minister in Tamil Nadu government Udhayanidhi Stalin, son of M K Stalin. Udayanidhi equated Sanatana Dharma to “dengue” and “malaria”, calling for its complete ‘eradication’. This extreme Hindumisia is institutionalized and such events happen routinely at institutions like Ashoka University, O P Jindal Global University, a few IITs and even some central universities. There is another set of institutions like AMU, Jamia Millia Islamia, Osmania University and Jadavpur University where ‘a reform agenda’ to ‘Sanatan dharma’ is articulated. Can such reforms be pursued say with Muslims or Christians? Palestinian [Hamas] terrorists were glorified in November 2023 at IIT Bombay during an online talk delivered by radical Leftists. Ashoka University witnessed anti-Hindu hate speech when students demanding caste census and reservation raised slogans like “Brahmin – Baniyawaad Murdabad”. In February 2024, a programme, “Ram Mandir: A Farcical Project of Brahmanical Hindutva Fascism” was held at O P Jindal University. A group which goes by Revolutionary Students League claimed that Pran Pratishtha Ceremony at Ayodhya Ram Temple on January 22, 2024, exposed “the inherent violence and anti-people nature of the Brahmanical Hindutva fascist state”. Global push on “Dismantling Global Hindutva” (DGH) is equally strong and gets a big pat from their friends in India and vice versa. The DGH campaign was a three-day online academic conference in September 2021 seeking to mobilize scholars from dozens of US and other universities. These self-styled scholars were to examine Hindutva as a political ideology. Hindu advocacy groups labelled the campaign as Hinduphobic which was backed by assorted forums in universities including Harvard, Stanford, Princeton, and Columbia. Employees at Tata Consultancy Service (TCS) were allegedly found to be involved in ‘Love Jihad’ and conversion activities was the unstated agenda of ‘Ghazwa e Hind’. Azim Premji University, whose parent company is Wipro, ran a campaign to annihilate Hinduism.  But, the university claimed that it did not host any event titled ‘Annihilate Hinduism,’ explaining that offending images came from a talk on ‘Politics of Emotions’ and were taken out of context. Employees of IT behemoths, whether shouting slogans to Annihilate Hindutva or involving in conversion by deceit and management turning a blind eye on the cases of targeting Hindus, smacks of conspiracy at certain level. It’s also clear that conversion by any means is part of ‘Annihilate Sanatan’ agenda. ‘Smash Brahmanical [Hindutva] Patriarchy is universal woke symbol of modernity and liberation as former CEO of X (the then Twitter) Jack Dorsey posed with a group of journalists, activists and writers during his 2019 visit to Bharat. These activists held placards that read “Smash Brahmanical Patriarchy”. Institutionalizing dismantling of Hindutva is getting bigger with institutes like Azim Premji University, AMU, Ashoka, TCS, Accenture and Tech Mahindra besides many foreign institutions becoming the hotspots. Universities like JNU celebrate demons like Mahishasura just to mock at Hindu deities like Goddess Durga. In several institutions students pursuing social sciences get roped in for anti-Hindu propaganda. These incidents revolve around insults heaped on Hindu deities, portraying Hindu traditions negatively and academic discussions that are blatantly biased. IIT Bombay students staged a play titled “Raahovan” in 2024 that was derogatory and portraying characters in the Ramayana vulgarly. In a PhD entrance exam question paper of 2024, IIT Bombay asked students to discuss if “Hindutva is hegemonic or counter-hegemonic.” A faculty member in humanities department of IIT Delhi told a foreign media outlet in 2023 that future of India would be without Hinduism. A conference at IIT Delhi faced intense backlash for promoting one-sided, anti-Hindu narratives and western critical race theory. IIT Gandhinagar has been in news for its disproportionate focus on Islam-related topics while holding anti-Hindu viewpoints. A campaign initiated by a pseudonymized user alleged that a project named “DeepFaith,” described as an AI-powered Islamic research initiative

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RSS in US: Civilizational Bridge @100

Without losing Bharatiya identity, diaspora can become vital link with host nation by demonstrating its complete commitment. Arun Anand Commemorating its centennial, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh has begun a serious conversation with a bevy of stakeholders in the West especially the United States and Europe. As part of its global outreach, RSS General Secretary Dattatreya Hosabale undertook a significant visit to United States in April 2026. It’s more than a routine diaspora engagement. This tour represented a carefully crafted civilisational outreach—one that combined reflection on a hundred-year journey with a forward-looking articulation of Bharat’s intellectual and cultural role in a rapidly transforming world. At a time when global discourse is increasingly shaped by technology, geopolitics and identity debates, Hosabale’s visit sought to position the RSS not merely as an Indian organisation but as a participant in a wider philosophical conversation about humanity’s future. Civilizational Dialogue in Silicon Valley The intellectual centre piece of the visit was Hosabale’s address at Stanford University during the Thrive 2026 conference. Speaking before an audience comprising technologists, entrepreneurs and members of the Indian diaspora, he framed his intervention around a central proposition: that modern technological advancement must be guided by deeper ethical and civilisational wisdom. Drawing from Indic traditions, he argued that knowledge systems in India have historically refused to separate the spiritual from the scientific. Ancient texts, including the Upanishads, were presented not merely as theological works but as repositories of inquiry into the nature of the human mind, the cosmos, and existence itself. In this view, the fragmentation of knowledge into rigid categories science versus spirituality is a relatively recent phenomenon. Hosabale suggested that this integrated approach offers valuable insights in an age defined by artificial intelligence, ecological stress, and social inequality. He advocated what he termed a “holistic lifestyle,” contrasting it with excesses of consumerism and unchecked technological ambition. The emphasis was not on rejecting modernity, but on anchoring it within a broader ethical framework. At the heart of this framework lies the idea of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, the belief that the world is one family. Hosabale presented this not as a rhetorical flourish, but as a practical principle for navigating global fragmentation and conflict. Science, Knowledge & Civilisation A key theme that ran through his address was the need to revisit and revitalise Indic knowledge systems. Centuries of disruption particularly during protracted periods of foreign rule led to erosion and marginalisation of indigenous intellectual traditions, he averred. As a result, many scientific ideas embedded within cultural and spiritual texts were either forgotten or dismissed as superstition. Today, he argued, there is a renewed effort in India to recover and systematise this knowledge. Education, in this context, becomes central, not merely as a means of economic advancement but as a tool for reconnecting society with its intellectual heritage. Hosabale emphasised that scientific inquiry and spirituality were not opposing forces. Rather, they complement and enrich each other. Historically, scholars engaged in both domains simultaneously, integrating empirical observation with philosophical reflection. This integrated approach also carries ethical implications. He proposed that any technology intended for human welfare must be evaluated on three touchstones: economy, ecology and ethics. Technological progress that generates inequality, exploits nature or violates moral norms, he warned, ultimately undermines both society and the environment. Equally significant was his emphasis on democratization of knowledge. While knowledge production has accelerated globally, access to it remains uneven. A truly equitable world, in his view, requires insights from all civilizations that be shared widely, enabling a more balanced and inclusive global order. Redefining Diaspora Role Beyond intellectual discourse, Hosabale’s engagement with Indian diaspora carried a clear and pragmatic message. Addressing gatherings in Silicon Valley, he urged Indian-origin communities to demonstrate complete commitment to countries they inhabit. For the diaspora, he stated, contributing to progress and well-being of their host nation is basic dharma. This articulation is significant in contemporary debates around identity and belonging. Rather than encouraging a divided loyalty, Hosabale advocated a model of integration rooted in responsibility and participation. At the same time, he encouraged diaspora to remain connected to Bharat’s cultural and civilisational values. This dual identity, being fully American while retaining an Indian cultural consciousness was presented as strength rather than a contradiction. In effect, the diaspora becomes a bridge: grounded locally, yet carrying a global civilisational perspective. Path Ahead: Balancing Extremes A recurring thread throughout the visit was call for balance. Hosabale warned against dangers of an unrestrained race for technological dominance, one that prioritises speed and scale over sustainability and human well-being. He argued that traditional Indian thought offers a corrective: a worldview that emphasises harmony with nature, respect for all forms of life and an understanding of interconnectedness of existence. This perspective, he suggested, is particularly relevant in addressing contemporary challenges such as climate change and social fragmentation. The concept of “knowledge guided by wisdom” emerged as a central motif. Knowledge, when divorced from ethical judgment, can lead to arrogance and exploitation. When guided by discernment, viveka, it becomes a force for collective good. Conclusion Dattatreya Hosabale’s 2026 visit to the United States was not merely a commemorative exercise marking RSS centenary. It was an attempt to articulate a vision, one that situates Indian civilizational thought within global debates on technology, ecology and human coexistence. By engaging with Indian diaspora and intellectual communities in Silicon Valley, RSS signalled its intent to participate more actively in shaping global narratives. The emphasis on loyalty to host nations, cultural rootedness and ethical balance reflects a nuanced approach to globalisation, one that seeks integration without loss of identity. (Author is a senior journalist & columnist. He has authored more than a dozen books)

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Canada’s Bill C-9 and Its Implications for Hindus and Khalistani Extremism

With the enactment of Bill C-9 (Combatting Hate Act), Canada’s legislative stance on hate speech, extremist iconography and religious space protection underwent an important change. The law establishes penalties for intimidation at religious institutions motivated by hatred and makes it illegal to publicly display insignia associated with terrorist groups. The law is both a chance for legal protection and a test of the legitimacy of enforcement for Canada’s Hindu minority, which is dealing with an increase in temple destruction, intimidation, and hate speech related to Khalistan. The rule was passed in response to growing worries about targeted animosity toward Hindu populations, temple destruction, and radicalization of the diaspora.

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Khalistani Terror Propaganda Put Bharat, US on Edge

Free run given to SFJ that equated Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Iran’s Khamenei reflect insensitivity of US & Canada.  N. C. Bipindra Latest provocative images and videos posted on social media by Sikhs for Justice (SFJ) have triggered a controversy intersecting free speech, diaspora politics, territorial integrity, global diplomacy and international relations.  SFJ frames its posts and messages as a free speech exercise asserting democratic rights within United States. But, the content portraying Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi alongside Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei killed in airstrikes by US and Israel on February 28, 2026 is of serious concern. Such messaging not only constitutes indecency and insensitivity but crosses limits and enters the realm of hostile propaganda, incitement of violence, deliberate misinformation and intolerable provocation. US authorities, particularly President Donald Trump, who calls Modi his good friend, should not turn a blind eye to such provocative content. For New Delhi, such freedom to propagate violence against India’s elected prime minister on US soil should have potential consequences for India-US relations. To understand why the SFJ’s post and its contents are contentious and objectionable, it is important to consider both the nature of messaging and broader political context in which the proscribed terrorist organisation operates. SFJ has no ground support in India, particularly the Sikh-majority Punjab province, but it operates freely in US and neighbouring Canada with impunity. SFJ advocates balkanisation of India, in particular, creation of imaginary Khalistan, a proposed independent theocratic Sikh state carved out of only Indian territories. An illegal Khalistan map that SFJ has released in last few years conveniently ignores territories that are now part of Pakistan but were historically ruled by Sikh emperors. But, the map includes present-day Indian provinces of Punjab, Haryana, Sikh-majority areas of Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh with Shimla as its future capital. The reasons for not claiming Pakistan’s Punjab and other provinces that were part of the erstwhile Sikh kingdom’s rule are not so difficult to fathom. Trump administration and Mark Carney government must read two key research reports released by US-based Hudson Institute and Canada-based Macdonald-Laurier Institute (MLI). Hudson Institute’s ‘Destabilisation Playbook: Khalistan Separatist Activism within the US’ authored by Aparna Pande, Husain Haqqani, C. Christine Fair and others present two main arguments that warrant attention of Trump administration. The Hudson Institute’s September 2021 report calls for investigations into Khalistani groups’ activities in US noting that these were directly involved in numerous terror attacks around the world including 1985 Air India’s ‘Kanishka’ bombing that left 329 people including Canadians dead and to shed reluctance to act on intelligence provided by India. MLI’s September 2020 report authored by senior Canadian journalist Terry Milewski, titled ‘Khalistan: A Project of Pakistan’ argues that the separatist movement was designed to subvert national security of both Canada and India, a serious threat that Carney’s government should be vigilant about. Those two reports would help Western democracies that are open to understand dangers of allowing SFJ and self-styled general counsel Gurpatwant Singh Pannun to be haughty. SFJ was banned in India in 2019 for threatening its sovereignty and territorial integrity. But, US and Canada are inviting such treacherous tendencies to grow within their territory without realising that the snake they feed would come back to bite them tomorrow, if not today. Indian proscription notwithstanding, SFJ continues to hold farcical “referendums” in US, Canada United Kingdom and Australia attempting to mobilise sections of Sikh diaspora around Khalistani cause. The latest social posts along with a video shared by SFJ are controversial due to their tone, tenor and intent. Equating Modi with Ali Khamenei is a clear attempt to draw parallels between a democratically elected popular leader of India and head of a theocratic state, often regarded as adversarial to West, particularly the US. This can’t be just criticism of Indian government or simply free speech, but rather a deliberate bid to delegitimise and demonise the Indian state, its political leadership and 1.4 billion Indians before the global audience and calling for destablising India through elimination of its prime minister or overthrowing the existing regime. Hudson Institute and Macdonald-Laurier Institute reports point to “playbook” and “project” against India, its political leadership and its people. In particular, use of “India’s Khamenei Alive” slogan juxtaposed with reference to Iran’s Ali Khamenei is a calculated attempt to evoke hostility, suspicion in US to frame India as a strategic adversary of West alongside Iran. Contrasting the phrase “Iran’s Khamenei dead” with “India’s Khamenei alive” is suggestive and goes beyond political free speech and commentary. It stops short of an explicit call to assassinate Indian prime minister. It normalises the idea of dastardly outcomes that can be interpreted as endorsement or glorification which is more troubling. Such rhetoric in democratic societies may not meet strict legal threshold for incitement but is nonetheless considered irresponsible and potentially vicious. SFJ’s post escalates issue by portraying India as an “enemy” of US. This messaging contradicts reality of India-US ties that have grown into a comprehensive strategic partnership since 2007 encompassing defence cooperation, economic ties and shared strategic interests in Indo-Pacific region grounded in values common to both nations. SFJ’s narrative-building is an attempt to influence public opinion and policy discourse in the West particularly United States. This messaging is sensitive, as it weaponises diaspora activism to advance geopolitical perceptions. The objection to such content is rooted in broader pattern associated with SFJ activities. Over the years, the proscribed fringe outfit has carried on inflammatory and divisive campaigns from controversial slogans to provocative demonstrations at Khalistan-related events. Its members have defaced Hindu temples in US and attacked Indian diplomatic missions. These actions have regularly pushed the boundaries of acceptable political expression and free speech. While some such instances have drawn condemnation in host nations, they highlight the fine line between activism and provocation that governments such as Trump’s and Carney’s should be mindful of. The US may have protection for free speech under First Amendment in its Constitution, but highly offensive and objectionable messages directly incite violence and

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Did SOAS Institutionalise Hinduphobia on behalf of George Soros?

The Leicester unrest of 2022 generated a crowded and contested reporting ecosystem. By the time the SOAS commission published Better Together: Understanding the 2022 Violence in Leicester in February 2026, the evidential field already included rapid-response briefs, computational forensic analysis, fact-finding reports, media investigations, and an ongoing UK government-commissioned review. The key analytic question, therefore, is not whether the SOAS report entered a vacuum. It did not. The real question is whether it fairly integrated the prior evidential landscape, or whether it reorganised that landscape through a pre-set ideological frame. Across the pre-2026 reporting ecosystem, a striking convergence is visible. Reports issued by CIHS, NCRI, CRT/Charlotte Littlewood, and CDPHR differ in method, tone, and institutional location, yet they repeatedly arrive at two common findings. First, disinformation and influencer amplification were not incidental features of the Leicester violence; they were causal drivers in escalating tensions, shaping perceptions, and mobilising individuals towards real-world confrontation. Secondly, Hindus were not merely one community among many caught in a diffuse breakdown of cohesion. They were, in significant respects, targets of online incitement, doxxing, false attribution, intimidation, and attacks on property and religious symbols, much of which these reports attribute to Islamist factions and allied misinformation ecosystems operating in and around Leicester. This matters because media gatekeeping failed at a critical moment. The prior reports, especially NCRI, CIHS, and CRT, converge on the claim that unverified influencer narratives were elevated into mainstream discourse without sufficient due diligence. In that environment, misinformation ceased to be rhetorical noise and became operationally consequential. False claims about “RSS terrorists”, “Hindutva thugs”, or organised Hindu extremism were not simply descriptive errors; they shaped how violence was interpreted, whom authorities and media treated with suspicion, and which communities were left exposed. The result was not neutral confusion, but a reputational inversion in which Hindu victims could be reframed as presumptive aggressors. It is against that background that the SOAS commission report must be read. The report adopts the formal language of inquiry, relies on mixed methods, and includes an express statement that Open Society Foundations had no influence over its methods or findings. Yet the report was privately funded, publicly linked to a reported £620,000 OSF grant, and conducted in parallel with an already existing UK government review. In a politically charged communal context, that institutional configuration was always likely to attract scrutiny. Even if one accepts the non-interference disclaimer at face value, such statements do not settle the deeper question of whether funding relationships, institutional culture, or ideological priors shaped the report’s framing, priorities, and recommendations. The central criticism advanced in this paper is not that the SOAS report contains no useful material. On the contrary, its own descriptive sections document anti-Hindu harm in serious terms, including intimidation, attacks in Hindu neighbourhoods, and the Shivalaya Mandir incident. The problem lies elsewhere: in the report’s interpretive and policy architecture. While acknowledging anti-Hindu targeting and admitting verification limits around some claims concerning alleged Hindutva-linked organisational involvement, the report nonetheless elevates “Hindutva extremism” into the principal prescriptive concern. In doing so, it produces a structure in which Hindus are descriptively recognised as having suffered harm, yet prescriptively positioned as the primary object of suspicion and institutional management. That asymmetry is the report’s most serious flaw. A report can document harm accurately and still institutionalise bias through the categories it privileges and the remedies it recommends. In the Leicester case, the cumulative evidential landscape pointed first towards protection: countering disinformation, recognising anti-Hindu prejudice, scrutinising Islamist mobilisation, and repairing failures of media and civic response. The SOAS commission instead shifts the centre of gravity toward the ideological containment of “Hindutva”. That is not a neutral synthesis of the evidence. It is a policy reorientation with downstream consequences for safeguarding, public discourse, community recognition, and the equal treatment of Hindus in Britain. This report therefore proceeds from a narrow but important contention: the SOAS commission should not be assessed only by what it says, but by what it does institutionally. Read against the wider evidential record, it raises a serious question as to whether a privately funded, politically salient inquiry helped recast a pattern of anti-Hindu victimisation into an official-sounding framework of Hindu suspicion. If so, the issue is larger than one report. It is whether elite institutions, media ecosystems, and donor-linked inquiry structures together contributed to the normalisation of a one-sided narrative of Leicester—one with damaging implications for public trust, social cohesion, and the recognition of Hinduphobia in the United Kingdom. Prior reports and what they establish The pre-2026 report ecosystem is largely overlapping. It contains briefs, computational forensics, and fact-finding studies. The correct analytic method is to compare what each report credibly establishes, given its methods, and then evaluate whether the SOAS commission report fairly integrates that evidential landscape or reorganises it into a pre-set ideological frame. The Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies (CIHS), an independent Delhi-based think tank issued rapid-response briefs in September 2022. Its Leicester briefs highlights that organised Islamist entities and individuals targeted Leicester’s Hindu population and that over fifty Hindu properties and vehicles were damaged in targeted attacks; it further records that Leicester police refuted the kidnapping narrative, and it names Majid Freeman as a prominent misinformation disseminator. CIHS reports there after have been tested against the computational and police-referenced work in NCRI and CDPHR. The Network Contagion Research Institute (NCRI) report is the most technologically explicit computational study. It describes multi-platform data collection and applies machine learning, natural language processing, network analysis and OSINT to build a timeline of malicious narratives and mobilisation patterns. Its headline figures include that AI models detected calls for violent action on Twitter during the Leicester events, with 70% of those calls directed against Hindus and 30% against Muslims. Crucially, NCRI also states that disinformation about Hindus as “bloodthirsty and genocidal” motivated attacks by recruiting online reinforcements to real-world engagements, and it explicitly criticises mainstream outlets for failing due diligence and amplifying Majid Freeman as a “central agitator”. This is not an aesthetic

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Client State or Regional Player?

BNP’s huge victory puts a big responsibility on Tarique Rahman to reshape Bangladesh’s politics, re-balance power equations globally and rejig economic policy formulation. N. C. Bipindra The outcome of February 12, 2026, general elections marked a watershed moment in Bangladesh’s political history. It has dramatically altered balance of power and set the stage for a new era in governance. Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s (BNP) resounding victory signals not merely a change in government but reflect a deeper shift in Bangladesh’s domestic political order. With a commanding parliamentary majority in 13th Jatiya Sangsad, BNP has tromped home to power after nearly two decades in opposition. The political space once dominated by Awami League has undergone an unprecedented shift. The election is widely regarded as most competitive and consequential since political upheaval of 2024 which saw fall of long-serving Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, following mass protests and civil unrest. The absence of Awami League from electoral fray reshaped competitive landscape, effectively ending entrenched two-party rivalry that had defined Bangladeshi politics for decades. In its place, a new alignment has emerged, with BNP consolidating power while Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami got mainstreamed, strengthened its parliamentary footprint as principal opposition formation. At the centre of this political transformation stands Tarique Rahman, BNP leader, who is poised to assume the office of prime minister. His return to frontline politics after years in exile represents a dramatic personal and institutional comeback. For BNP, the electoral mandate is both a vindication of its long campaign against what it described as authoritarian rule and heavy responsibility to deliver institutional reform, economic recovery and political reconciliation. One of the most significant developments accompanying the election was approval of constitutional reforms through a parallel referendum. The amendments introduce term limits for prime minister, strengthen judicial independence and expand safeguards aimed at preventing executive overreach. These reforms are designed to address concerns about excessive concentration of power that had accumulated over past decade and a half. The referendum’s success indicates broad public appetite for systemic recalibration and democratic consolidation, reflecting a desire to prevent re-emergence of dominant-party rule. Domestically, BNP’s victory reshapes political calculus in several critical ways. First, it dismantles old Awami League–BNP binary that had structured electoral competition since the 1990s. The sidelining of the Awami League leaves a significant vacuum in secular-nationalist political space. Whether that space is eventually reoccupied by reconstituted Awami League, a new centrist force or remains fragmented will determine durability of the new political order. For now, BNP’s dominance gives it legislative freedom to pursue policy reforms without the constraints of a fragmented parliament. Second, the rise of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami as a strong opposition block introduces new ideological dynamics into parliamentary politics. Jamaat’s improved electoral performance underscores continued resonance of conservative and religiously oriented political narratives in certain regions. While BNP and Jamaat have historically cooperated tactically, the evolving relationship between them will shape legislative debates on social policy, education, socio-religious equations and governance norms. The presence of a robust Islamist opposition also complicates BNP’s balancing act between appealing to its traditional base and projecting a reformist, moderate image to urban and business constituencies. The collapse or marginalisation of smaller parties, including the once-influential Jatiyo Party highlights another structural shift. The electorate appears to have consolidated around clearer poles of power, reducing role of kingmakers and coalition brokers. This concentration of power can enhance decision-making efficiency but also raises concerns about reduced pluralism if institutional checks are not effectively maintained. The newly introduced constitutional safeguards will therefore face an early stress test under BNP stewardship. Youth participation and civic mobilisation have emerged as defining undercurrents of this electoral cycle. The protests of 2024 were largely driven by younger Bangladeshis demanding accountability, employment opportunities and an end to entrenched patronage networks. Although youth-led political platforms did not translate that energy into sweeping parliamentary gains, their influence on public discourse has been unmistakable. All major parties, including BNP were compelled to address issues such as job creation, digital governance, anti-corruption measures and institutional transparency. The durability of youth engagement will determine whether Bangladesh’s political evolution moves toward participatory reform or reverts to personality-driven politics. Economically, the new government inherits a fragile macroeconomic environment marked by inflationary pressures, currency volatility and strains in the export sector. The garment industry considered backbone of Bangladesh’s economy, experienced disruptions amid political instability. BNP has pledged to restore investor confidence, stimulate private-sector growth and reform regulatory institutions. Achieving these objectives will require careful fiscal management and sustained political stability. A decisive parliamentary majority gives the government room to legislate, but it also removes excuses for policy paralysis. Governance credibility remains a crucial question. The BNP’s previous tenure in government was marred by allegations of corruption and administrative inefficiency. To differentiate itself from the era it replaces, the party must demonstrate a tangible commitment to institutional strengthening rather than patronage redistribution. Early actions on judicial independence, anti-corruption enforcement and civil service reform will serve as signals of intent. Failure to meet heightened public expectations could rapidly erode the legitimacy conferred by the electoral mandate. The broader significance of the 12 February 12 2026 election lies in its redefinition of political legitimacy in Bangladesh. For years, electoral contests were overshadowed by boycotts, disputes and questions about inclusivity. The competitive nature of this poll and comparatively strong voter participation suggest renewed engagement with democratic processes. However, the absence of a historically dominant party complicates narratives of full inclusiveness. Long-term stability will depend on whether political competition remains open and institutionalised rather than episodic and crisis-driven. Ultimately, the 2026 election represents both an end and a beginning. It ends an era defined by prolonged single-party dominance and inaugurates a phase of recalibration in Bangladesh’s domestic politics. When Tarique Rahman assumes office as prime minister, Bangladesh’s external alignments are likely to undergo calibrated adjustments rather than abrupt reversals. Relations with India may enter a more negotiated and transactional phase. Historically, BNP has taken a more sovereignty-centric approach compared to Awami League, particularly on issues such as water sharing,

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Hindu Pogrom Under a Nobel Laureate’s Watch in Bangladesh

Ethnic Cleansing of Bangladeshi Hindus A Nobel Peace Prize is not a shield against scrutiny. Bangladesh’s post-August 2024 reality demands a hard, evidence-led assessment: violence against Hindus has escalated into a pattern that aligns with internationally recognised elements of ethnic cleansing. This is not a claim made lightly, nor is it built on rhetoric. It is grounded in documented indicators that appear repeatedly across historical cases, from the Balkans to Rwanda and the forced flight of Kashmiri Hindus. Our report, “Hindu Pogrom Under a Nobel Laureate’s Watch in Bangladesh,” examines what changed after the extra-constitutional transition that installed Muhammad Yunus as head of the interim administration. In the immediate aftermath of Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, Hindu homes and temples were specifically targeted, and minority families attempted to flee toward India. This is the first stage seen in many ethnic cleansing trajectories: a sudden collapse of security, followed by identity-targeted attacks that signal “you are not safe here.” Reuters reporting captured these early markers, including vandalism of Hindu temples and homes and attempted flight by minorities. Ethnic cleansing is defined less by slogans and more by method. The method in Bangladesh is visible through six elements. Forced displacement is the predictable output when a minority is subjected to sustained terror and sees no credible protection from the state. When families attempt to flee, when communities retreat into guarded enclaves, when daily life becomes a risk calculation, the displacement is no longer voluntary. It is coerced Violence and terror form the second element. The pattern includes killings by shooting, hacking, abduction, lynching, and arson. The purpose is not only to kill, but to send a message to all remaining members of the community. Dipu Chandra Das’s lynching and burning is an emblematic example of violence designed to intimidate, not merely to harm. Deliberate attacks on civilians are the third element. The victims are not combatants. They are teachers, traders, community leaders, elderly couples, workers, and youth. They are targeted in homes, workplaces, and transit routes, consistent with identity-based selection rather than incidental crime. In the first post-ouster phase, minority groups documented attacks on Hindu homes and temples across multiple districts, underscoring organised targeting rather than isolated incidents. Destruction of property is the fourth element, and it is a strategic tool. Burning homes, looting businesses, and desecrating temples do more than punish. They make return difficult, erase cultural presence, and collapse economic survival. These are classic “remove the population by destroying the conditions of life” tactics. Reuters recorded that hundreds of Hindu homes and businesses were vandalised and multiple temples damaged during the initial post-ouster violence. Confinement is the fifth element. Even without formal camps, a minority can be confined by fear. When communities self-restrict movement, rely on volunteer night-guards, and avoid public visibility, they are being functionally contained. This is how pressure accumulates until exit becomes the only perceived option. Systematic policy is the sixth element. Ethnic cleansing does not require a written decree. In many cases, it proceeds through the combination of organised extremist violence and state failure: weak protection, delayed response, denial of communal targeting, and persistent impunity. Here, the core accountability question is state responsibility. Minority groups have accused the interim government of failing to protect Hindus, and the Yunus administration has denied those allegations. Denial, in the presence of repeated identity-targeted attacks, is not neutrality. It is an enabling posture. This is where the Yunus interim administration becomes central. The issue is not whether Yunus personally directs each assault. The issue is whether the state under his leadership has fulfilled its duty to prevent, protect, investigate, prosecute, and deter identity-based violence. When the outcome is repeated killings, recurring temple attacks, widespread property destruction, and the steady tightening of fear around a minority community, responsibility does not stop at the street-level perpetrator. It rises to the governing authority. The report also examines the role of Islamist forces operating in the current environment. Independent reporting notes that hardline Islamist actors have become more visible and influential since the fall of Hasina. This matters because ethnic cleansing campaigns typically require both ideological mobilisation and operational impunity: a narrative that dehumanises the target, and a system that fails to punish the perpetrators. Bangladesh is at a decision point. It can either reassert protection for all citizens and rebuild the rule of law, or drift toward a majoritarian model where minorities survive only as tolerated remnants. The world has seen this script before. The lesson from Rwanda and the Balkans is that early warning indicators are not “political noise.” They are the architecture of atrocity. What is required now is not performative condemnation. It is measurable action: robust protection for minority localities, transparent investigations, prosecutions that reach organisers and inciters, disruption of extremist mobilisation networks, and independent monitoring that makes denial impossible. Without these steps, the pattern described in our report will continue to harden. The Nobel label does not change the facts on the ground. The responsibility of the interim government is to stop the trajectory. If it cannot, it must be treated internationally as enabling an ethnic cleansing process by omission, denial, and impunity.

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Khalistani-Jamaat Joint Operations amid Minority Killings in Bangladesh

Situational Analysis: Khalistani-Jamaat Joint Operations amid Minority Killings in Bangladesh

Khalistani support for Islamist-linked violence and minority killings in Bangladesh, and the appearance of anti-Hindu and anti-India sloganeering outside the Bangladesh High Commission in London, reiterate that this is not simply a local Western “public order” problem. It is foreign territory being utilised as an outward-facing theatre for a Pakistan-rooted, anti-India orientation, where street spectacle and digital amplification do the work of deniable pressure.

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A Civilisational Reawakening in 1943

A Civilisational Reawakening in 1943

CIHS Desk On the morning of 30 December 1943, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose fulfilled his vow, he hoisted the tricolour at Port Blair. This was no ritual gesture but a declaration that the soul of Bharat had arisen. Under Bose’s leadership of the Azad Hind Fauj, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands were liberated from British colonial occupation. The solemn Cellular Jail, long the symbol of British cruelty, now looked on as its jailors empire began to crumble. The flag fluttering at Netaji Stadium (then the Gymkhana Ground) proclaimed that India’s freedom was no longer a distant dream, it was being claimed here and now. In mid-1943, Bose had already proclaimed the Azad Hind Sarkar, India’s first provisional government in Singapore. He made clear that this was not a symbolic cabinet-in-exile, but a strategic, ideological and military assertion of India’s right to self-rule. The INA raised its own treasury and even issued stamps and currency under Bose’s tricolour, signaling real statehood. India’s freedom struggle had transformed into a true war of liberation. Bose explicitly rejected petitions and half-measures: “India would fight for her freedom not through pleas or petitions, but through armed struggle and sacrifice,” he declared. In his words, the Azad Hind Government was “the Government of the free Indians… representing the will of the entire Indian people”. This fiery claim of sovereignty stunned the colonial occupiers. By late 1943, even a Japanese handover made Port Blair and nearby islands the first piece of Indian soil “freed from British rule.” On 30 December itself, Bose stood before a crowd of freedom-loving Andamanis. With pride and resolve he unfurled the tricolour at the very spot where countless patriots like Vinayak Damodar Savarkar had once been tortured. The effect was electric. In a speech charged with the fervor of Bharat Mata, Bose invoked the martyrs of the Cellular Jail, comparing its gates opening to the fall of the Bastille in France, and consecrated the day as one of liberation. He renamed the Andaman’s as  Shaheed Dweep (Martyr’s Island) and the Nicobar’s as Swaraj Dweep (Self-Rule Island), dedicating them to the memory of India’s sacrificed heroes. This was more than pageantry, the tricolour rising there “symbolised not just the freedom of the islands but the resurgence of India’s spirit”. The colonial empire understood the message: Indians had moved from petitions to power, and Britain’s colonial story was broken. Bose’s act proclaimed that India would seize its destiny “through determination, sacrifice, disciplined action and uncompromising courage,” not through British concession. 30 December 1943 therefore must be remembered not as a footnote, but as a defining assertion of Bharat’s civilizational will. On that day, Netaji, born of a family steeped in patriotism,  rekindled the ancient flame of Bharat’s freedom. The raising of the tricolour at Port Blair stands as a witness that India’s independence was not granted but earned, seized by heroes who embodied the country’s spiritual resilience. This is the legacy of that day, a story of national awakening that resonates with the soul of Bharat.

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